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ABSTRACT
This dissertation was a 23-month comparative case study of Y’en a Marre, a civic
organizing movement based in Dakar, Senegal and FESCI, a student organization in
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. This study investigates the ways in which these organizations
view Hip-Hop and its pedagogical utility as a means to encourage socialization, promote
authenticity, and foster leadership. Through Hip-Hop, young people are drawn to a
cultural expression that reflects the social, economic, and political realities of their lives
speaking to them in a language and manner they understand. This is critical given subSaharan Africa’s tremendous youth population and their potential impact on the
continent.
Utilizing a transnégritude theoretical framework, this study situates Hip-Hop
pedagogy and epistemic disobedience as vehicles of expression impacting language,
identity, and engagement as a means to decolonize and liberate from dominant narratives.
To articulate Hip-Hop pedagogy as an effective tool for engagement, a comparative case
study methodology was employed study to consider the macro, that is the social, political
and historical dynamics that have shaped and influenced young people, education and
engagement; and the micro—the multilayered lived realities of young people in West
Africa.
By focusing on young people as an asset, this study considers young people to be
at the helm of social change, playing a crucial role in curtailing corruption, migration,
and political instability. The influence and notoriety of organizations such as Y’en a
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Marre and FESCI, illustrate the impact of a Hip-Hop pedagogy that not only heals but
promotes leadership, ownership, and autonomy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In June 2011, thousands of young men and women shouting “enough is enough!”
marched in Dakar to protest the president’s illegal bid for a third term. Citing mass
unemployment, limited infrastructure, and a violation of the rule of law, organizations
such as Y’en à Marre (fed up) rallied citizens through town hall meetings, makeshift civic
classes, and Hip-Hop music and activism to engage the population in order to recognize
their political strength as a collective unit (Lambert, 2016; Gueye, 2013). In March 2012,
president Wade stepped down and admitted that he had indeed been defeated in run-off
elections. Democracy, it seemed, had prevailed and young people throughout subSaharan Africa were emboldened to challenge their respective leaders who had
continuously overlooked the constitution to govern as they saw fit. Youth protests
erupted in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo; with
young people sharing their support, their strategies, and their willfulness to fight against
social injustice.
In Côte d’Ivoire, university students fed up with broken promises including
scholarships, student housing, and transportation, took on the mantle to challenge the
university and later government officials. FESCI (Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de
Côte d’Ivoire, or the Student Federation of Côte d’Ivoire), was initially created in 1990 in
“response to repression by President Houphouet-Boigny’s government, a failure of
dialogue to address the increasing demand for political freedom and rights in Côte
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d’Ivoire” (Sany, 2010, p. 9). Claiming to be apolitical, they carried out their struggle
outside the university campus to challenge the government on political and social issues,
organizing strikes and protests (p. 9). From Dakar, to Ouagadougou, and now Abidjan, it
seems that young people in West Africa are at the helm of a monumental sociopolitical
change.
Sub-Saharan Africa has one of the fastest growing youth populations in the world.
Recognizing the role young people are beginning to play in social and political activism,
it is evident that young people can stimulate innovation, but they can also be a
destabilizing force (Lambert, 2016; Abbink, 2005; Strong and Ossei-Owusu, 2014). A
confluence of factors has contributed to a disgruntled generation of youth facing mass
unemployment, limited infrastructure and resources that Senegalese journalist and
organizer Fadel Barro frames the dilemma facing youth today as, “Y’en a Marre or Boko
Haram,” civic organizing or radical extremism.1 Given the region’s young population
and its development struggles, young people reside in a delicate imbalance that could and
has affected the sociopolitical make-up of the country and the region. Yet, through HipHop, youth organizations appear to have found a powerful, expressive tool to engage
effectively with disaffected youth (Gueye, 2013; Lambert, 2016; Clark, 2018; Schumann,
2012). My research project seeks to investigate the role of Hip-Hop as a pedagogical tool
as a means for challenging majoritarian epistemologies of disobedience, schooling, and
engagement.
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are in the midst of this critical organizing or
radicalizing conundrum. A French-speaking and predominantly Muslim country, Senegal
stands as one of the few stable countries in West Africa. It is surrounded by politically
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tumultuous states such as Mali, Mauritania, and Guinea. Additionally, mass
unemployment and limited options lead many to question the necessity of formal
schooling. This leads to over 50% of young people eschewing post-basic education and
who are susceptible to recruitment (UNESCO, 2016). Is it no wonder that Y’en a Marre
(YEM) was so eagerly adopted by young people in Dakar who felt invisible and
voiceless? I contend and show through my research that a Hip-Hop pedagogy can be
useful as a counter to formal schooling, a tool for civic engagement, and identity
formation.
Côte d’Ivoire too, faces a complex social and political quagmire for its young
population. Also a French speaking West African nation, Côte d’Ivoire has a mixed
Muslim and Christian population that is heavily divided between the North and South.
Young people must navigate massive unemployment with limited skills and education.
When young people face a lack of opportunity, they may feel compelled to flee in search
of safety and better opportunities therefore implicating nations within these social
transitions. Those who stay, are left to navigate limited social services or in the case of
child-gangs, resort to violence as a means of survival. As Ivoirian sociologist Francis
Akindès concludes, petty crime has been legitimized as a source of economic activity for
child-gangs and, if given the option, many would join jihadist groups if recruited (Adélé,
2016, para. 2). This is why youth organizations are so relevant in the Ivorian context.
What this study shows is that when managed and organized by young activists, youth
movements that incorporate global education, Hip-Hop, and political activism are eagerly
and quickly accepted by those they feel share their same social and political frustrations.
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Though there is considerable discussion concerning the purpose of education
(McMannon, 1997), education in Africa has generally been seen as a key to national
development (Kanu, 2007 and Woolman, 2001). In this regard, the role of education
goes far beyond socialization and instruction but instead to build or rebuild—in the case
of postcolonial African countries—a country’s national identity, infrastructure, and
prosperity. Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, like many African countries, endured a forced
transition from an indigenous to a colonial educational system. Much later, the two
countries, like much of the continent, fought for an emancipated education system, which
placed a specific emphasis on the political and social autonomy of the continent. It is
through this political and social autonomy that I wish to examine civic education, identity
formation, and socialization. Echoing Ladson-Billings (2004) and Spindler (1987),
Levinson (2011), contends that, “much, if not all education is citizenship education” (p.
280). As such, I seek to understand whether and if so how a pedagogy influenced by
Hip-Hop can be an effective tool utilized to transmit sociocultural norms, challenge the
status quo, police social systems, and effect change within a society.
For a lot of young people, Hip-Hop reflects the social, economic, political and
cultural realities of their lives speaking to them in a language and manner they
understand; or as Bridges (2001) puts it, Hip-Hop is a “term used to describe the
collective experience, modes of thinking, epistemologies of urban youth” (p. 326;
Aldridge & Stewart, 2005, p. 190). Hip-Hop pedagogy is thus a “way of authentically
and practically incorporating the creative elements of hip-hop into teaching,” that is
rapping, djing, mcing, breaking, graffiti, and the philosophies of consciousness and social
justice, and inviting students to “have a connection with the content while meeting them
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on their cultural turf by teaching to, and through, their realities and experiences”
(Johnson, 2017).
Due to its longevity and its pertinence to youth worldwide, Hip-Hop cannot be
dismissed as “merely a passing fad” or something that will run its course. Though
vilified in certain fields and broader society, Hip-Hop can be a critical pedagogical tool
that builds on what Bridges calls a “critical cultural movement,” that is, “a critical
epistemology or a theoretical tool that challenges our beliefs about teaching, shapes our
conception of the function of informs our understandings of the qualities of effective
educators” (p. 327). bell hooks (1994) calls this an “engaged pedagogy,” to teach in a
way that nurtures the soul of the student; what Freire (2000) called conscientizacao. As
such, Hip-Hop as a pedagogical tool, can be used as a challenge to schooling, an
epistemic disobedience, and a source of transformation.
My research project investigates how Hip-Hop is and can be used as an effective
pedagogical tool to engage and organize youth exposed to social inequality, illegal
migration, gangs, and extremism. Through my examination of Y’en a Marre and FESCI,
I will discuss Hip-Hop, Hip-Hop pedagogy, and the sociopolitical complexities that
impact young people. Given ongoing discussions with the overwhelming idle youth
population and the encroaching threat of extremism in neighboring countries, young
people are a critical focus in the present and future political structure of West Africa. To
this end I ask the following research question:
With the intention to further understand Hip-Hop culture as a pedagogical counter
to infrastructural lack of, how does Hip-Hop culture engender civic engagement
and civic education in Senegalese and Ivorian youth?
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Context
Education has played a long standing role historically in the continent of Africa.
From the ancient philosophers of Egypt to the great research centers of Timbuktu and
Jenne, which served to educate and inform much of western Europe, it is evident that
education has been a major influencing factor in African history. As famed Senegalese
scholar, Cheikh Anta Diop (1997) writes, “it is impossible to stress all that the world,
particularly the Hellenistic world, owed to the Egyptians” and, as he later notes, the
Ethiopians or Nubians of east Africa (p. 230). This view and respect for education would
dramatically change during the colonial period as education “was changed to meet the
goals of the colonizers” (Pagano, 1999, p. 3). Thus the status education had received in
the region and much of the continent, significantly deteriorated and evolved to benefit an
elite population.
Education in Senegal
The intersections of education, religion, engagement, and identity are intricately
interwoven in Senegal’s history. From Cheikh Hamidou Kane’s (1961) famous tale of a
young man educated in both Qur’anic and French school, struggling between his dual
identities in L’aventure Ambiguë, to Ousmane Sembène’s tale of protest against
colonialism in Les bouts de bois de Dieu, to La grève de bàttu, Aminata Sow Fall’s
objective critique on the role of religion and government in Senegalese life, the country
has evolved within a unique stance marrying religion, education, youth, and protest that
engendered a unique sociopolitical makeup within West Africa. Navigating the history
of education in Senegal will provide a lens to examine the evolution and perception of
education in Senegal.
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The end of colonialism, brought with it greater expectations for many African
countries to remove all signs of foreign domination and push toward modernization.
Universities were supposed to produce experts in all fields as a counterbalance to colonial
expatriates. They were also expected to restore African languages and culture and to stop
the curricular dependency from the West. Economic transformation of the continent, it
was argued, was to follow from university education (Banya and Elu, 2001, 5).
The United Nations designated the period of 1960-1970 the “Development
Decade for Developing Countries,” during which concentrated efforts would be made "to
lessen the gap, to speed up the process of modernization, to release the majority of
mankind from crippling poverty, to mitigate the tension and hostility which must flow
from the world's vast inequalities in wealth” (Harbison and Myers, 1964, 50). It was
clear that African states had a long way to go in order to build towards an economic
stable future. And in many ways, several countries experienced tremendous growth postindependence.
However, the economic crises of the 1980s, critically impaired the political and
economic strength of many African states. Many were forced to seek foreign aid for
economic relief. Banya and Elu (2001) write, “The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and other international institutions…attached the reduction of public expenditure and the
commitment to a free market as the conditions for major loans and structural adjustment
programs” (p. 16). Thus, spending on public services such as health care, infrastructure,
and education was severely cut to allow for external aid from (mostly) western countries
and/or agencies. Since then, the region has been stuck under a vicious cycle of
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dependency that persists to this day, which is continuously mirrored within the
continent’s education systems.
In Senegal, the French influenced educational system plays a significant role in
the social and political makeup of the country. The structure of the formal education
system in Francophone Africa closely resembles the French system with its three general
stages: primary, secondary, and higher education. Even though the overall curriculum of
French schools has been adapted to fit within local realities, the overall system of
education is still highly similar to the French system. In 2004, for example, the
Senegalese government changed laws concerning compulsory education which was
extended from 6-16 years old. (Gönsch & Graef, 2011, p. 5). This was also similarly
done in Côte d’Ivoire under the first president Houphouet-Boïgny and later under the
Gbagbo administration. Briefly, primary education begins around age 6/7 years old and
continues for six years. At the end of primary school, students take an official nationwide
exam that includes several written and oral exams to obtain the Certificate of Completed
Primary School Education (CFEE) in order to enter secondary school.
There are two cycles that makeup secondary schools with mandatory exams at the
end of each cycle. The lower cycles last four years and end with exams for the Diploma
for Completed Lower Secondary Education (BFEM) at around 16 years old. Those who
pass the BFEM are then promoted to secondary school which can be attended between 13 years depending on the type of qualification. At the end of upper secondary, students
take the Baccalauréat (BAC), which is equivalent to a high school diploma (p. 5).
The current school curricula have been specifically designed for Senegal unlike
previous curricula that were developed for Europe and later transferred to Senegal and
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other francophone African countries. In their “Education for All” case study in Senegal,
Gönsch & Graef (2011), state that teachers have confirmed that the curriculum is “well
adapted to the realities in the country,” consisting of math, science, French, health care,
hygiene, and protection of the environment (p. 5). However, teachers have voiced
complaints over the inability to complete all the proposed lessons in the curriculum and
language deficiencies. They write, “since children typically only speak their maternal
tongues when they enter school, the first year at school is used to teach them French and
basic Calculus” (p. 6). Along with deficient equipment, large class sizes, multi-grade
teaching, poor school conditions, and the financial burden of schooling, it is evident why
daara, quranic schools, are considered the most attractive choice especially for those in
low income households. Yet, as Gönsch & Graef note, those who complete French
school BACs have access to university in Africa and/or abroad, an opportunity rarely
afforded to those with a Qur’anic education.
Marabouts argue that the attainment of a daara BAC prepares one for any and all
professions. This shared understanding mixed with the perceived wealth and status of
marabouts, lead many to eschew post-basic or post-secondary education. More
importantly, the underlying issue of unemployment and urbanization continuously hinder
educational pursuits, especially within the formal sector. As such, youth are prone to
forego formal schooling and its expenses with the more collective daara as a means to
reinforce religious piety. Here in lies the ensuing dilemma, can Hip-Hop assist in
challenging perceptions of schooling?
Despite Senegal’s commitment to accessible education, in practice, social and
political constrictions have demeaned educational initiatives. Post-independence, Senegal
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adopted a new educational project known as “école nouvelle” in the 1980s to “move
schools out of their former colonial patterns toward a system with a more truly African
character, better adapted to current national development needs” (Pagano, 1999, p. 14).
Today, Senegal has attempted to align its educational projects within the current
international framework as a means to promote “Education for All.” Through the United
Nations’ Millennium Development Goals, enrolment in primary school in Senegal
increased from 57% in 2000 to 82% in 2015 and secondary school enrollment increased
from 15% to 49% in 2015 (UNESCO, 2016).
Currently, the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), of which
ensuring equal and inclusive quality education is a major goal (Goal 4), is attempting to
improve access to education (UNESCO, 2005). As of yet, continuous K-12 attendance is
still low; only 50% of boys and 49% of girls manage to attend secondary education; even
fewer finish (UNESCO, 2012). The literacy rate, though one of the highest in West
Africa, is still relatively low at 55%. Lastly, the unemployment rate among young people
is estimated at 48% (UNESCO, 2012). The implications for the Senegalese population
and specifically the youth population are huge. Much work must be done in encouraging
and bridging school attendance and social and political engagement. Hip-Hop, can
therefore be the tool needed to engage youth and influence their social perceptions.
Young people in West Africa, and Senegal specifically are a social political asset
(Maina, 2012). They face significant challenges—unemployment, limited skills and
education, and exposure to extremism—and yet are an opportunity source who can
challenge and shape the future of the continent (Maina, 2012; House Foreign Affairs
Committee, 2020; AYS, 2020). Recognizing their importance is necessary in order to
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develop policies and programs that can aid in increasing engagement and encourage
positive perceptions to education.
Cote d’Ivoire and education
Similar to Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire too, is a country that faced a similar French
colonial trajectory, however that is where the similarities end. Whereas Senegal has a
majority Muslim population, Côte d’Ivoire has a mixed Muslim (42% of the population)
and Christian (33.9% of the population) population, with a large immigrant population
that is ~25% of the population, and a diverse ethnic makeup (Sany, 2010, p. 4; Banegas et
al., 2010). Cote d’Ivoire’s population tends to be divided between the Muslim, agrarian,
immigrant populated north and the predominantly Christian, wealthy population in the
south. In sum, the country’s internal tensions arise from the country’s immigrant,
religious, and economic division that has been used as tools to justify conflict and
division (Miran-Guyon, 2006 and Onishi, 2000). Navigating the country’s colonial past
and its multilayered present, I was confronted with the opportunity to provide nuance to
Côte d’Ivoire’s educational system and inform us on whether and how Hip-Hop is
utilized to encourage engagement.
Since Côte d’Ivoire gained independence in 1960, Ivoirians have placed a high
value on education. During his tenure, former President Laurent Gbagbo initiated the
politique de refondation (policy of renewal), a process that overhauled the educational
system in Côte d’Ivoire to “give every child in Cote d’Ivoire the chance to go to school”
(Sany, 2010, p. 2). During this time, education became a symbol of Ivorian identity and
status, a factor that would play a role during the coup d’état and eventual civil war.
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Though Gbabgo’s initiatives had made gains, the limited gains adopted became tools
used to stoke oppositional attacks against the government.
However, the economic crises of the 1980s brought on by “deteriorating terms of
trade and fierce competition between economies, increasing the concentration of capital
giving conglomerates the power to determine prices and economic policies” led to the
Bretton Woods institutions that led to the imposition of fiscal restrictions called
Structural Adjustment Programs in sub-Saharan Africa leading to a dramatic decrease in
spending for social programs such as education and health (Oyeniran, 2017, p. 284).
Whereas the education budget was 45% of the national budget between 1960 and 1980, it
decreased to 4.4% between 1980 and 1990, and since the civil war it has recovered to
25% of the spending, though still half of what it used to be after independence (p. 284).
The limited lack of state support and the general struggle for Islamic school
students to enter the formal sector’s job market left them “confined to precarious
informal activities and oftentimes unemployment…a majority of juvenile offenders and
drug addicts…were former madrasa students” (Miran-Guyon, 2006, p. 19). Reformists
therefore developed a new type of Islamic school modeled after Christian schools. These
schools named, “conventional confessional Islamic school” adopted French as the
language of instruction, Islamic and Arabic lessons were optional, and students were not
forcibly Muslim (p. 20). Though there seemed to be educational reforms and
advancement made in the late 20th century, the civil war starting in 2002, severely
handicapped if not halted the education system all-together, encouraged the militarization
of young people on both sides and changed young people’s perception on schooling.
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Prior to the civil war, school attendance was already unequal between the north
and the south. In 2001, school attendance in the north averaged five years while it was
fifteen years in the south. Literacy rates were 30% in the north and 70% in the south
(Hamer, 2011, p. 11). To explain the low achievement rates in the north, Hamer found
that most students stopped going to school due to a lack of means, loss of interest in
general education, to generate an extra source of familial income, feeling too old to
continue going to school, or educational failure (such as repeating grades) (p. 12). Many
of these young people made great targets for mobilization during the war either through
the government, rebels or their own causes. During and after the war, most recruits took
up arms as a means for self-protection and others took up arms because there was
“nothing else to do” because in the hardest hit regions, economic activities had either
stopped or slowed down so young people “pragmatically decided to join an armed group
to have something to do and to at least be fed” (p. 16).
The civil war resulted in a large number of out-of-school children and youth left
to their own devices. (Sany, 2010, p. 6). The massive displacement caused by the war
caused at least 700,000 students out of school, including university students in some
northern cities who had to flee rebel-controlled zones. Many more were not able to leave
and thus saw their education interrupted leading some to argue that “with this many outof-school children and youth Cote d’Ivoire may be developing a ready pool of malleable
youth who could contribute to further instability” (p. 6).
Past economic crises and the civil war of 2002 have had adverse effects on the
social fabric of Ivorian life. Sany (2010) writes that besides intensifying economic
disparities and ethnic differences, which have impacted access, quality resources, and
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organization, “the conflict has had a more subtle and pernicious sociopsychological
impact on individuals, particularly on students” (p. 7). According to Sany, the failure of
the state to provide educational opportunity to young people, has “undermined their selfesteem” leaving them vulnerable to criminal behavior, violence, and drug use (p. 7).
Even before the war in 2002, the country was already struggling with education
initiatives and goals set under the Education for All (EFA) movement. Though significant
gains had been made by 2001, research shows that the literacy rate, primary, and
secondary school attendance still remain low. Currently the youth literacy rate (those
between 15 and 24 years old) is 58%, while the adult literacy rate (those older than 25
years old) is 56.9% (UNICEF, 2019). Though primary school enrollment has increased
dramatically, up to 95%, continuous primary school attendance stagnates at 68% with a
significant drop in secondary attendance to 28%. Given that 60% of the country’s
population is under 25 years old (World Bank, 2017), what measures can be done to
ensure that out-of-school young people are engaged?
Given the role of education, the popularity of Hip-Hop music, and the rise of civic
engagement among youth, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are perfect case studies for
analyzing the role Hip-Hop can play as a tool for youth engagement and organizing in the
region. Whereas the proliferation of Hip-Hop in Senegal is firmly entrenched and has
been popular for a time, Côte d’Ivoire has developed a nascent Hip-Hop population
equally attracting and empowering young people. This study therefore looks at the
intersections of Hip-Hop, sociopolitics, and youth education, as a potential pedagogical
tool for engagement and political activism among young populations. Senegal and Cote
d’Ivoire will provide a rich, nuanced, and challenging landscape to assess how young
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people have navigated division, new political and economic power structures, civil war
and social inequality. Hip-Hop could potentially be that tool.
Literature and theoretical framework
This study is based on a transnégritude (Touré, forthcoming) theoretical
framework that expounds on the shared struggles of colonized people throughout the
diaspora, which creates an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983) of oppressed
peoples that can elicit engagement or mobilization. Within this framework, I argue that
utilizing Mignolo’s (2003; 2009) epistemic disobedience provides a necessary
understanding of how engagement is thus employed and utilized by young people. My
discussion focuses on literature centering Hip-Hop pedagogy as is discussed by Alim
(2011), Akom (2009), Hill (2009; 2013), Adjapong (2017), and Buffington & Day (2018)
among others. I also consider the ways in which Hip-Hop vis-a-vis civic education and
epistemic disobedience is used as a vehicle of expression that impacts language, identity,
and engagement as a means to de-link and liberate from dominant narratives. I then
define youth and discuss the social political contexts young people navigate in West
Africa. This allows for a nuanced examination that forefronts the voices and experiences
of young people as one of the tools to determine policy changes and local action.
Research design - Comparative Case Study
I utilized Vavrus and Bartlett’s (2017) Comparative Case Study (CCS) to engage
with decolonizing research, as it contributes to a better understanding of the sociopolitical
nuances of Senegalese and Ivorian history, their educational policies, and the role
music/Hip-Hop has played in influencing young people. This framework allows for a
critical glance at challenging majoritarian narratives while highlighting the lived realities
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of colonized populations. Given the unique phenomena evidenced in Abidjan and Dakar,
CCS proves to be a useful methodology to contextualize how a group of young people
have utilized a derided art form to teach, mobilize, and engage. Vavrus and Bartlett
(2017) Glesne (2011) and Bray and Thomas (1995) note that researchers should approach
case study as a means of contextualizing a unique event or phenomenon to the larger
social systems at play. As such, data for this research was collected over 23 months in
Dakar, Senegal and Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. The data was heavily influenced by
ethnographic methods and came from interviews, participant observation, field notes,
surveys, and document analysis to provide what Vavrus and Bartlett (2017) call a
transversal analysis that combines the macro, that is the social, political and historical
dynamics that have shaped and influenced young people, education and engagement; and
the micro—the multilayered lived realities of young people.
Contributions
In general, research that looks at Hip-Hop pedagogy, engagement, and young
people in Africa, usually concerns discussions surrounding rap as a musical tool to
connect to English literature (Kelly, 2013; Pardue, 2004; Emdin, 2008), as a means to
equate engagement with violence (Oosterom, 2018; Tsuma, 2012; Cubitt, 2012 ), or by
viewing young people on the continent as a ticking time bomb rather than an opportunity
source as Krystal Strong suggests (House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2020; Abbink,
2005; Lambert, 2016; Gueye, 2013). This study aims to address a significant gap in
literature by first, providing a comparative study on the growing youth movements in
west Africa and the ways young people expand the boundaries of Hip-Hop by going
beyond incorporating Hip-Hop culture into school-based curricula (Hill, 2009) and

16

instead considering a “hiphopography,” (Alim, 2011) an approach that combines the
methods of ethnography, biography, and social and oral history (Alim, 2011 as cited in
Buffington & Day, 2018, p. 3). Secondly, this study goes beyond the school to challenge
epistemological norms around young people, schooling, and engagement in West Africa.
And lastly, this project incorporates ethnographic methods that “interrogates the
relationship between hip-hop and identity formation…[and] the fluidity and location of
engagement” (Hill, 2009, p. 11). By focusing on young people as an asset, expanding our
understanding of Hip-Hop pedagogy, and reframing how we view youth engagement on
the continent, this study significantly contributes to the global literature on Hip-Hop in
Africa, Hip-Hop pedagogy, and youth engagement in the field of comparative education.
Overview
In the following chapters, I will provide my definitions of youth or young people,
how Y’en a Marre and FESCI approach and employ Hip-Hop pedagogy, and how
engagement is nuanced within the socio-political context young people face. In chapter 2,
I will review my theoretical framework and literature that explores issues of
transnégritude (Touré, forthcoming), epistemic disobedience, civic education, the
sociopolitical contexts in Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire, Hip-Hop pedagogy, engagement and
definitions of young people. Chapter 3 will explore comparative case study as the
methodological orientation I chose to use to frame and examine these multilayered topics.
Chapter 4 will present the two organizations, Y’en a Marre (YEM) and FESCI, their
histories, mission and structure. I will also contextualize these two organizations within
the larger historical and sociopolitical contexts in Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal.
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Chapters 5 and 6 present the major findings from this study. Chapter 5 focuses on
the macro-level findings that contextualizes young people’s lived experiences and
investigates how young people view and approach Hip-Hop and Hip-Hop as pedagogy.
The chapter will interrogate socialization and schooling and how these concepts nuance
youth engagement. Chapter 6 will delve into the micro; that is how FESCI and YEM
employ Hip-Hop as pedagogy. I will first consider one of Hip-Hop’s major philosophical
tenets, “keepin’ it real,” then I will explore how this is employed through language,
leadership and identity formation. I conclude by contending that young people mobilized
via YEM and FESCI envision a pan-African unity that emboldens and encourages
ownership.
Chapter 7 concludes the project with a summary of the main arguments and an
examination of the major findings from previous chapters. The chapter discusses how
young people are and should be considered an opportunity source and an asset to
changing the sociopolitical context of the continent. Chapter 7 suggests that young people
are at the helm of social change and may play a crucial role in curtailing corruption,
migration, and political instability. The chapter raises questions on the role of women and
considers my limitations on not considering how students at the universities in Dakar and
Abidjan perceive FESCI and YEM, their impact/effectiveness, and their views and
approach to Hip-Hop. These limitations provide rich opportunities for follow-up projects
that further examine the micro. Finally, the chapter concludes with a short discussion on
centering the voices and epistemologies of young people and recognizing their optimism
and “bullish” efforts to effect change (Kazeem, 2020).
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CHAPTER 2
OUTTA HERE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
To further consider the role of Hip-Hop as a pedagogical tool for engagement,
transformation and social justice, I draw from the ensuing literature to expound on
concepts of youth and identity and the role Hip-Hop plays as a pedagogical force for
young people in West Africa. I will first provide my theoretical framework;
transnégritude (Touré, forthcoming), and the ways in which it shapes the transcolonial
and decolonizing methods and motives of young people. Given Hip-Hop’s origins,
elements, and characteristics, epistemic disobedience becomes a pertinent element by
which to structure and approach this transnégritude framework. I will consider how civic
education is contextualized within FESCI and Y’en a Marre, then I will examine the role
of Hip-Hop not only as an educative tool but as a healing and transformative pedagogy
that can impact language and identity.
Lastly, I will contextualize the general conditions of young people in West Africa.
Herein, I wish to frame the experiences, struggles and modes of engagement that
influenced groups such as Y’en a Marre (YEM) and FESCI. Because of the inconsistent
definitions of youth, I provide my fluid, unbounded definition of youth or young people,
informed by Lambert (2016) and Spencer (2012) and provide a brief historical context of
the sociopolitical dynamics young people have faced in Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal; this
will be examined further in chapter four.
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Côte d’Ivoire is a dynamic state to analyze how young people within a postconflict context can be encouraged to engage. On the other hand, even though Senegal
has never endured a civil war, the country has protested numerous times to challenge
leaders and regional struggle with mixed results. Lastly, the global scope of Hip-Hop
culture and its manifestations in West Africa nuances the ways in which young people
approach education and how they are influenced by it as a counter to social ills. A
transnégritude perspective aptly “straddles” black identity, agency, and
deconstructionism and allows for a fluid navigation of Hip-Hop pedagogy. Through this
framework, I am able to theorize epistemologies of disobedience and resistance, which
inform the views of Y’en a Marre and FESCI. This text intends to contribute to
qualitative inquiries on the connections between Hip-Hop, identity formation, and the
“fluidity and location of engagement” in Hip-Hop culture (Hill, 2009, p. 11). The goal is
to challenge the formal schooling context, interrogate youth identity and engagement.
Transnégritude
To better understand this concept of transnégritude as is understood by Touré
(forthcoming), we must first understand the roots and origins of the négritude movement,
developed in France in the 1920s and 1930s. The three major figures attributed to the
movement, were francophone intellectuals from various parts of the diaspora who met
during their studies in Paris: Léopold Sédar Senghor from Senegal, Aimé Césaire from
Martinique, and Léon-Gentran Damas from Guyana. These three along with other
intellectuals would grapple with questions of blackness, identity and colonialism (Clark,
2013; Sprague, 2018; Graham; 2014). Clark (2013) writes that négritude responds to two
pillars of colonial discourse: the “power of erasure,” which resulted in the “psychic
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disorientation” and the “arrested development of the african world” and “racial othering.”
“Racial Othering,” he writes, “is a social process of demarcation where differential
standards and moral codes are applied to distinct racial groups” (p. 74). As such,
négritude, as it is understood, was, “a literary and philosophical movement that responds
to colonial domination...a philosophy of black identity [that] evolved into a mode of
thought that inspired blacks to reimagine African alternatives to the colonial state” (p.
71).
On February 12, 2018, Frieda Ekotto professor of comparative literature and chair
of AfroAmerican and African Studies at the University of Michigan was invited to speak
at the African Studies Center Speaker Series at UCLA. Dr. Ekotto began by saying: “To
read Césaire’s work in light of recent events is to bear witness to the ongoing struggles of
Black people. His work is rooted in the history of Blackness” (Sprague, 2018). Through
Césaire, Ekotto provides a transnational analysis of the state of blackness within the
diaspora. Négritude, as she understands it, responds to the systematic oppression and
alienation of Black individuals by embracing African heritage, examining and
challenging colonial relations of power, and incorporating previously ignored Black
experiences into writing (p. 244).
Though developed in France in the 1930s, what Touré (forthcoming) and other
contemporary Francophone researchers glean from the négritude movement are aspects
of visibility and ownership. It is from this shared “struggle” and the current sociopolitical
dynamics that impact the diaspora, that a reimagining of this francophone movement and
its relevance today brings us to Touré’s (forthcoming) “transnégritude.” Just as Clark
(2013), Sprague (2018), Graham (2014) and Thompson (2002) analyse the origins of

21

négritude, Touré also considers the “shared colonial oppression” in former colonies.
Transnégritude, he writes, is informed by Françoise Lionnet’s concept of
transcoloniality, “which translates the shared experience of colonial oppression in all
former French colonies and those of other major European countries” (Touré,
forthcoming, p. 1). Because of this transnational and transcolonial basis, the experiences,
philosophies, and writings of the Négritude thinkers vary according to their geographies,
histories, colonial encounters and freedom struggles. (p. 1).
In a nutshell, Touré continues:
Transnégritude also accounts not only for the silenced, oppressed, and invisible
but also Afrodiasporic individuals whose living conditions entail no, single, dual
and multiple roots, ranging from the physical to the digital spaces. It probes and
articulates the conditions of the people trapped in the errant circuits between
bodies of water and landmasses in search of freedom or alternative existence. It
concomitantly deconstructs and reenacts the ongoing co-construction of an
ostracized self and fearless other (p. 1).
Because one of the central questions that early négritude thinkers grappled with was how
to be both Black and French within a colonial context, négritude offered what Clark
(2013), citing what Benedict Anderson (1983, as cited in Clark 2013 and Lambert, 2016)
calls the “imagined community.” Clark writes, “a community where there is a mental and
emotional affinity among blacks that transcends nationality, language and economic
circumstances” (Clark, 2013, p. 74). Touré instead imagines “multiple négritudes” and
challenges the homogenization of the movement. He writes that transnégritude attempts
to “examine the layers of the conceptual misreading of négritude by arguing for many
ongoing négritudes instead of one, shunning the debates couched in the homogenization
of négritude” (p. 2)
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In considering this imagined community and the many “Africas” one might
traverse, Touré challenges the notion of “cultural fixity.” The ability to converse with
“different sections of the black worlds,” as imagined by early négritude thinkers, provides
new ways of reconfiguring the Black condition. The reason why this is important is that
in understanding this shared struggle, Black people could create what Césaire (1939)
considered to be a cultural bridge that would do away with the “old negro.” (Touré,
forthcoming). Through the writings of Césaire, Touré coaxes us to assess how the
“falsification of history” has played a major role in “shaping the consciousness of black
people” (p. 15). If, as he notes, the status of black people has not “transformed drastically
in terms of their narratives and contribution to the conceptualizations of black identities,”
how then can Black people benefit from this shared struggle? Referencing Césaire, Touré
suggests that Black people “need to recalibrate linkages and bonds among people who
share a common history of slavery, colonialism and ongoing racial prejudice or
discrimination” (p. 13). The challenge however, lies in the identity crisis Black people
have inherited from the “psychic disorientation” of colonialism.
Whereas Césaire’s conception of négritude was on race, psychology and color
consciousness and thus, subjective. Clark argues that Senghor’s négritude was objective
and focused on the “sum total of black cultural values;” objective (Clark, 2013, p. 76).
Négritude, for Césaire (1939), was the “simple recognition of the fact that one is Black,
the acceptance of this fact and of our destiny as Blacks, of our history and culture”
(Césaire, 1939 as cited in Sprague, 2018). This is an announcement of a “sharpened,
diasporic consciousness in the Black world” and one that seemed to challenge adherence
to majoritarian narratives (Sprague, 2018, p. 244). Senghor’s négritude, was the “sum of
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the cultural values of the black world as expressed in the life, the institutions, and the
works of black men; the sum of the values of the civilization of the black world"
(Senghor, 1964 as cited in Ba, 1973, p. 44). Senghor approached the movement by
promoting the culture and civilization of the Black world; which has been critiqued for
“essentialising Africanness” and not engaging in the sociopolitical struggle (Clark, 2013,
p. 88).
These tensions within the experiences of négritude thinkers would be evidenced
in their work. For Césaire, growing up in Martinique, Creole was his first language but it
was regarded as “servile” and French was seen as the language of mobility. For Senghor,
having French citizenship seemed to matter more than a Senegalese one (Clark, 2013, p.
75). This practice of “denigrating one’s mother tongue and elevating the language of the
conqueror” illustrates what Fanon (1952), Ngugi (1987) and Clark (2013) recognize as
viewing the “Self” through the eyes of the colonizer (Clark, 2013, p. 75).
Négritude writers struggled with the identity crisis of being Black and French visa-vis language and identity. As the diaspora grows and evolves, questions of language
and identity still permeate our society. Language, as Ngugi (1987) puts it, is “central to a
people’s definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment,
indeed in relation to the entire universe...Language as culture is thus mediating between
me and my own self; between my own self and other selves; between me and nature.
Language is mediating in my very being” (p. 4 & 15). The subjugation of one identity or
language over another is what Ngugi problematizes in his tome, Decolonizing the Mind.
As Clark (2013) maintains, so embedded was the image of the ‘Dark Continent’ on the
cultural assumptions of people of African descent that they did not identify with it. It was
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commonplace for African elites in the Francophone world to identify as Frenchmen who
happened to be black” (p. 76). Ngugi asserts that African intellectuals who claimed their
allegiance to the West were essentially burying their “Africanity” under layers of
“Europhonism” (Ngugi, 2009 as cited in Touré, forthcoming). Transnégritude, thus,
allows for a more nuanced approach to the migritive cultural mélange that is the diaspora
today.
Discussions with members of Y’en a Marre and FESCI led me to believe that they
each approached and conceptualized their identities and missions differently. Though
they had similar intentions, their methods and view of Hip-Hop pedagogy diverged in
their employment and application. This will be further illuminated in chapter 4. However
what I witnessed was that members evoked a sense of consciousness that urged adherents
to “heal themselves.” And, their use of language, forms of leadership and identity
formation, were seen as a means of “personal presentation, verbal artistry, and
commentary on life’s circumstances” (Keyes, 2004, p. 22); Concepts that I wish to
complicate within transnégritude.
Apart from language, Transnégritude allows us to reconsider négritude writers'
views and approaches to authenticity as a response to imperialism. In 2018, President
Nana Akufo-Addo of Ghana, declared and launched the “Year of Return, Ghana 2019”
for Africans in the Diaspora, “giving fresh impetus to the quest to unite Africans on the
continent with their brothers and sisters in the diaspora” (Tetteh, 2018). So too did
Césaire’s “return to the native land” call for Black unity across the diaspora. Clark (2013)
views it as a “uniting idea for African peoples to forge an ‘imagined Pan-African
community,’ one that transcends ethnic, religious and national affiliation” (p. 76). But
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how do we imagine this community not solely from the continent but also “from the
experiences of diasporic populations?” (Touré, forthcoming, p. 11). “The question of
migritude,” Touré writes, “responds to the proposal of négritude—that is to say, that we
are no longer in a conceptualization of identity centered on race but on the migratory
experience...” (p. 11).
In his discussion of Y’en a Marre (YEM) and their cultural philosophy of
nouveau type de sénégalais (A New Type of Senegalese), Bryson (2014), considers how
YEM draws not just from Hip-Hop culture but also from Senghor’s négritude (p. 35). He
continues, “Y’en a Marre’s cultural interventions in Senegalese society echo Senghorian
cultural ideology not simply in the way they embody a linkage between culture and
politics, but also in the manner in which they evoke Senegalese national identity” (p. 50).
Transnégritude, however goes beyond just national Senegalese identity but also considers
the sociopolitical expression of black identity manifested contextually in each specific
space and time.
Though francophone literature has concerned itself with the transformation of the
immigrant, as Touré surmises, why has it not done the inverse? Or further still,
considered the transformation within? (p. 11). If, as some have critiqued that Négritude
was an ideal of the alienated bourgeoisie and not of the masses (Clark, 2013),
Transnégritude then problematizes the Self within a decolonial narrative that pushes for
epistemic and economic liberation. This framework challenges the “posts” in postpositivist research because, as Smith (1999) suggests, “[t]here can be no 'postmodern' for
us until we have settled some business of the modern” (p. 34).
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This study therefore situates transnégritude within discussions that consider the
ways in which young people within this shared “transcolonial” narrative, bound through
an “imagined community,” or “multiple roots,” negotiate their space, their identities, and
their ways of knowing through a Hip-Hop pedagogy. This community comprises of
young people who espouse an aesthetic, a linguistic expression, an identity, and sound
with a philosophy that is “guided by black nationalism and street consciousness”(Keyes,
2004, p. 157). Guided not only by this shared struggle but also armed with the
understanding that “Hip-Hop is a culture and genre of music that promotes social justice
and provides an outlet for youth who have been marginalized to share their stories and
experiences with the world” (Adjapong, 2017, p. 38). This discussion looks to epistemic
disobedience to nuance our understanding of engagement and the shared struggle for
liberation.
Epistemic Disobedience
In discussions surrounding the notion of the Self, Fanon (1952), Ngugi (1987),
Wiredu (1998), Smith (1999), and Mignolo (2009), examine how language and identity
have shaped the neocolonial socioframework and the pains in “delinking” from these
disorientations. My analysis is thus informed by Mignolo’s (2003; 2009) epistemic
disobedience and the geo- and body-politics that challenge neo-colonial epistemologies.
Ngugi (1987), succinctly elaborates the connection between the Self and the impact of
imperialism:
...I have pointed out that how we view ourselves, our environment even, is very
much dependent on where we stand in relationship to imperialism in its colonial
and neo-colonial stages; that if we are to do anything about our individual and
collective being today, then we have to coldly and consciously look at - what
imperialism has been doing to us and to our view of ourselves in the universe.
Certainly the quest for relevance and for a correct perspective can only be
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understood and be meaningfully resolved within the context of the general
struggle against imperialism ((Ngugi, 1987, p. 88).
Along with the sociopolitical and economic domination of imperialism, western
colonialism also privileged its own epistemology over all other ways of knowing. The
world, according to Mignolo (2003), “became unthinkable” beyond western
epistemologies and this colonial difference and hierarchy, “marked the limits of thinking
and theorizing, unless modern epistemology...was exported/imported to those places
where thinking was impossible” because it was lore, magic, or “ancient” wisdom
(Mignolo, 2003, p. 90). This “geo- and body-politics of knowledge” a response “from the
Third World to the First World,” brought to light the “epistemic privilege of the First
World” (Mignolo, 2009, p. 8; Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 5). Geopolitics, Mignolo (2003)
writes, “regionalizes the fundamental European legacy, locating thinking in the colonial
difference and creating the conditions for diversality as a universal project” (p. 91). Thus,
Mignolo continues, a step towards decolonial thinking is the “the unveiling of epistemic
silences of Western epistemology and afﬁrming the epistemic rights of the racially
devalued, and de-colonial options to allow the silences to build arguments to confront
those who take ‘originality’ as the ultimate criterion for the ﬁnal judgment” (p. 4).
Where there is power, Foucault (1978) wrote, there is resistance (p. 95). Building
on Touré (forthcoming), Mignolo (2003, 2009), and Ngugi’s (1987) shared understanding
of a shared oppression, epistemic disobedience as exemplified by Mignolo and Ngugi
also calls for acts of resistance. As Medina (2013) puts it, the shared struggle of
Yenamarristes and Fescists is both internal and external. Those who live under conditions
of oppression, however they inhabit those contexts, “have an obligation to resist”
(Medina, 2013, p. 17). Throughout my interactions with yenamarristes and Fescists, it

28

was clear to me that they were not just resisting sociopolitical and economic structures
that have engendered a push for autonomy but they also disobeyed or resisted social and
pedagogical norms; from talking back to elders, to having women activists/leaders, to
developing their own schools. This geo and body-politics of epistemic disobedience
exemplifies this internal and external resistance. As Medina (2013) asserts, “It is a
mistake to think that the forms of exclusion, subordination, and marginalization... can be
resisted only from the outside, and not also from within...for the multifaceted activity of
resisting is conceptualized as contending with, and not exclusively or fundamentally as
contending against” (p. 17). From this epistemic oppression, comes an obligation to resist
as Ngugi (1987) and Medina (2013) assert or “de-link” as Mignolo (2009) affirms. In
order to do so, one must assume several “epistemic duties” to fight against ignorance, to
know oneself and others, to learn and teach others, and to work towards social justice
(Medina, 2013, p. 17).
Epistemic disobedience, or resistance as Medina puts it, charges one to
“undermine and change oppressive normative structures and the complacent cognitiveaffective functioning that sustains those structures” (p. 2). When talking to Yenamarristes
and Fescists it was reported that their call to engagement was embedded in these theories
of democracy, politics, oppression, and decolonial epistemologies. As medina (2013)
notes, resistance begets contestation, that is the “political mechanisms and activities that
make democratic interaction possible” (p. 3; Celikates, 2016). This involves a collective
self-determination for citizens to protest and participate even if it can be complicated and
divergent (Celikates, 2016 p. 41; Medina, 2013, p. 14). In the case of language, for
example, linguistic resistance as asserted by Ngugi (1987) and built upon by Duranti
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(2009) and Medina (2013), functions within oppressive language games and as such
subversion of the “normative core” relies on “speaking from elsewhere while remaining
within” (p. 16).
If, as Smith (1999) and Mignolo (2009) assert that “[k]nowledge-making
presupposes a semiotic code shared between users in semiotic exchanges” (Mignolo,
2009, p. 18) then, the reclamation of sovereignty must contest the “accounts of the past
by colonizers and colonized…They are not simply struggles over ‘facts’ and ‘truth’”
(Smith, 1999, p. 33). This “de-linking” that Mignolo (2009) suggests involves the
promotion of local experiences and needs “rather than from local imperial experiences
and needs projected to the globe, invokes also the body-politics of knowledge” (p. 19).
This is what contributes to epistemic disobedience and I will further examine as I discuss
the themes of language and identity.
“There is an extraordinary power,” Fanon (1952) wrote, “in the possession of a
language.” (p. 2). To speak, therefore, is not just the syntax and structure of a particular
language but “above all assuming a culture and bearing the weight of a civilization” (p.
1). Language thus influences and molds one’s perceptions. Echoing Fanon, Ngugi (1987)
writes that language is central to a “people’s definition of themselves in relation to their
natural social environment” and is at the “heart” of the social forces on the continent (p.
4). The colonial consequence of language is substantial and complex as such, liberation
and “delinking” must stem from the “rediscovery and the resumption of our
language…[and] a call for a regenerative reconnection with the millions of revolutionary
tongues in Africa and the world over demanding liberation” (Ngugi, 1987, p. 108). He
continues,
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It is a call for the rediscovery of the real language of humankind: the language of
struggle. It is the universal language underlying all speech and words of our
history. Struggle. Struggle makes history. Struggle makes us. In struggle is our
history, our language and our being. That struggle begins wherever we are; in
whatever we do: then we become part of those millions whom Martin Carter once
saw sleeping not to dream but dreaming to change the world” (Ngugi, 1987, p.
108).
Because the legacy of colonialism favored the imperial language over local
languages, there has been an impetus to “force” the continent into a state of “intellectual
dependence” on the West (Mazrui, 2000, p. 56). Mazrui writes that this intellectual
dependence is due in part to the favoring of euro-languages by international aid
organizations such as the World Bank, but also the “wider capitalist design” that
preferences euro-languages “which create and maintain social divisions serving an
economy dominated primarily by foreign economic interests and, secondarily, by a small
aspiring african bourgeoisie” (p. 55). This is why, Smith (1999), asserts that knowing the
past is a necessary part of the “critical pedagogy of decolonization” that leads to an
“epistemic awakening” from western thought (Mignolo, 2009, Wiredu, 1998). From this
awakening, Medina (2013) concludes that it is through resistance that “relations of
solidarity against domination” and various forms of oppression become possible and
effective. Through resistance, Medina continues, citizens can develop their identification
and thus influence their society (p. 21).
It is from this epistemic delinking and decolonial thinking that form the central
frame for how I understand the parallels of Hip-Hop pedagogy and citizenship and civic
education, as well as Hip-Hop pedagogy, epistemic disobedience, and transnégritude.
There is a shared struggle that is echoed by Mignolo (2009), Keyes, (2004), Smith
(1999), Ngugi (1987) and Touré (forthcoming) that colors the lived experiences of young
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people. Through Hip-Hop culture we see young people or groups such as FESCI and
YEM recognizing the failures of institutions to provide the “essential needs for economic
survival and maintenance” and thus turn to this cultural expression as it “maps out real
and imagined relations between people that speak to the realities of displacement,
disillusion, and despair created by the austerity economy of post-industrial capitalism”
(Keyes, 2004, p. 6; Buffington & Day, 2018). And, through this struggle and cultural
expression, YEM and FESCI are emboldened to assert their identity, mobilize, engage,
and create expressions that challenge neo-colonial struggles (Ngugi, 1980).
Civic and citizen education
Over the past forty years, there has been a rise in civic education (Evans 2007,
Levinson, 2005; 2011). This became an important feature for many countries in the
global South as they transitioned to multi-party systems, embraced democracy and
developed a national identity (Johnson & Morris, 2012). Moreover, after decades of
being excluded from citizenship rights, research shows that young people are eager to
embrace their civic rights and participate in nationbuilding (Crossouard & Dunne, 2015).
This approach to education incorporates citizenship and civic rights, which are
essential components to peacebuilding, state building, and nation building (Levine &
Bishai, 2010; Evans, 2007). Given that our focus is on civic education in the global
South, it is essential to also contextualize and broaden our definition of citizenship, which
goes beyond “vertical relations between individual citizens and rights recognizing states”
(Lieres, 2014, p. 49). For many, citizenship is experienced through “highly localised
processes of horizontal identiﬁcation and mobilisation” (p. 49). As such, citizenship is
highly relational and contextual.
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I utilize Levinson’s (2005, 2011) definition of citizenship and democracy, which
is informed by Ladson-Billings (2004) and Spindler’s (1987) discussion of citizenship
and education which argues that, “all education is citizenship education” (Levinson,
2011, p. 280). Going beyond Levine and Bishai’s (2010) definition, Levinson (2011),
conceptualizes citizenship as “constituted by the meanings, rights, and obligations of
membership in public, as well as the forms of agency and modalities of participation
implicated by the such membership” (p. 280). This definition approaches citizenship as
relational and as developing identities of citizens, given that identity “captures the
varying senses of social belonging and commitment” (p. 280).
From this we can gleam that citizenship education, for comparativists, considers
the state, the citizen, and their relational participation in society. Levinson (2011) defines
democracy as “the continual striving toward a social order that sponsors reasoned
deliberation, promotes civic participation in decision-making, justly and equitably
distributes political economic power, and facilitates cultural inclusiveness” (p. 281). The
study of citizenship education for democracy therefore situates members vis-a-vis their
social belonging and participation as citizens (p. 282). For this study, the goals and
methods of engagement of Yenamarristes and Fescists were heavily influenced by their
identities as young people, their sense of belonging, and space in society.
This study intends to address the broader implications of schooled identities and
how they have resisted or found “alternative political imaginaries” to shape their
sociopolitical outlook and engagement. This analysis considers the ways in which the
civic identities proposed in schools may also be in contradiction with alternative and
informal ways of knowing that also influence young people. Y’en a Marre and FESCI
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illustrate this dichotomy. They both engage in civic education that at times goes against
learned curricula within the school setting. Examining Y’en a Marre and FESCI’s
engagement allows us to consider how civic education, through a Hip-Hop pedagogy, is
adopted within and outside the formal schooling structure to consider matters of identity,
democracy, citizenship, and engagement.
For Y’en a Marre and FESCI, what I witnessed was that they viewed their
methods of engagement as “diasporic counterspaces of education” that contributed to
affirming concepts of identity and belonging (Shirazi, 2019, p. 480). Similar to Touré’s
(forthcoming) “multiple négritudes” and challenging the notion of “cultural fixity,”
Shirazi argues that within the context of schooling, diasporic spaces and practices provide
possibilities of teaching and learning from multiple vantage points thereby becoming
“counterspaces to query the dehumanizing modes of representation that position youth as
outsiders to the nation-state” (p. 498). This study therefore examines the educational
practices of Y’en a Marre and FESCI as “sites of cultural production and narrativization”
(p. 483). What we see is that the practice of citizenship and education is “inherently
messy” and involves “participation in, and resistance to a wide range of political
institutions and societal spaces” (Lieres, 2014, p. 49).
If, as Levinson (2011) and Lieres (2014) contend that citizenship is a collective,
intended to build broad coalitions, mobilise under a new agenda, and provide a counter
balance to the state by encouraging citizens to voice their demands, advocate and play a
watchdog role, we must then also consider the “possible disjunctures between the
practices of democracy...and the everyday realities of clientelism, patronage and
authoritarian local politics” young organizations such as FESCI and YEM face (p. 52).
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Discussions surrounding civic education and citizenship, center the importance of an
empowered citizenry who can actively participate in democratic life and hold the state
accountable. If that is the case, then Hip-Hop pedagogy provides that source of
empowerment and self-determination. As Hip-Hop pedagogy rests on the notion that
traditional and non-traditional educational spaces that are youth driven can be places that
“embody a critique of oppression, a desire for social change, and ultimately lay the
foundations for community empowerment and social change” (Love, 2016, p. 417).
Hip-Hop, transnégritude, and epistemic disobedience
Young people of the Hip-Hop generation, represent a duality and contradiction
that is unique and that which transcends geography. Consider first that Hip-Hop’s origins
was highly influenced by interactions between Black American residents, Puerto Ricans
and West Indians in the Bronx (Clark, 2018). Secondly, some of the early pioneers of
Hip-Hop were Caribbean born immigrants who helped shape the sound and style of HipHop (Clark, 2018, Chang & DJ Kool Herc, 2005). Moreover, Bridges (2011), Collins
(2006) and KRS-One (2005) write of the contradictions splicing the Hip-Hop generation
one which sees a population born after the Civil Rights and Black Nationalist Movements
in the U.S. and the end of the colonial era in Africa. Bridges (2011) writes that the HipHop generation has on one hand, benefitted from voting rights, educational reform and
affirmative action campaigns yet at the same time, “they too have experienced the rapid
erosion of the racial, social, and educational gains that their foreparents worked so
diligently to achieve” (p. 326). Hip-Hop artists recognized and lived these opposing
experiences and proselytize to a willing and eager population who regarded Hip-Hop
artists as “surrogate teachers and Hip-Hop culture as alternative classrooms” (p. 326).
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Hip-Hop like Transnégritude speaks to the delinking and expressive actions of
those othered. Clark (2018) and Haupt (2008) write that Hip-Hop is connected to the
“notion of a global black experience of oppression and resistance” in the construction of a
black nationalist identity (Haupt, 2008, p. 145). Hip-Hop pedagogy speaks to its healing
power and its “ability to give voice, shape, and dimension to the often ignored and
disregarded sources of pain” that Black people negotiate (Bridges, 2011, p. 327). Why?
Because of the implications inherent within Hip-Hop to better understand language,
learning, identity, and curriculum (Petchauer, 2009). In his attempts to frame and review
Hip-Hop educational research, Petchauer looks at how educational research has had to
contend with the utility and significance of Hip-Hop as a pedagogical tool in and outside
of classrooms.
If Hip-Hop is a tool needed to explicate the lived realities of young people, then
Mark Anthony Neal’s “What the Music Said,” considers the factors surrounding the birth
of Hip-Hop in the mid-1970s as representative of a “concerted effort by young urban
blacks to use mass-culture to facilitate communal discourse across a fractured and
dislocated national community” (Neal, 1999, p. 136). Much like Césaire (1939) and
Lambert (2016) evoked Benedict Anderson’s (1983) imagined community, Hip-Hop was
the imagined community personified. Whereas many tend to look at the culture as merely
a genre representing rap only, it is necessary to note that though rap is one part of the
culture it does not represent it fully. As KRS-One (1989) is quoted, “rap is something
you do, Hip-Hop is something you live.” Keyes (2004) takes KRS-One’s notion further
to view Hip-Hop within the context of urban street culture, “rap is from the streets. If you
don’t know what's going on out there, you can't do rap. You can live in Beverly Hills, but
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your heart has to be in the streets'' (Fee, 1998 as quoted in Keyes, p. 5) Essentially, it is
important to look at the culture as a whole, that is the music, dance, visual art, clothing,
philosophies, and politics that comprise Hip-Hop and its multilayered identity. And, more
importantly, it is essential that we recognize the push for resistance and engagement
within Hip-Hop, given the contexts surrounding its genesis.
It is now accepted that Hip-Hop has become an effective and legitimate field of
study in academia (Hill, 2009 & 2013; Akom, 2009; Seidel, 2011; Petchauer, 2009). Yet,
those who utilize Hip-Hop in (and especially outside of) academia, are often challenged
and made to consider whether a Hip-Hop pedagogy can provide educative benefits that
challenge other accepted methods. Sam Seidel (2011) argues however, that Hip-Hop’s
genesis and success is from its “creative collaging” which bodes well, as Jenkins (2013)
concurs, for a “transformative educational” approach.
What Seidel (2011) forces us to do is, as Jenkins (2013) boldly calls for is to
reconceptualize what is a school or text in order to “begin to appreciate life in itself as a
form of school” (p. 12). As such, when it comes to looking at the ways in which young
Ivorian or Senegalese people approach their language and identity via this transcolonial,
epistemic disobedient medium, we must recognize the transcultural, socio political and
economic mutations that have impacted the diaspora. What better pedagogical tool to
utilize than one that highlights and espouses from its origin, a blended means of coming
to know?
The study of Hip-Hop can hold its own within traditional and nontraditional
academic spaces. It merges the fields of sociology, cultural and ethnic studies, history,
education, politics, and the arts (p. 13). The very spirit of Hip-Hop culture Jenkins (2013)
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confirms, not only informs classrooms, community programs, and educational
experiences. But too, the culture “advances a spirit of healthy competition, a dedication to
excellence, the act of truly listening to young people” (p. 13-14). This epistemological
approach, one that embraces a critical pedagogy of “imagination, humanism, agency, and
becoming,” sits at the crux of the mission statements of YEM and FESCI. These
organizations above all push for a new way of becoming that emboldens young people.
This is evident with the new slogans calling for “un ivoirien nouveau” or “un nouveau
type de sénégalais” emphasizing agency and awareness adopted by the Ivorian and
Senegalese government and local organizations. This allows me to contend then that HipHop pedagogy in this case forces us to challenge the concept of school and/or schooling.
Hip-Hop as Pedagogy
What is school or schooling? What does it mean to learn? And, who is a student?
I appreciate Jenkins’ (2013) definition of a school and a student, it provides a broad and
objective interpretation of what it means to acquire knowledge. A school, she writes, is,
any purposeful learning community, whether for children or adults, public or
private, compulsory or voluntary. I include formal institutions and voluntary
gatherings, from pre-kindergarten to universities, community colleges and homebased learning…When I use the word “student” I mean anyone who is engaged
purposefully in learning, whatever their age and whatever their setting (p. 12).
We can therefore situate Hip-Hop as a critical space to study transformative education,
and liberatory knowledge production. The classroom must be contested in order for it to
truly evolve so that we might reshape the act of learning, from a “structured, mechanized
experience into a creative, imaginative, and socially conscious endeavor” (Jenkins, 2013,
p. 14). This will allow for a “critical pedagogy of imagination and humanism, which
concerns creating educational spaces where the educational content matters to students”
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(p. 14). What ensues is therefore a literary historiography that challenges the notions of
education that schooling suggests and the critical role Hip-Hop can play in transforming
and informing a very powerful population.
In Critical Hip Hop Pedagogy as a Form of Liberatory Praxis, Akom (2009)
reorients and furthers the narrative on Hip-Hop pedagogy in academia utilizing Freire’s
problem-posing method to carry a community based case study through youth
participatory action research to promote and dissect the meaning, purpose, and function
of Hip-Hop. Informed by Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Bernal and Villalpando’s
(2002) counter narratives, Akom engages the five elements of CRT “to introduce an
alternative instructional strategy called Critical Hip Hop Pedagogy (CHHP)” (p. 52). In
doing so, Akom hopes to assess the meaning, purpose, and function of Hip-Hop within
academia.
Why? The answer is two-fold: first, since its inception the culture has been
influenced by socio-political transformations that have “converged to make Hip-Hop’s
origins multifaceted, politically conflicting, consistently debated, and highly
complicated” (Bernal & Villalpando, 2002, p. 52). Thus, people of color in general and
those of the Hip-Hop generation specifically, have had to contend with a rapidly evolving
socio-political sphere with limited support from the very structures engendering these
changes. Secondly, though the culture has had a significant presence in the classroom—
through the adoption of the Hip-Hop aesthetic by young people, it is still as of yet
marginalized within institutions of higher education and within scholastic research; a
perpetuation of what Delgado Bernal and Villalpando (2002) call an “apartheid of
knowledge” (p. 53). Provided that, as Akom (2009) argues, “Hip-Hop is the dominant
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language of youth culture, and those of us who work with young people need to speak
their language,” how then can we as scholar-activists merge theory and practice—that is,
Hip Hop and critical pedagogy—to promote an emancipatory practice for those
communities long oppressed?
If Hip-Hop speaks on the socio-political aspects of marginalized people, then
critical pedagogy from a Freirean perspective, builds on this notion of students viewing
education as a practice of freedom, a place to build critical consciousness and social
mobility – a place “where we learn to perceive social, political, and economic
contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality” (Akom,
2009, p. 56). Freire’s problem-solving methodology uses a five step approach to
challenge the dominant status quo. The steps, from identifying a problem, analyzing a
problem, developing a plan, implementing the plan, evaluating the plan, is where,
according to Akom, the intersection of Hip-Hop meets critical pedagogy in the “creation
of a pedagogical space of resiliency and resistance developed to challenge the dominant
mindset, increases engagement and achievement, and builds new understandings of the
strength and assets of youth of color and the communities from which they come” (p. 57).
Should we agree that Hip-Hop is an important lens for socio-political analysis and
an influential representation of marginalized communities, then CHHP should, as Akom
(2009) argues, inform our understanding of the lived realities of marginalized people.
Influenced by Freire’s (1970) problem-posing method and socially and politically
conscious Hip-Hop, Akom writes that CHHP operationalizes what Freire termed
conscientização in order to suggest that “transformative education for the poor and
disempowered begins with the creation of pedagogic spaces where marginalized youth
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become aware of how their own experiences have been shaped by larger social
institutions” (Akom, 2009, p. 55). Using counter-hegemonic curricula, racial identity,
social reproduction, counter-narratives, CHHP insists that “students are active agents and
should analyze a diverse set of data” (p. 55). The ensuing goal for a CHHP then, is to
“demonstrate the ways in which youth-driven research supports students’ long-term
academic trajectories, both because of the academic rigor of the research and
concurrently because of the socialization of critical intellectual identities” (p. 55). Bernal
and Villalpando (2002) successfully argued that knowledge production of people of color
are almost always waylaid for seeming to lack rigor or intellectual fortitude. However,
the very same social, political, and pedagogical dilemmas that are currently being
discussed in research institutions, have been discussed since the birth of Hip-Hop in the
1970s.
Evidence of rappers critiquing the status-quo, educational institutions, and the
political dynamics affecting Black people easily flowed from various rappers in the early
days of Hip-Hop. Rapper, KRS-One, also known as “The Teacher,” widely criticized the
inherent Eurocentric educational influence and bias in U.S. public school curricula in
“You must Learn” (1989). Or consider Hip-Hop duo dead prez’s use of Black freedom
fighters in “They Schools” (2000) to project “a scathing critique of the ways in which
Black folks remain mentally incarcerated if and when we rely on a Eurocentric education
system rather than developing curriculum that reflects our own culture, history,
socioeconomic, and spiritual realities” (Akom, 2009, p. 54). These are not published
academics with a long list of chaired positions, fellowships, or other prestigious markings
that signify supposed intellectual might or rigor, yet their refrains, couched within a
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counter-narrative discourse, equally illustrates what other critical pedagogists have
assessed within the confines of academia.
Let’s not get it twisted, not all forms of Hip-Hop are emancipatory, revolutionary,
or even resistive, many are not and some even the opposite. It is no wonder there is no
one definition of négritude; these multiple definitions are what challenge, prod and push
the movement forward. Akom (2009), however, is quick to note that he is mainly
challenging the notion that “given the long history of socio-political conscious hip hop as
a tool for illuminating problems of poverty, police brutality, patriarchy, misogyny,
incarceration, racial discrimination, as well as love, hope, joy—academic institution’s
under-utilization of hip-hop’s liberatory potential in the classroom is surprising” (p. 54).
Akom (2009), along with two faculty members, co-taught one of the more popular
undergraduate courses in the Africana department at San Francisco State University
(SFSU), in which he was able to put his CHHP into practice. Arguing that a community
case study is based on the premise that “communities of color are communities of
strength even though research on communities of color over time frames communities of
color as problems, pathologies, or poisons rather than focusing on the communities
emerging assets, agency, and aspirations” (p. 60). As such, he along with his co-teachers,
sought to counter deficit approaches to research by arguing for an asset based research
“grounded in the capacities, skills and assets of people and their neighborhoods” (p. 61).
They utilized youth participatory action research (YPAR) for its collaborative approach,
commitment to social justice, liberatory principles, and decolonizing frameworks, and its
action within the research process (p. 55). As such, CHHP builds on Hip-Hop pedagogy
by not only centering race and racism and their intersectionality with other forms of
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oppression but challenges traditional paradigms, centralizes experiential knowledge of
students of color, emphasizes the commitment to social justice and encourages a
transdisciplinary approach (p. 63). As Akom concludes, “CHHP challenges these
assumptions by suggesting that transformative education for the poor and disempowered
begins with the creation of pedagogic spaces where marginalized youth are enabled to
gain a consciousness of how their own experiences have been shaped by larger social
institutions” (p. 63).
What is heartening about Akom’s analysis is his commitment to Hip-Hop, his
earnestness in his appreciation of the intellectual and rigorous magnanimity of the
culture, and his call to social justice. He is in a privileged position to be in a geographical
area and at an institution that has access to local and international Hip-Hop artists to
further improve on his on case study at SFSU. Given the multicultural student makeup of
the institution, a YPAR in such a space speaks to the potentialities of students’ reception
to a course taught by three faculty members. However it would have been helpful to hear
the voices of those students (as he suggests surveys and comments were sent
intermittently throughout the semester), and their attitudes towards a pedagogy that
centralizes race and racism among other things.
While from Akom we are able to understand how a CHHP allows for a
transformative education, what we know less is how a CHHP would translate within an
African context. Recognizing the consequences of neo-colonialism and its manifestations
throughout the continent, this study seeks to contextualize how young west Africans are
negotiating decolonial educational frameworks through a complex and ever evolving
cultural expression such as Hip-Hop (Buffington & Day, 2018). It is interesting to note
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that Akom promotes the radical idea further supported by Chang (2005 & 2006) that HipHop has several origins and one of it is from the African continent. If this may seem
inaccurate to some, it is his insistence that it “reflects the hip hop community’s refusal to
be singularly defined and demonstrates the dynamic nature of hip hop as a global
phenomenon that many in the community believe must be felt and experienced, in order
to be understood and communicated” (Akom, 2009, p. 52-53). Echoing Clark’s (2018)
study of Hip-Hop in Africa, this study hopes to consider how a Hip-Hop pedagogy can
construct “understandings of political institutions, social change, gender, migration, and
identity in Africa” (p. 2). This provides an encouraging progression to consider the
international aspects of Hip-Hop and critical pedagogy within its emancipatory
framework.
Hip-Hop and language
Famed rapper Nas’s debut album Illmatic, is considered to be one of the best HipHop albums to date. Written and recorded in his late teens, Nas beautifully creates a CNN
worthy documentary of life in Queens, NY. What made the album so dope was not only
its front seat to the realities of inner-city youth in the 1990s, but its poetic substance and
sophisticated, complex rhyme patterns or lyricism, that powerfully convey what many
lived, experienced, and saw. Illmatic took its listeners inside the world of a young poet
fighting his way out of poverty and describes “what the streets taste like, feel like, smell
like…” (NPR, 2012), this is what makes the album and its content, ill, dope, perfection.
Nas’s technical skills and thematic substance splice through conventional written works
on urban poverty, gang violence, and drug use and provides its listeners an accessible,
thought provoking language that is both familiar and unfamiliar. It is with this sentiment
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that Alim’s (2011) “Global Ill-literacies: Hip Hop Cultures, Youth Identities, and the
Politics of Literacy,” intends to challenge literacy and literary practices among youth in
both local and global contexts.
Much like Hip-Hop culture chooses to counter majoritarian norms on language,
structure, and usage, so too does Alim’s global ill-literacies attempt to circumvent
standard English grammar to highlight Hip-Hop youth’s ill-literacy. What does he mean
by this? Alim (2011) purposefully chooses to use ill-literacies as a “practice of semantic
inversion, whereby standard negative meanings attached to words are inverted to produce
positive ones, to highlight the irony of youth described by educational institutions as
semi-literate or illiterate” (p. 122). In this sense, standard English is seen as limited and
Black Language as limitless as a means to highlight Hip-Hop youth’s appreciation of
Hip-Hop ill-literacy as a form of counterhegemonic practice against a limited version of
language. As such, the ill in ill-literacies in this case does not refer to a lack of literacy
but to the “presence of skilled literacies” (p. 122). Recognizing Hip-Hop’s coded
language, Alim intends to then privilege not only the politics of Hip-Hop but also its
poetics within its linguistic practice.
To further explicate on the inherent coded language within Hip-Hop, Alim utilizes
I.L.L. as an acronym for a new theoretical endeavor in the same vein as Tupac Shakur’s
encoded acronym for Thug Life—The Hate U Gave Little Infants Fucked Everybody.
Alim therefore ascertains that his use of ILL, is not only to signify skill or talent but “as
referring to the three major components of literacy put forth within ill-literacy studies:
Literacy must be Intimate, Lived, and Liberatory” (p. 123). Alim begins his assessment
of Hip-Hop ill-literacies by providing examples from youth in Asia (China, Korea, and
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Japan), engaged in local and global identifications in the creation of what Chang (2006)
refers to as “the sounds of the future.” His example of a Chinese rap battle in a mix of
Mandarin, Cantonese, and English illustrates Hip-Hop culture’s push towards
authenticity, connectedness and above all, skill.
In this sense, the verbal art of Hip-Hop, speaks to the voice of the people, disrupts
hegemonic middle-class norms using vulgar language, and encourages the composition of
complex “multirhyme matrices” (Alim, 2011, p. 124). In short, the myriad examples he
provides from Asian Hip-Hop youth shows that not only are youth “localizing Hip-Hop
literacy practices in accordance with the varying local configurations of languages,
ideologies, and politics, but these complex literacy practices are pushing scholars to
critique and expand even our very notions of language” (p. 124). The argument then that
Hip-Hop and Black Language is unintellectual and limited is turned over on its head to
challenge how academics consider language.
It is no wonder then that global ill-literacies in this context focuses on the politics
of identity, language, and race and forces us to explore “how global ill-literacies present
challenges for local language policies and educational institutions” (alim, 2011, p. 126).
Hip-Hop language and its inherent global nature makes it such that young people have
begun to see themselves through the eyes of the other and in doing so, have created ways
in which language and culture form a new iteration of their identities within their social
worlds. It goes to show that language in this sense becomes a “source of creative
pleasure and counterhegemonic politics, both of which routinely escape the attention of
educators” (p. 129). This point is further driven home with his analysis of African youth
embracing Hip-Hop culture.
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If Ill-literacies engender to be intimate, lived and liberatory, then the ways by
which African youth embrace Hip-Hop culture speaks to and illustrates a complex history
of colonialism, the struggle for independence, and subsequent neocolonial realities that
tend to cast many African countries under the shadows of their former colonial masters.
As such, language in this context, takes on a powerful, counterhegemonic meaning when
one considers how African youth utilize local languages along with their colonized
languages to, as Alim argues, perform “new, local forms of indigeneity that recast their
marginalization as an empowered transnational form of identification” (Alim, 2011, p.
131). In Nigeria, for example, youth often codeswitch between Yoruba, Igbo, English
and Nigerian pidgin as a “new sort of lingua franca.” What this is doing is disrupting the
notion of English as the official language of Nigeria by forming what Alim contends to
be a “pan-Nigerian identity” departing from the established assumption that English is the
official language. This, Alim notes, “raises serious educational, political, and policy
concerns” since these young people construct multilingual texts that undermine official
language and educational policies that tend to view English as the dominant and sole
lingua franca of Nigeria (p. 131).
Alim’s international analyses of Hip-Hop youth contends that global ill-literacies
are “agentive, progressive, linguistic acts of identification and social transformation” as
they clearly challenge “prescriptive, restrictive, and antidemocratic notions of culture,
citizenship, language, literacy, and education” (Alim, 2011, p. 131). How then can
educators appreciate and encourage ill-literacies especially when they work within
dominant, mainstream, hegemonic institutions? Studies have shown that schools and
educators seldom appreciate, encourage and at times hinder the creativity and ill-

47

literacies of Hip-Hop youth. Alim writes, that not only do educators ignore the cultural
and linguistic resources young people bring into the classroom from their diverse
backgrounds, but that “they…sometimes are even opposed to, youth ideologies of
language and literacy” (p. 132). Alim’s analysis is therefore effective, in not providing a
rich literary argument for the creative and intellectual gymnastics inherent in ill-literacies,
but also equips readers with pedagogical possibilities for scholars to engage youth illliteracies.
Educational institutions to date are at a paradox. On one hand, they demand and
encourage dominant varieties of language and literacy practices from their students while
at the same time researchers disregard or are ignorant of their students’ abilities. This,
Alim (2011) argues, is unreasonable and leads to damaging marginalized youth (p. 134).
It is then implicit for scholars who adopt and support ill-literacy to espouse its liberatory
qualities by embracing young people’s lived realities and rewriting majoritarian
narratives that ascribe marginalized youth experiences as lazy or unintelligent (p. 136).
Classrooms informed by Hip-Hop ill-literacy must be a safe space to critically examine
the world by interrogating issues such as race, gender, class, and sexuality in an intimate,
reciprocal space underlined by mutual respect (p. 135 & 136). It is to be said that Alim is
not without critique and admonition for those who intend to introduce Hip-Hop literacy
into their classrooms.
We as researchers, Alim (2011) notes, need to be mindful not to fall trap to
respectability politics and/or a white washed, sanitized version of Hip-Hop. If our goal is
to consider the lived realities of young people, then we should choose to incorporate
those texts that are wildly read and circulated by young people. Hip-Hop is a “rare,
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democratic space where the sacred sits right alongside the profane, allowing for open
discourse and prioritizing expression over the monitoring of the acceptable” (p. 138). In
doing so ill-literacy studies can avoid reproducing dominant ideologies by monitoring
what is acceptable or “right.” Second, he argues, we should be mindful of what values we
place on Hip-Hop texts and spoken word texts. If we uphold the false binary that spoken
word is intellectual and conscious and Hip-Hop as bling-bling and about nothing, then we
end up promoting respectability politics by educators who “positively evaluate youth as
poets when their rhymes align with institutionally sanctioned behavior and negatively
evaluate them as rappers when they do not” (p. 139). Third, educators do not introduce
CRT, critical literacies or critical pedagogies in their classroom even though these studies
draw on these theories, that must be changed in order to forefront what is already inherent
within Hip-Hop ill-literacy (p. 139).
In late 2017, December 14, 2017 to be exact, The Roots MC, Black Thought,
asserted his GOAT status in a fiery, relentless, lyrical freestyle that left the Hip-Hop
community shook. We all listened, re-listened, scoped out the lyrics on Genius and
played it a few more times to cop what has been deemed to be one of the most
electrifying, assertive, and intentional ten-minute freestyle, ever. Think pieces were
written by NPR, the New Yorker, The Rolling Stone, etc., all expounding the freestyle’s
complex, autobiographical, metaphorical, and literary content (Cobb, 2017). What this
watershed moment in Hip-Hop showed to the world, once again, is its incessant
dominance, maturity, and counter-narrative that at once exhilarates, obliterates, and
educates.
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Alim’s (2011) literary analysis of ill-literacies falls in this vein in his attempt to
elevate an oft maligned culture into the echelons of academia. Black Thought’s rhymes
earned him praise for his “wordsmith and poetry” (The Source), his casual “erudition,
metaphor and poise” (New Yorker) and other accolades in a ten minute, 2,000-word
rhyme that embraces the local to the global. Much as Alim makes claim to the global illliteracies of Hip-Hop, so too does Black Thought bring it all in within a ten-minute
freestyle that once again challenges mainstream, bourgeois tastes to re-acknowledge HipHop’s poetic and literary prowess by “draw[ing] on the ubiquitous Hip-Hop practice of
semantic inversion, whereby standard negative meanings attached to words are inverted
to produce positive ones, to highlight the irony of youth described by educational
institutions as semi-literate or illiterate” (Alim, 2011, p. 122).
It becomes quite apparent why within an international, urban setting such as
Dakar or Abidjan, Hip-Hop pedagogy and rhetoric is easily adopted and adapted to suit
local educative needs. Alim’s (2011) explication of Ill-literacies, firmly confirms and
speaks to what Freire (1970), hooks (1994), Woldu (2010) and Jenkins (2013) have
shown thus far. Challenging the notion of language, Magro’s (2016) study discusses the
obstacles heritage speakers face in navigating a Standard and non-Standard “native”
language. Given that only 29% of the Senegalese population and 34% of the Ivorian
speak French (CIA, 2019)—with the remainder speaking either Wolof, Dioula, Nouchi,
and other ethnic languages—how language is used and manipulated plays a significant
role in the cultural capital of young people.
What happens when the dominant language of a culture is no longer the culturally
accepted standard language it replaced? Educator, Hip-Hop artist, and linguist, José
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Magro’s (2016) article, pushes us to investigate why heritage speakers view their Spanish
as less than formal/academic Spanish. Utilizing contrasting methodological approaches
to examine language attitudes in a Spanish heritage speakers Spanish class in public
university in NYC. Magro uses a “matched-guise technique with rap followed by an
interview” utilizing quantitative and qualitative methodologies for studying languages
and attitudes (p. 16).
Magro (2016) sees language and attitudes as epistemologically compatible since
“attitudes are influenced by ideologies and both fields feedback on each other” and so, in
utilizing Labov’s (1966) language stratification theories, and the concept of overt and
covert prestige, Magro hopes to use his triple positionality, as sociolinguist, teacher and
insider in Hip-Hop, to assess Spanish heritage speakers’ response to formal or informal
Spanish. Sociolinguists argue that “prestige is the respect granted to a specific language
variety within a particular speech community in relation to other varieties” as such,
Magro, building on work with Spanish heritage speakers who view their language as
lacking prestige, attempts to dissect how Hip-Hop circumvents these notions of race,
class, and accepted Spanish linguistic varieties (p. 16). In doing so, the study was carried
out in a Spanish heritage language class at a public university in NYC and participants
were Dominican or Dominican descent belonging to low or middle-income families so as
to maintain statistical efficiency (p. 16).
Hip-Hop’s glocality is reimagined from within New York’s urban setting. Since
moving to NYC in 1999, Magro (2016) started a program of Hip-Hop within the Latin
community through concerts, festivals, recording sessions, meetings, and other activities
and has also built an educational program which articulates Hip-Hop with critical
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thinking and literacy (p. 17). These programs were open to all Latinos but were mostly
populated by Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Mexicans “who were first and second
generation immigrants” (p. 17). Young people in these contexts, he argues, are drawn to
Hip-Hop because it speaks “to the experience of the Spanish speaker and his/her identity”
(p. 18). Much like what one sees in Africa, Asia, and Europe, young Latinx in NYC reconfigure Hip-Hop to represent their lived identities. As Alim (2009) notes in Hip-Hop
Nation Language, “Hip-Hop style does not impose a homogenized “one–world” culture
upon its practitioners,” rather “the global style community of Hip-Hop is negotiated not
through a particular language, but through particular styles of language, these styles are
ideologically mediated and motivated in that their use allows for a shared respect based
on representin’ one’s particular locality” (p.18; p. 106).
Hip-Hop is about authenticity, “keepin’ it real,” (Low et al., 2013; Adjapong,
2017), and being true to the local,” this idea of authenticity, Magro (2016) argues, “is
linked to specific linguistic varieties” thus, “membership in a global community of style
may have as much to do with ideologies of language and transidiomatic practices, as it
does with local forms and share linguistic systems” (p. 18). Thus, if Hip-Hop and
authenticity is about embracing street varieties of language as a form of “resistance
vernacular,” and if this resistance vernacular has now obtained “symbolic capital” a
variety of prestige in pure Hip-Hop, then, if these vernacular varieties can achieve some
social capital so too, Magro asserts, can Spanish be used as a “resistance tool in the
public space of the United States” (p. 18).
And so, the study was carried out in a heritage language speakers Spanish class,
with heritage Spanish speakers between ages 18-31. Magro uses a mentalist research
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study to look at language attitudes and the techniques used (semi-structured interviews)
of students. In using a matched-guise – recording rap rhymed in two varieties of Spanish
followed by a questionnaire/test “adapted to the semiotics of HIP-HOP culture,” Magro
(2016) is able to utilize a medium that is both appealing to his subjects and centers his
authenticity as a Hip-Hop insider to better dissect the nuances in the recordings (p. 20).
Participants in the class were asked to listen to four raps (two male, two female) and
asked to identify where each person’s language variety placed them geographically.
What he found aligned with previous studies of Latino Hip-Hop youth. As “HipHop heads,” the participants were able to “demonstrate their agency when identifying the
proper ways of speaking in different contexts, recognizing their own dialect, sociolect,
and register of Spanish as an authentic way of speaking within the context of Hip-Hop”
(p. 24). Sadly, and necessary for this study, participants also showed a bias and
perceived prestige towards Standard Spanish varieties that were not their own, thus
building on the stigmatization of “linguistic behavior” by curriculum developers or even
the general population which may lead to a complete abandonment of their language
variety entirely. As will be illuminated in my findings chapters, YEM and FESCI make
considerable use of Wolof (YEM) or Nouchi (FESCI). Though widely spoken, both
languages have proven at times to be controversial in academic and professional settings.
Provided our understanding of how Hip-Hop challenges accepted ideations of language,
schooling, and knowledge production, I argue next that we need to examine how this
impacts identity generally, and specifically, for young people in West Africa.
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Hip-Hop and Identity
Research that falls within Identity studies have often been criticized for at times
being simplistic, reductionist, or overtly deterministic politically (Fraser, 2000 and
Young, 1990). What has been challenged however, is the oversight in recognizing the
power wherein a particular group is subjectively centralized within the larger social
fabric. Morgan and Warren (2011) articulate how Hip-Hop is interwoven with the politics
of identity, ethnicity vis-a-vis Aboriginal youth in Australia. In this study, the authors
want to situate discussions of identity and identification. Identification, they argue, is
“the processes by which particular identity positions come to achieve a subjective
centrality, to operate as master codes in shaping social actors and their public roles at
particular moments” (p. 926). This of course is not a given goal but rather something that
“requires the performance of identity work in the fields of culture and politics” (p. 926).
Hip-Hop, can be easily associated with identity work and can serve as a powerful tool in
helping to negotiate between tradition and modernity as is evidenced with the studied
Aboriginal youth in Australia.
Though there has been much written on aboriginal youth cultures, there has been
little discussion on the “complexities of identity work and the politics associated with this
creative practice” (Morgan and Warren, 2011, p. 929). What was found however, was
that Hip-Hop played a unique role in centering and espousing Aboriginal identity among
young people. Why Hip-Hop is able to not only relate to but transform colonial views of
their identity, is due in part, as the authors quote Hip-Hop’s “incorporation of traditional
rituals and practices into more global techniques such as MCing, breaking, and
freestyling” (p. 928).
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Morgan and Warren (2011) conducted an ethnographic study on “six young
aboriginal hip hop enthusiasts” using semi-structured interviews from participants and
supplemented by interviews with a number of older aboriginal community
leaders/activists, and members of the pre-Hip-Hop generation in Redfern-Waterloo
(RW/outside of Sydney) and Norwa (p. 929). What they found was that Hip-Hop was
crucial in developing “patterns of mentoring, informal pedagogies, through which global
cultures are grounded in indigenous expressions” (p. 931). This was particularly evident
when the authors provided a juxtaposition of the sociopolitical experiences of
Aboriginals in RW and Norwa and why Hip-Hop resonated deeply with the population.
Young people in RW and Norwa eagerly embraced West Coast rap for its ability to
provide an account of oppression similar to their lived experiences in Australia. Among
Aboriginal people in RW there are very high levels of addiction, family breakdown,
incarceration, mortality and unemployment. Indigenous youth unemployment levels are
particularly high and low levels of workforce participation hide a much more substantial
problem of long-term unemployment and welfare reliance (Morgan and Warren, 2011, p.
932). Unemployment, the authors write, “also results from an inability to form individual
narratives of aspiration, to see pathways into the adult world” (p. 932).
West Coast rap profoundly resonated with young people in RW because it proved
to be more than a “fad [and] naive and uncritical consumption of imported youth
subculture,” rather, it provided a clear and raw account of “urban racism, police
persecution and the sense of living in a ghetto. It revealed that Black men elsewhere had
a similar experience with state authority and fought against it” (p. 934). This was not the
first time that “youth culture built a symbolic bridge between Afro American and
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indigenous Australia,” rather it enforced and validated the experiences of young
aboriginal men who suffered more under the region’s “zero-tolerance policing” more so
than women (p. 934). It was from these visualized and explained shared moments of
hardship that led to a communal organizing of young Aboriginals.
RW and Norwa share a similar trend in established arguments of the difficulties
facing Aboriginal youth, mainly employment, out-migration, and dependence on welfare.
Hip-Hop in this sense is a gathering place, a means utilized “via networks, and practices,
supported through a local youth center, tutoring and informal pedagogies from
experienced indigenous rappers…simultaneously informing ideas of what it means to be
a young Aboriginal person in a disadvantaged urban setting” (Morgan and Warren, 2011,
p. 937). This was particularly needed as young people in Nowra and RW had become
alienated from, and resistant to, formal pedagogy experienced at school. Thus:
hip hop and its practices evoked solidarity and brotherhood between young
Aboriginal men facing urban disadvantage and stigmatism. The role of
mentorship by established and credible Indigenous performers and rappers then
became crucial, crystallizing notions of, and identification with, Aboriginality as
cultural brotherhood, in the process connecting youth with parent generations
(941).
Young people who choose to become a part of these mentorship programs, do so after
having lived a life of hardship. The patterns of recruitment utilized were easily adopted in
contrast to the legal and institutional compulsion associated with formal education and
allowed “creative endeavors [to] arise from existing informal networks” (Morgan and
Warren, 2011, p. 935).
Creative and informed endeavors are easily adopted given the shared experiences
within young people. This is due in part to three factors, first, young Aboriginal men who
resisted formal educational thrive in informal settings, particularly because they are
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“participating in communities of practice with their peers. Second, youth cultural
projects are more successful when they draw on subcultural/street culture enthusiasm.
These projects provide forms of institutional support for cultural production (equipment,
payment for teachers/mentors) and they constitute gathering places for young people that
contrast with the rigid compulsions of schools. And, they provide alternatives to
dangerous street activities, illegal, or both. Finally, “cultural brokers” encourage young
men to see hip hop not just in its Black American form but as a “vehicle for handling the
contradictions in their own lives. They nurture the symbolic expression of Indigenous
resistance and survival, teach about the history of struggle and encourage stronger
identification than the young Aboriginal men might otherwise experience” (Morgan and
Warren, 2011, p. 936). Through Hip-Hop, these mentorship programs encourage selfexpression through the sharing of lived experiences between Blacks in America and
Aboriginals in RW and Norwa.
The adoption of Hip-Hop culture in Australia can be attributed to a “transnational
black culture” that has resonated throughout the world amongst marginalized groups. In
their discussions of Hip-Hop’s international reach, Warren and Evitt (2010), consider
how its global language can be articulated and “flush[ed] by local experiences for the
articulation of aboriginal identity based on the valorization of blackness” (p. 143). What
is evidenced is, much as Seidel (2011) speaks of “creative collaging,” Aboriginal rappers
developed their own ways of doing Hip-Hop. Aboriginal underground rappers in Norwa,
for example, used computer programs instead of DJ equipment, as it was cheaper and
allowed them to work on their music and share it with a wider audience. Because HipHop is a fusion between the traditional (language, cultural stories, histories and dance)
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and contemporary (equipment, software and technologies), much like Hip-Hop,
Aboriginal Hip-Hop, Warren and Evitt (2010) surmise that “is ‘creative’ because it is
concerned with being artistic, resourceful and innovative” (p. 156).
In his study of Somali refugee students in a North American high school, Forman
(2001), looked at how students negotiated their Somali-ness and blackness through
symbolic creativity” (p. 959). In this way, Forman calls upon us to conceptualize “HipHop not as a text to be analyzed or included in a curriculum but rather as a set of
aesthetic practices containing and producing situated ways of doing (and being)” (p. 961).
Which brings us to consider certain implications for research, mainly, how the physical
and mental can support or harm educative practices and movements towards social
justice. By conceptualizing Hip-Hop as a “community of practice and social networks
with localized language, ideologies and epistemologies” allows for an intricate analysis
of the ways in which this pedagogical expression can be utilized by West African youth
to promote social change.
Hip-Hop and engagement
Given a history of single party systems, civil war, coup d’etats, economic
instability, young people today are enjoying the liberties of democracy, social media, and
interconnectedness never before seen (Kazeem, 2020; Spencer, 2012). And for many,
they are choosing to speak up, tired and overwhelmed by the seeming stagnation of their
communities. Though recognizant of the obstacles facing them, young people are also
becoming more and more vocal (Lambert, 2016; Gueye, 2013; Clark, 2018). They are
beginning to recognize their power and the role they can play as “stakeholders in the
reconfiguration of society and the political project of a nation” as more and more seek to
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“claim [their] rights and representation” (Abbink, 2005, p. 23). Spencer (2012) agrees,
though speaking of Sierra Leone, his words resonate throughout the region when he
writes, “[t]he auspicious space created for free expression in the new democratic
dispensation... has helped broaden the base of participation in governance to include
more youths, who have not only seized the opportunity to express their political views
freely through music, but to dominate elected local councils, increase their number in the
legislature, and establish an array of civil organizations” (p. 79). Young people are
pushing for self-determination and transformation as they figure out their sociopolitical
role on the global stage.
In the last few decades, there has been an upsurge of music as a form of protest
and discontent in West Africa. Some of these musicians blend both African and imported
western rhythms to create an aesthetic that is uniquely African (Spencer, 2012, p. 83). As
many African countries are navigating post-war societies, there has been a push, though
“grudgingly” to “give primacy to freedom of expression” as a push to implement “goodgovernance recovery” programs (Spencer, 2012, p. 72). For young people who have not
had much say in governance, this is a “welcome opportunity to make known their views
and influence political decisions” (p. 72). Young people in Sierra Leone have
enthusiastically embraced the right to free expression, which has been “ manifested in the
singing of songs with political undertones” that decry bad governance and a need for
urgent change (p. 74). Because they tend to stay abreast of “democratic developments
taking place elsewhere in the world,” and recognizing the “discouraging state of affairs,”
young people embraced Hip-Hop for its vulgarity, audacity and violence (p. 74; Gueye,
2013; Lambert, 2016; Clark, 2018).
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As Fredericks (2014) notes, the “radicalizing discursive geography of rap” makes
it a “democratically accessible, unbridled critique which shatters traditions of propriety
and rules governing who is allowed to speak for the community” (p. 132). Artists sang
about sociopolitical and economic issues but were also “open-minded and honest
enough” to condemn the rest of the populace “who through their own laziness,
indiscretion, and political passivity allowed themselves to be manipulated into
collaborating with treacherous politicians” (p. 75). As such artists sang about citizens
reorienting their thinking and attitudes in order to “bring about economic recovery and
political stability” (p. 75).
One of the reasons why Hip-Hop has been so eagerly adopted in West Africa, is
as Fredericks (2014) notes, that it serves as a “language of contestation globally…[by]
facilitating new discursive spaces of self-expression for those who may not otherwise
enjoy such outlets” (p. 136). Through Hip-Hop, young people are able to assume
leadership roles to influence “not only their generation, but their communities, city, even
nation” (p. 136). This is rather affronting especially in countries such as Senegal and Cote
d’Ivoire with a “strongly hierarchical age-power system.” Young people assuming the
role of spokesperson is radical not only because it counters the “conventional delineations
of who is allowed to speak for the community” but also, “rap as a mode of speaking out
of turn, embodies a rejection of the status quo that is the core of a sort of generational
revolt” (p. 136). As previously stated and repeated here for emphasis, Smith (1999) notes
that when self-determination is present in the goals of a movement, it becomes more than
a political goal. It becomes a goal of social justice involving the processes of
“transformation, of decolonization, of healing and of mobilization as peoples” (p. 115).

60

Young people have an urgency, a unique tactic, and a motive that underlies their push to
engagement and social justice.
Young people in a quagmire
As we consider the impact of Hip-Hop and young people in West Africa, let us
examine the situation of young people on the continent. Though there have been gains
made in education, migration, and job opportunities, Africa’s rapid population increase
and limited resources within failing state contexts have “led to a relative decline in the
well-being and social advancement of young people in Africa” (Abbink , 2005, p. 1). Jon
Abbink (2005) firmly asserts that young people in Africa today, “are facing tremendous
odds and do not seem to have the future in their own hands” (p. 1). To illustrate, Abbink
provides the facts: young people, he argues, “are growing up in conditions of mass
unemployment and are facing exclusion, health problems, crisis within the family due to
poverty and the AIDS pandemic, and a lack of education and skills” (p. 1).
The changing social makeup of the traditionally well-integrated society into a more
disjointed and divided society has “led to a large proportion of youth having no welldefined place in society and being vulnerable and dependent, especially in urban
conditions” (p. 2). This has created social paradox amongst young people in Africa. On
one hand, children are valued by adults, but as they grow, the “ability, and perhaps even
the interest,” to care for them Abbink argues, decreases as they age. This, he concludes,
is a result of poverty, violence, disease, and the breakdown of the family” (p. 2). Is it
truly so bleak for such a group given the rise in innovation, arts, and politics?
How can we write about youth in Africa without as Abbink (2005) suggests,
“falling back on the bleak picture of crisis, crime and violence?” (p. 3). Is this a problem
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of perception? As a Congolese-American womyn, I wanted to know why being young in
Africa brings with it a “consistently perceived problematic essence”? International
organizations utilizing statistical data tend to show African youth as problematic and
embroiled in violence. Doesn’t this view end up prejudging and overburdening youth
without fully understanding context? What we as scholars should understand, as Abbink
narrates, is the “manifestations and causes” that have caused the generational conflict in
Africa (p. 3).
It is very obvious that young people in Africa are a formidable group. And, the
“chronic” problems that they face can have significant political impact. Young people
today, are eager and willing to address their own issues and can also be easily recruited
by both positive and negative forces for their own purposes (Abbink, 2005; Lambert,
2016; Gyimah-Brempong & Kimenyi (2013). And, though the media, through the
complicity of international organizations and NGOs, highlights the negative forces youth
may be susceptible to, let us not forget the willingness of young people to engage in
positive movements. Before discussing the challenges and opportunities young people
face manifesting themselves in a plethora of ways, let’s first inquire into how we look at
and identify youth or, my preference, young people.
Defining “young people”
How do we define young people? How much of what we consider ‘youth’ is
socially constructed? For example, is a man in his 30s considered part of the youth
population if he is unemployed, under-educated and cannot raise a family? Don’t they, as
Abbink (2005) argues, “ideologically resemble the biologically younger people with
whom they share a way of life defined by poverty and deprivation?” (p. 6). Is it political
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in who gets to define the term and its limitations? There does not seem to be a universal
definition of young people. The United Nations defines “youth” to be those between the
ages of 15-24; the African Youth Charter (2006) classified “youth or young people” from
15-35; Gyimah-Brempong and Kimenyi (2013), write that several African countries,
including Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Swaziland range their young people as low as
12-39 (p. 3). Is youth just a notion of time; a mood, a space, an identity?
Difficulties in naming and defining the term “generation” or “youth” shows the
difficulty we have with how we understand time. Arnaut (2005) utilizes Spencer’s (1990)
view of time as historically and flowingly embedded in our day to day, saying that “it
allows us to see how people mobilize the metaphoric of the ‘routine transitions of life,’
that is birth, youth and age-cohorts, adulthood and death – in the way they label,
experience and/or context ‘historical transitions’ in terms of rebirth or infantilization,
rejuvenation or senescence, and such like” (p. 117). Youth therefore forefronts age not as
a trajectory but as an identity “where identity is intended to invoke neither…adolescence
as a prolonged ‘search for identity,’ nor a rigid and essentialized concept (p. 117;
Bucholtz, 2002, 532). This therefore allows us to accentuate “youth agency and identity”
(p. 117). Which is necessary in order to consider the youth identity category as a
“temporal and local outcome of hegemonic struggles of subjectification and power
distribution” (p. 119). As such, a definition defining young people must incorporate an
inclusive and objective characterization that emphasizes their diverse identity
expressions.
My definition of young people is drawn from Lambert (2016) and Spencer’s (2012)
fluid understanding of young people, that is not “bounded by age parameters.” Lambert
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envisions, young people, as an “imagined and gendered category, much in the spirit of
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities” (Lambert, 2016, p. 35). For Lambert,
young people are a category that “cannot and should not be reified;” they are “imagined
to be so” and as such are “situational, amorphous, unbounded, and understood to be of
shifting composition” (p. 36). Drawing from Durham’s (2000) definition of youth,
Spencer (2012) approaches youth as a “relational, historically constructed social category
that is context specific” (p. 132). For Spencer, much like Abbink (2005), the category of
young people is “deeply tied up with power; knowledge, rights, and notions of agency
and personhood” (p. 132). Recognizing the political and epistemological weight inherent
within the term, Lambert wishes to decenter the category; to extrapolate on the dynamics
and lived experiences of a shared identity. This is the definition I will employ to
contextualize young people in Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal.
Young people in context
Let us contextualize the Africa that young people are living in today. What young
people have inherited in Africa generally, is a long and varied sociopolitical history that
has severely impacted their lives (Abbink, 2005; Schumann, 2012 and Lambert, 2016).
Abbink (2005) lays it all down as he conjures:
A long historical process, shaped by authoritarian colonialism, post-colonial state
failure and a generally problematic engagement with material modernity has
yielded the conditions of crisis and upheaval under which youths in Africa are
growing up. State failure and the peculiar nature of the African bureaucratic
bourgeoisie that are living on ‘rent-seeking’ not productive investment, dubious
Cold War alliances and a lack of economic initiatives have played their role (7).
After centuries of slavery and its gruesome effects on the social and political fabric of
African communities; followed by the devastating consequences of colonialism which
essentially dissolved the social make up of African communities, and severely interrupted
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the “transmission of social capital and indigenous skills and knowledge” (p. 7). This
interruption played a crucial role in transforming adult and youth relations leading to
feelings of shame and humiliation inherent among today’s young people. Abbink writes
that young people feel that “adults have given up on them or have reneged on their social
and moral obligations towards them” such that the perceived lack of guidance contributes
to those feelings of shame and humiliation.
This youth problem is not an African specific problem, it very much is a global
issue affecting many societies. “Virtually everywhere on the continent,” Abbink (2005)
notes, “youth, while forming a numerical majority, are in a situation of dependency,
economically marginalized, and feel excluded from formal power and prestige, even
when the time has come for them to become part of established society” (p. 11). These
issues are evident in both rural and urban settings and the challenges they face echo the
challenges we hear from students and members of YEM and FESCI.
Writing about why a rural pastoral community in East Africa has generational
issues, he argues it is because in these communities where age is used as a “social
distinction and power marker,” there is difficulty among the older population in
“absorbing the challenges and problems of modernity” (Abbink, 2005, p. 12). As such,
young people “are faced with processes of economic exclusion, unmediated
commercialization, wrong-headed state policies and so-called development schemes that
do not enhance interaction, cooperation or well-being, but rather the reverse” (p. 12). It
is these struggles, he writes that have led to the massive recruitment and involvement of
young people in revolutionary or insurgent movements since the 1970s. These groups
recognize young people as members, give them a sense of belonging and a promise of
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social change, justice, or at least some loot (p. 12). Clearly, there are egregious violations
of rule of law and social cohesion to lead to such a sharp contrast.
When we further investigate closely African politics in the post-colonial era, we see
a period marked by “immobility and the monopolizing behavior of the elites in power,
sustained by often surrealistic and ruthless methods of intimidation” along with an
exploitative relationship with the West that frequently hindered the economic and
political potential of the continent (p. 13). We see these examples with Mugabe’s rule in
Zimbabwe, Nujoma in Namibia, or Mobutu in the former Zaire. Moreover the crippling
effects of the Structural Adjustment Programmes led by the World Bank and IMF not
only impacted social services and trade relations but created new and informal “power
configurations and criminalized elite activities” which precluded youth from benefiting
from any such reforms (p. 14). What becomes clear is that it is necessary to look at the
experiences of young people in relation to the social, political, and economic spaces they
navigate.
In politics and in conflict, the political structure has often stifled or censored young
people into entering politics. Often this censorship was violent and terribly oppressive.
Abbink (2005) points out that it is not that African youth are prone to violence but that
social conditions have created a shift towards violence that has become normalized in
everyday realities. In the 1990s, for example, due to social and political changes
internally, young people played a major role in armed conflict at times voluntary, via
recruitment either willingly or through manipulation (p. 14). This resort to conflict is
often one the most “frequent responses to a situation of stagnation and a lack of future
prospects” coupled with an element of revenge (p. 16).
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When looking at discussions surrounding autochthony, researchers place it within
globalization, democratization, and socio-economic development but, as (Ngugi (1987),
Smith (1999), Mignolo (2003 & 2009), and Arnaut (2005) argue, we must also consider
the “long national history of categorizations of people along different lines (ethnic,
religious, political, in terms of nationality) because it rearticulates existing categories into
power dynamics between those who yield it and those who function with it” (Abbink,
2005, p. 140). Young people therefore play a crucial role in the politics of history and of
hegemonic struggles of “subjectification and power distribution.” They hence are a
“powerful instrument” in encompassing a privileged role in the rupture, inclusion, and
exclusion of social power dynamics (p. 119).
Concluding Discussion
The ensuing precis provides a glimpse into the potential and the power of Hip-Hop
pedagogy as a critical, educative tool. Hip-Hop’s ability to create epistemic assessments
of lived realities propels those fellowshipping within its tenets to not only take ownership
of the geo-and body-politics of knowledge production but to its transmission. When
contextualized within a West African context, we see Hip-Hop as a challenge to
traditional schooling. Hip-Hop thus, provides a door, a motive, and a purposeful tool to
unite, teach, and learn from those who have chosen to learn outside the traditional course.
What we see with organizations such as YEM and FESCI, is this sense of urgency in
sharing and learning within this transformative educational tool.
The following chapter introduces my methodological application of Vavrus and
Bartlett’s (2017) Comparative Case Study (CCS) in the study of YEM and FESCI. CCS
provides a multiscalar approach to this study and allows for a nuanced investigation on
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how young people in Dakar and Abidjan negotiate their identities through Hip-Hop.
Acknowledging Touré (forthcoming) and Mignolo’s (2003, 2009) understanding of the
transcolonial, shared struggle of colonized people; I will illustrate how YEM and FESCI
members see themselves as a “lost” and marginalized population who are drawn to HipHop’s counterhegemonic aesthetic. As I elaborate on Low et al., (2013), Magro (2016),
and Adjapong’s (2017) consideration of authenticity and “keepin’ it real,” I will analyse
how FESCI and YEM’s adoption of Hip-Hop pedagogy is a means to demonstrate
authenticity and engage in epistemologies of resistance and disobedience. Finally,
Mignolo (2003, 2009) and Ngugi’s (1987) epistemic disobedience and decolonizing
approach informs how YEM and FESCI use language, forms of socialization, and
identity formation as counternarratives, to delink and liberate from imperialism.
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CHAPTER 3
MORTAL THOUGHT: METHODOLOGY
Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss my methodological considerations for examining the role
of Hip-Hop, schooling, and civic engagement in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. I base this
research on the transnégritude implications of Hip-Hop culture (Touré, forthcoming;
Appert, 2015 & 2016; and Fielder, 1999) to consider what the culture vis-a-vis civic
movement groups mean when confronting authenticity, knowledge making, and
transformation. Just as Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1987) pleads for a decolonization of the
mind, so too did Afrika Bambaata (1977) and KRS ONE (1989) urge for Hip-Hop heads
to consider achieving liberation through knowledge of self as detailed in chapter 2.
In Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, there has been a push to reclaim a sense of
authenticity and transformation, either through political and economic means, in the
countries’ economic development and higher education policy plans (Plan Sénégal
Emergent, 2014 and Politique Nationale pour l'Enseignement Supérieur de la Côte
d’Ivoire, 2017) but also by young people through activism and civic engagement. For
those students who feel they have been conditioned and trained in a system of deception
and disillusionment (Abbink, 2005, Sany, 2010, Akindès & Fofana, 2011), Hip-Hop
culture has become a powerful tool in their expression and their thinking, such that it
begins to run counter to their appreciation of their current reality. (KRS-ONE,1989). As
such, they have adopted a culture and tradition that speaks to their realities, identities, and
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their experiences. As highlighted in the second chapter, Hip-Hop culture provides a
platform where young people can fully express themselves and creates a space to
engender a movement that speaks to the healing and transformative power of the culture.
This notion goes beyond just the musical genre of the culture, and instead influences the
“processes of identity formation by which youth and young adults conceive of
themselves, others and the world around them” (Petchauer, 2009, p. 947, hooks, 1994,
and Bridges, 2001). Hip-Hop pedagogy in this case is both a counter-narrative and
creates spaces for other counter-narratives to emerge or, as Mignolo (2009) calls it, “an
apparatus of enunciation” to reclaim the social, political, and cultural reality of young
people.
To this end, my theoretical and epistemological standing are informed by an
epistemology of disobedience (Mignolo, 2009) seen through a post-structural and
decolonizing paradigm that considers the macro—social, political and historical
dynamics that have shaped and influenced young people, education and engagement; and
the micro—the lived realities of students considering language, music, and culturally
relevant pedagogy. As such, my work will rely heavily on what Solórzano and Yosso
(2002) call “counter-stories.” Counter-stories, Solόrzano and Yosso state, are a means of
“telling the stories’ of those people whose experiences are not often told.”
Decolonization is not only the liberation of the nation but the liberation of the self and as
such, counter-stories act as a “recovery of ourselves, an analysis of colonialism, and a
struggle of self-determination” (Smith, 1999, p. 7). Therefore, an ontological and
epistemological framework assessing the influence of power, transnégritude, engagement
and transparency is necessary for these purposes.
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My goal is to provide/engage in an interdisciplinary approach in the study of
epistemological disobedience, power, and transnégritude as it relates to Hip-Hop culture
within West African social dynamics. Much like my ontological perspective, my
epistemology “announces [my] partisanship in the struggle for a better world” and so
encourages me to come to know and engage through textual analysis, individual
narratives, case study, historiography, aesthetic criticism and all other options that allow
full meaning making (Kincheloe et al., p. 349). In so doing, my goal is to allow for
scholars and policymakers alike to consider holistic practices when it comes to
implementing educational initiatives.
In the ensuing sections, I will discuss my methodological considerations and its
application in my research. I will first discuss my onto-epistemological assumptions;
why I chose to study the dynamics of power, transnégritude and engagement in Cote
d’Ivoire and Senegal, to frame my research. I will then introduce Vavrus and Bartlett’s
(2017) comparative case study and my theoretical paradigms and their applicability in
this study. I will discuss my positionality and subjectivity as a Congolese-American
researcher in West Africa, situate the case study sites, data collection methods and
analysis. I will then conclude with my ruminations on my role as a researcher and the
limitations of the study.
Onto-Epistemological Assumptions
When employing a comparative case study (CCS) informed by a decolonizing
framework, it is necessary that I affirm my stance and my definitions. As Smith (1999)
implores, when it comes to doing research within an indigenous context, a researcher
must ask themselves some critical questions: “whose research is it? Who owns it? Whose
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interests does it serve? Who will benefit from it? Who has designed its questions and
framed its scope? Who will carry it out? Who will write it up? How will its results be
disseminated?” (p. 10). Asking Why this research is necessary, is at the crux of a
decolonizing framework. Smith (1999) identifies research as a “significant site of
struggle between the interests and ways of knowing of the West and the interests and
ways of resisting of the Other” (p. 2). For our purposes, the study of young people’s use
of Hip-Hop as a counternarrative compels us to consider what we mean by the terms
colonized people, colonialism itself, and the implications of intellectual and state
sovereignty (Tuck and Yang, 2012). Studying the role of Hip-Hop and civic movements
in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire provides a unique lens into examining the French colonial
influence in the region and the various forms of decolonization and self-determination
attempted by Senegalese and Ivorians students.
In choosing to define the terms colonized/colonizer, colonialism, and intellectual
and state sovereignty, I wish to emulate Smith to be explicit about my intentions. “All
words are made up,” so said Thor in Avengers: Infinity War, on their way to Nidavellir,
in an attempt to take down Thanos. Our social politics and history give power to words
thus changing and reframing new and old words to fit within geopolitical contexts. This
is not to deny the power derived in naming and words but seems to weigh heavy when I
try to describe a colonized people in West Africa and their seeming connection to the
U.S. and beyond. When invoking the terms colonized/colonizer, colonialism, and
sovereignty, I initially framed these concepts within a postcolonial narrative. I did not
want to reduce and ignore the efforts of geopolitically defined indigenous groups fighting
for autonomy. Invoking terms such as indigenous and native too, can carry with it certain
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connotations that undermine an already marginalized group; Africans. But Africa is not a
country, so simply stating Africans reduces the scope and legitimacy of my work. As
such, I referenced the terms other post-structuralists such as Fanon (1963), Memmi
(1965), and Mbembe (2007), use, colonized/colonizer to demonstrate what was revealed
to me by my participants and what current sociopolitical contexts illustrate. What we do
know is that Ivoirians and Senegalese were once a colonized people, under French rule,
who gained their independence in the 1960s. This however, does not change the fact that
many feel as though they are still colonized in some ways. Kwame Nkrumah (1969)
penned this subtle difference as neocolonialism. Stating,
The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory,
independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In
reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from
outside...Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who
practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it,
it means exploitation without redress (p. 5).
My research project aims to consider the perspectives of colonized people, those
who, Nkrumah would argue, are still exploited today under the “worst form of
imperialism” (Nkrumah, 1969, p. 5 and Tuck & Yang, 2012). For this investigation, I
will be discussing the dynamics of French colonization on Ivorians and Senegalese
people specifically. Sovereignty in this context then refers to the goals of decolonization,
which pushes for the reclamation of the nation state from neocolonial forces. As Fanon
(1963) acutely impresses, “...how could we fail to understand that we have better things
to do that follow in that Europe’s footsteps?” (p. 236). Decolonization therefore, can
engender the seizure of imperial intellectual and physical space and wealth.
By engaging within a decolonizing framework, I hope to reclaim the intellectual
and physical space of Western hegemony. Under colonialism, colonized people were at
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once against a Westernized view of their histories and complicit with that view and so,
they “have often allowed our histories to be told and have then become outsiders” as the
stories were retold (p. 33). Counter-stories such as Hip-Hop, as Solórzano and Yosso
(2002) call it, act as a “recovery of ourselves, an analysis of colonialism, and a struggle
of self-determination” (Smith, 1999, p. 7).
Al-Hardan (2014), echoing Smith’s sentiment, speaks of the political negotiations
in academia for those who identify as “indigenous” studying “indigenous narratives.”
For those of us identifying as colonized scholars who intend on studying stateless or
colonized peoples, Al-Hardan (2014) notes, we “have a decided disadvantage.” She
continues, “This disadvantage sheds light on the colonial power relations within the
academy insofar as the academy privileges colonizing epistemologies that embody
assumptions about the ‘universal’ researcher for whom these epistemologies are
designed, and the relationship of this presumed universal researcher to the researched
other as an object of knowledge” (p. 64). However, in seeking to refer to a broader
epistemology that goes beyond the Western canon and rejecting a dominant and a
“colonizing ego-politics of knowledge,” a decolonized framework repositions researchers
to “listen to and participate with those traditionally ‘othered’ as constructors of meanings
of their own experiences and agents of knowledge” (Bishop, 2011, p. 18 and Al-Hardan,
p. 69). This is crucial when looking at the shared histories of oppression of “othered”
peoples.
As Smith (1999) writes, the rise of civic movements led by indigenous peoples
“developed simultaneously out of the survival strategies and cultural systems which [had]
nurtured people, their values and their beliefs within their own communities, reserves,
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tribes and nations” (p. 108). Though each region experienced colonial oppression in
various ways, what is universal was the shared dissatisfaction, leading to monumental
acts of civil and epistemic disobedience by colonized peoples, born out of frustration and
disenfranchisement. Much like the birth of négritude, the rise of FRELIMO or the
notoriety of the Black Panther Party, these movements began “out of sight (of the
dominant society) before bursting onto the national and international stages” (Smith,
1999, p. 108).
For social organizations such as Y’en a Marre in Senegal or FESCI in Côte
d’Ivoire, these shared experiences of dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement influenced
the rise of a movement that “developed a shared international language or discourse
which enables indigenous activists to talk to each other across their cultural differences
while maintaining and taking their directions from their own communities or nations”
(Smith, 1999, p. 110). Much like bell hooks (1994) writes of a “healing pedagogy” for
those confronting different forms of othering, so too does a decolonized framework
speaks to the need for a liberatory, self-recovery (p. 61). Self-determination is a part of
social justice. This notion of self-determination, as Smith (1999) notes, can be expressed
through multiscalar ways. This is a necessary process, she mentions, because selfdetermination, “involves the processes of transformation, of decolonization, of healing
and of mobilization as peoples” (p. 115).
Methodology: Comparative Case Study
To better engage in decolonizing research, I employ a comparative case study
(CCS) to study the “complexity within the case, on its uniqueness, and its linkages to the
social context of which it is a part” (p. 22). Comparative case study (CCS) as a
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methodology promotes critical qualitative research that forces us to consider and make
sense of “actions, narratives, and the ways in which they intersect” (Glesne, 2011, p. 1).
What makes CCS pertinent for this study is its intersectional approach to the “bounded
integrated system” of the individual, the nation, and the social structures that complicate
our lived experiences. I hearken back to Denzin and Lincoln’s (2013) note to qualitative
researchers, our responsibility is to “stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the
intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational
constraints that shape inquiry” (p. 17).
I build on Yin (2014), Merriam (2009) and Stake’s (1995 & 2006) approaches to
case study to employ Vavrus and Bartlett’s (2017) comparative case study methodology.
This is a process-oriented approach that works well with this research because it
combines the focus on the ‘phenomena’ or case to analyze within a larger context while
recognizing the narratives and stories of those we don’t usually hear from.
Specifically, my project is informed by 23-months of field work in Senegal and
Cote d’Ivoire; 13 months based primarily in Dakar, Senegal and 11 months in Abidjan,
Côte d’Ivoire. While there, I collected 210 surveys from undergraduate and graduate
students at the universities of Cheikh Anta Diop (in Dakar) and Félix Houphouët-Boigny
(in Abidjan) and I conducted interviews with twelve members of Y’en a Marre and
FESCI (18 total interviews in SN and CI). In addition to interviews, I made sure to keep
a research journal, utilize document analysis (newspapers, journals, and social media,
etc.), while a participant and observer at this time.
In the sections below, I will explain why I chose to use CCS as a methodology,
highlighting the concept of transnégritude, which I use to operationalize my
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epistemological assumptions and data collection methods. I will then provide an
examination of my case study sites and data analysis methods. I will then conclude with
my positionality and subjectivity within this research, my role as a researcher, and the
limitations I encountered in this study.
Power and the Case Study
Qualitative research espouses the interpreted and constructed realities of
participants/topics/subjects. Case study, additionally, provides an extensive lens into a
particular phenomenon in order to contextualize it within a larger narrative. It is through
this lens wherein my discussion on the role of Hip-Hop in West Africa is essential. First,
if we consider a vertical or “process-oriented approach” (Vavrus and Bartlett, 2017) to
this topic, we have to consider the social and political implications of education, youth
and engagement in Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire. And, we should examine the historical
roots and role of music, and why young people are using Hip-Hop, specifically, to
transform, engage, and act.
What is appealing about case study is its agnostic approach to research and lack of
fixed labeling on its ontological and epistemological orientations. Much like Hip-Hop
and qualitative research in general, case study is messy and hard to pinpoint but yet easy
to recognize. As such, given the topic at hand, West African youth navigating Hip-Hop
and engagement as a means to transform and counter social ills, it is necessary to accept
the “messiness” of such a study and too the contradictions inherent within Hip-Hop
culture.
I draw upon an understanding where Power operates not just within a racialized
society but also within a colonized people, who after more than 50 years of independence
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still feel the oppression and “bothering” of a foreign entity that seems to control their
social, economic and political lives. As Nkrumah (1969) notes, “For the methods of neocolonialists are subtle and varied. They operate not only in the economic field, but also in
the political, religious, ideological and cultural spheres” (p. 12). It is within these nuances
we must function and we must consider the struggle within decolonization and also hold
in regard Nkrumah’s call for “Pan-African unity” as the sole means to destroy neocolonialism. This pan-African unity, hearkens back to WEB DuBois’s pan-African
congress, Smith’s examination of a shared “struggle,” and Touré’s (forthcoming) analysis
of transnégritude, that is the shared black experience within the diaspora.
Case Study and Transnégritude
In discussing the internal struggle colonized people endure during the process of
decolonization, Frantz Fanon (1963) asserts, “Because it is a systematic negation of the
other, a frenzied determination to deny the other any attribute of humanity, colonialism
forces the colonized to constantly ask the question: Who am I in reality?” (p. 182) ).
From conversations with Young people in Dakar and Abidjan, I see that many feel as
though they have been conditioned and trained in a system of deception and
disillusionment, and they grapple with the dichotomy of authenticity and
maintaining/challenging the status quo. This is not an issue specific to Africa, and given
that our lens is through Hip-Hop, we must recognize the diasporic reach of the culture.
Hip-Hop’s international reach, it’s historical/political origins, and its cultural uniqueness
urges for an understanding of the transnégritude experience of blackness vis-a-vis HipHop.
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Informed by Touré’s forthcoming dissertation, “Transnégritude: Identity Politics
in Francophone African Literature in the 20th and 21st Centuries,” transnégritude as a
concept allows me to “explore the philosophical and literary articulations of the politics
of identity in Africa and the Diaspora” (p. 9). This concept as Touré notes, is apt for
studying Hip-Hop, civic engagement and schooling, because it builds on Senghor’s
conception of Africa transcending geography, nationhood, and space. In this regard,
transnégritude, Touré acknowledges, “deals with several imagined Africas…” (p. 14).
This allows for a freedom and flexibility to sway within and throughout the diaspora to
make the case for Hip-Hop, schooling and civic engagement.
Vavrus and Bartlett (2017) recognize comparative case study’s fluidity and its
inability to be boxed in. Instead, they speak to falling into the “transversal,” to reckon
with all aspects of the study. Engaging in such a study infers that I must acknowledge the
multiscalar scope of this research. I must therefore, consider the role “spatial politics”
play in this conception. Transnégritude as such, “echoes the notion of transversality of
négritude...the temporal (transgenerational) for one and the spatial for the other” (Touré,
forthcoming, p. 15). Hip-Hop as a transnégritude concept then falls not only within
diasporic narratives but clearly possesses its own unique creation outside it as well.
Transnégritude like CCS, allows for the “dissection of tensions,” but also
illustrates the links between and within the diaspora. The goal is to consider the
“deterritorialization of Africa, an Africa present in the European and American
continents, and differently on the African continent” (Touré, forthcoming, p. 16). All part
of the same root but with overlapping and intersecting branches with their own distinct
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characteristics. If we are to accept this notion of transnégritude, then we acknowledge its
role as a tool for denunciation through unity.
Hence, transnégritude allows for me to think through Hip-Hop; its transnational
links and its influence and use by students. It also promotes an intersectional use of the
multiscalar scope of this project and the many interweaving aspects that color this
investigation.
Navigating the Case Study: A process-oriented approach
Utilizing a comparative case study (CCS) analysis in decolonizing research,
contributes to a better understanding of the sociopolitical nuances of Senegalese and
Ivorian history, their educational policies, and the role music/Hip-Hop has played in
influencing youth. Case study proves to be a useful methodology to contextualize how a
group of young people have utilized a derided art form to teach, mobilize, and engage.
Vavrus and Bartlett (2017), Glesne (2011), and Bray and Thomas (1995) note that
researchers should approach case study as a means of contextualizing a unique event or
phenomenon to the larger social systems at play. As such, data for this research came
from individual surveys from university students and interviews with activists/leaders and
members of Y’en a Marre and FESCI; participant observation, field notes, surveys, and
document analysis in both Dakar and Abidjan.
I utilize Vavrus & Bartlett’s (2017) process-oriented comparative case study (CCS)
to provide a holistic analysis of a complex study of power, transnégritude, and social
justice through the lens of Hip-Hop vis-a-vis schooling and civic engagement. Why this
is necessary is as follows: First, Hip-Hop has proven to be a destabilizing force in
international politics and specifically, in African politics, from the rise of Y’en a Marre in
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Senegal, Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso, to Filimbi in DRC and now Sandaka in Sudan.
This unique phenomenon has manifested itself differently in various settings and
contributed to a rise in youth awareness and civic engagement throughout the continent.
Secondly, a CCS approach allows me to contextualize how a group of young people have
utilized a derided art form to teach, mobilize, and engage from a political and social
context. This approach combines the focus on youth protest and engagement, analyzing
it within the larger socio-political context while recognizing the narratives and stories of
those participants we do not usually hear from.
A CCS approach compliments this research as it compounds specific characteristics
of Merriam (1998), Yin (2014) and Stake’s (1995, 2006) evolution of case study while
considering too, the unbounded nature of research along with scale, time, critical
awareness and the transnégritude experience. Yin (2014), conceptualizes case study
research as a “realist perspective” that is bounded in time and space, or “real world
setting” as a means to maintain objectivity in methodological considerations. Case study,
in this sense is concerned with what is happening in the now, and as suggested by Yin,
does little to marry the past to the present and instead bounds itself to a constructed
objectivity.
Merriam (1998), approaches case study from the notion that reality is “constructed
intersubjectively” allowing that meanings and understandings are developed socially and
experientially. The goal is to provide an ordered and practical analysis, given the plurality
of information at hand and the multitude dissections. Building on this “pragmatic
constructivist” approach, Stake (1995, 2006), pushes for the discovery of meaning and
understanding of experiences in context. Not only is the researcher’s role critical in this
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endeavor, but it is also interpretive. I must contend with the multiple realities and
subjectivities around me and interpret those meanings and experiences through contextual
and timely placement, interviews, observations, journaling and vignettes are necessary to
allow for a “thick” description of findings. It is within this lens, through Yin’s (2014)
rigorous “replication logic,” Merriam’s (1998) constructivist approach, and Stake’s
(2006) acontextual analysis that leads me to Vavrus and Bartlett’s (2017) approach,
which is process-oriented and which considers time, scale, context, translocality and
critical awareness.
What we see in Vavrus and Bartlett’s (2017) process-oriented approach is the
unboundedness of CCS. CCS, like Hip-Hop in this regard, is not constrained but rather
relies on an “emergent design” allowing for flexibility. This methodology allows me to
go against traditional case study approaches and as is crucial in critical work, encourages
me to be more ‘daring’ and ’explicit’ in my methodological decisions (p. 24, 38). Much
like Hip-Hop culture, a process-oriented approach to CCS encourages me to go beyond
perspectives that are bound in time and that do not allow for linear interpretations of time
and space. Outside of the social and political factors, historical and economic
interpretations must be taken into consideration. What of the shared experiences of those
who identify as part of the Hip-Hop generation or generation Zouglou? Can we not
simultaneously discuss their shared space within a transnégritude understanding while
also acknowledging their unique expressions? This project contextualizes the
multilayered aspects that significantly influence and impact young people from the
macro—politics, economics, sociocultural nuances, to the micro—schooling, civic
engagement and Hip-Hop, etc.
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When considering a methodological tool for researching engagement and education
in West Africa, case study has proven useful for it has been used in different traditions
within comparative and international education. Crossley and Vulliamy (1984) note that
case study has a common “conviction” regarding the “centrality of contextual
understanding and detailed micro-level research” evidenced in comparative and
international educational, among other fields (p. 96). In this regard, case study is both a
methodological and epistemological approach to comparative studies arguing for the
“case for the case,” noting that meaning known about one context cannot be presumed to
be true in another context. This holistic approach to research they refer to as “ecological
validity” illustrates the importance of examining how social, political, cultural, and
economic factors interplay in various settings.
Though Vavrus and Bartlett (2006) have moved away from a vertical research
approach to a process-oriented approach to comparative case study, their justification for
a holistic approach to case study still holds true. Case study, if conducted well, considers
both the ‘micro-level understanding” of a specific phenomenon and a “macro-level
analysis” to situate local action and interpretation within the broader social, historical,
and political structure (p. 96). In their re-processing of case study to a comparative case
study approach utilizing a process-oriented analysis, Vavrus and Bartlett (2017),
acknowledge the importance of conducting a study that examines the interconnections of
systemic structures to provide a thick description of the micro and macro contexts within
the local, national, global. They note, “understanding of the microlevel is viewed as part
and parcel of larger structures, forces, and policies about which the researcher must also
develop a full and thorough knowledge” (p. 96). This is similar to Bray and Thomas’s
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(1995) multilevel analysis, in which they argue for comparison across different
dimensions and, specifically, geographic or locational levels to avoid “incomplete and
unbalanced perspectives on educational studies” (p. ?).
When conducting case study through a decolonized lens, Vavrus and Bartlett (2006
& 2017) implore us, much as Smith (1999) does, to consider: whether we have sufficient
knowledge of the region, if we have sufficient understanding to make the project
meaningful, not to reproduce dominant/knowledge relations, and to decenter the nationstate from its privileged position to one of the many systems to analyze (p. 98). Why this
is beneficial is twofold, first, a holistic case study that considers the micro and macro,
places local knowledge on “equal footing” to that of “authoritative” knowledge by
assessing what “ought to be,” as mandated in policy pronouncements and what is
happening as is told by local actors (Vavrus & Bartlett, 2006, p. 98). In doing so, the
researcher is made to critically consider the “politics of knowledge production” in
comparative and international education and the role they play in perpetuating research
that “privileges certain ways of knowing over others” (p. 98).
If we are to contend that Hip-Hop is about authenticity and self-determination,
qualitative research and CCS specifically are the perfect engines for detailing young
people’s experiences with their educational training, their perceptions of their educational
systems, and how they have attempted to counter these challenges with their own
motivations. Moreover, though speaking about African Americans, Tillman (2002)
notes, when it comes to examining and analyzing their realities, qualitative research is
necessary as it is allowing for an engagement with a practice that has similar traditional
and cultural roots as those seen in Diaspora. She attests that given the cultural and
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historical politics of the Black experiences, it is only necessary to utilize research
traditions that emphasize rather than minimize Black lives. With that said, it is clear why
CCS, for these purposes, addresses the complexities of Hip-Hop, sociopolitics, and the
lived realities of West African youth.
Post-structural theoretical paradigms with the goal for deconstruction
If we are to argue for a transnégritude experience of Hip-Hop culture, that is, the
emancipatory practice of transformation shared within the Diaspora, it is necessary to
expound on the notions of post-structural and decolonizing theories and its relevance
within education and Hip-Hop as it relates to youth in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. In her
groundbreaking work, Decolonizing Methodologies, Smith (1999) shares this
transnational sentiment when discussing the history, impact, and process of colonization
and decolonization when she writes that “colonized peoples share a language of
colonization, share knowledge about their colonizers, and, in terms of a political project,
share the same struggle for decolonization” (p. 45). As such this research project is
intended to deconstruct and disrupt majoritarian narratives and to center the voices of
young Senegalese and Ivorian students.
“African, know thyself”
The creation of the “other” has played a significant role in western sociopolitical
history. In his discussion of the construction of the Orient, Edward Said (1978) writes,
“the Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of
romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences” (p.
1). Looking at the social construction of the Orient, the “Occident” promoted the notion
of the “other” from itself and thus dealt with it by “making statements about it,
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authorizing views of it, describing it by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short,
Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over
the Orient” (p. 3). This cultural explication of the other was maintained “politically,
sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the postEnlightenment period” and beyond (p. 3; Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 4).
The violence and savagery of colonialism resulted in the dehumanization of the
colonized and the colonizer. Echoing Césaire (1955) and Fanon (1963), Prasad (2005)
asserts, “not only does colonialism oppress and exploit entire nations, but it also turns
their inhabitants into objectified commodities…this objectification, which robs people of
their dignity and humanity has always equaled “thingification” (p. 264). In linking the
materiality of the black body to its historiography, I argue that the “thingification” of the
black body was manifested into the beastification of the Black body. This beastification
can be seen as a result of the pathology of colonialism, which was responsible for the
social construction of differences along racial lines and “ultimately annihilated black
subjects into nothingness” (Prasad, 2005, p. 264).
My research seeks to decolonize the scholastic approach to a single experience of
schooling, engagement, and Hip-Hop culture. Decolonization, Fanon (1963) wrote, is
almost always a violent process one that leads to “total disorder…Decolonization is truly
the creation of new men…The thing colonized becomes a man through the very process
of liberation” (p.2). However, if one chooses to challenge the colonial system, one must
also be determined “from the very start to smash every obstacle encountered” (p. 3).
Poststructuralism with its tendency to deconstruct is a relevant continuation of
postcolonial thought as it challenges the colonial and neocolonial condition, its
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consequences and contradictions when considering education goals as attributed by
international organizations. Utilizing a decolonizing framework humanizes the
constructed beast of the “other.” Hip-Hop pedagogy in this case becomes a counternarrative method necessary to reclaim the social, political, and cultural reality of those
“othered.”
Solórzano and Yosso (2002), affirm that “oppressed groups have known
instinctively that stories are an essential tool to their own survival and liberation” (p. 32).
As such counter-stories can be a method used to “exposing, analyzing, and challenging”
majoritarian narratives on racial privilege, young people, their agency, and methods of
engagement (p. 32). What better way to challenge dominant ideals than by using a
tradition that is intrinsically foreign and yet familiar? Foreign because, as the authors
argue, storytelling has a rich and continuing tradition in brown communities. And yet
familiar due to storytelling’s intimacy and naturalness. In my analysis, my goal was to
forefront FESCI and YEM member stories in order to engage in what Strauss and Corbin
(1990) call “theoretical sensitivity,” which refers to the insight and capacity of the
researcher to interpret and give meaning to their data. And, “cultural intuition” as
discussed by Bernal (1998) to recognize the complex processes that impacts participants
and colors both participants and researchers in the research process.
What I continuously saw during my time in Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire was a
response to the ”othered” discourse and its implications on the local, national and
international stage. Young activists in either Y’en a Marre or FESCI, it seemed, engaged
in epistemic disobedience, a prism I found myself naming and from which I began to
frame this research. This othering was rooted and based on a shared colonial experience
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by both myself and my participants; students, that colored our outlook, our work and our
interaction within our social and political circles. To wit, functioning within the prism of
epistemic disobedience (Mignolo, 2009 and Ngugi, 1987) allows us to re-examine the
“colonial wound” and consider the geo and body politics of knowledge and knowledge
making. The cultural attachment attributed to the ‘third world’ assumes that scientific
inquiry cannot be gained from those whose previous status was to be “studied.” The goal
of this research project is to illustrate how Hip-Hop can be and is being utilized as “an
apparatus of enunciation” to reclaim the social, political, and cultural reality of young
people.
Researcher positionality
“…for all research necessarily starts from a person’s view of the world, which
itself is shaped by the experience one brings to the research process” (Grix, 2002,
p. 179).
As a Congolese refugee growing up in the Midwest of the United States, my
identity and social realities were in effect placed within a postcolonial/neocolonial
narrative. Many refugee children coming from the continent have living relatives who
lived under a colonial regime. Many more have lived and grown in communities that
were and continue to be affected by neo-colonial tendencies that influence social,
economic, and political climates. It is not uncommon to overhear conversations of
“better times” (for some) and “crippling” times for others; each relative and friend having
their own perspective of the legacies of our colonial and postcolonial legacy. But as life
experiences have continuously begun to shape my identity, I have also come to accept
how and why I am critical and work to deconstruct the social, cultural, and political
dynamics that influence our social realities. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge
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that my nationality, race, class, and gender have also played pivotal roles in my
comprehension of the larger social dynamics.
I was born in the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire). When I was six,
my mother, brother and I, fled to Nairobi, Kenya to re-join my father who had escaped
two years earlier from political persecution by then dictator Joseph Mobutu Sese-Seko.
Back then as it is today, journalists could not freely denounce the president without fear
of consequence. As a young child, I was not aware of the tensions surrounding our
displacement, only that my parents’ demeanor was slowly changing, and I no longer
spoke French and Lingala with school mates. In Nairobi, English and Kiswahili were the
lingua franca. Along with these linguistic changes, I was also learning about Kenyan
culture and history. I can still sing the Kenyan national anthem in both Kiswahili and
English, as we were taught in school! Four years into our new life in Kenya, we were to
move once more, having received asylum status from the UNHCR. We were at the mercy
of whatever foreign government who would give Congolese refugees their visas. The
United States proved to be merciful and my parents could breathe a sigh of relief. We
landed in Cedar Rapids, IA on a cold and windy night in March, on the first day of
Spring. My refugee status, years of displacement, and eventual arrival to the U.S made
me an inexplicable mutt even to other Africans.
For a long time, I hid my background and was ashamed to share. Having seen
U.S. depictions of Africa, Africans, and refugees; while simultaneously being reminded
of my “savagery,” cemented that the continent of my birth was not a place from which to
be proud. No, it was best to accept the “backwardness” of the continent and fully commit
to the more civilized and progressive country that was now to be my adopted home. It
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also helped that my very white, very Midwest classmates strongly encouraged this
narrative. Much like Derrick Bell (1992) speaks of the cultural shame many African
Americans faced of their slave history, so too was I a “subordinate and mostly shunned
portion of a society….” My beloved continent, as Bell writes in speaking of African
Americans, was a symbol of shame that “burdened black people with an indelible mark
of difference as we struggled to be like whites” (pg. 1-2). Omission and denial, it
seemed, would become my new allies to the outside world.
It is from this vantage point whereby I unknowingly began to understand and look
at my social reality. Here I was: a young female refugee from central Africa, living in a
predominantly white state (and country), in a low-income community, and with limited
resources, trying to navigate multiple identities. Moreover, my father, a proud
Lumumbist, made sure to remind us of the post-colonial realities of our beloved country.
Thus, even before I could comprehend the greater forces around my 12-year-old self, I
already knew that we lived in a world of great inequality, deep racial and ethnic tension,
and entrenched roles; be it gender, race, class, or nationality. I knew that “refugee” was
not a title one could proudly proclaim, I understood that there was a hierarchy even
among us “outsiders” that was given to us by our fellow white counterparts such that
when terms such as “exotic,” “intelligent,” and/or “loud” were used, I knew that
ethnically and culturally, they represented and even lauded certain minorities while
demeaning others. Cue: Hip-Hop.
Hip-Hop culture spoke to me when I was a teenager consumed by a cultural
duality and internal conflict I could not name. Those who spoke to me most were young,
loud, and angry protesters such as Tupac, Queen Latifah, and KRS-ONE, who embodied
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the spirit of Patrice Lumumba and Thomas Sankara. Though my equally religious
parents forbade the music, I could proudly express my truth and authenticity though my
language, clothing, and artistic output—clinging to a voice I could not yet own.
The attempt to comprehend and perhaps answer these quandaries is also what
drove me to my academic interests. For, at the end of it all, my research drives me to
better understand myself and my world, in order to fight for social change. Grix (2002),
Lincoln and Denzin (2013), Mason (2002) and Arzubiaga et al. (2008) all have spoken on
the personal nature of qualitative research. Because qualitative research is grounded in
the tradition of interpreting our social reality and/or our lived experiences, it hearkens to
the old Zoroastrian saying, “Knowledge of self, is knowledge of god.” Manifestations of
deity notwithstanding, the saying does have its truth in the connection between the
personal and theoretical. Before a Zoroastrian is able to fully understand their deity,
they must first understand themselves, equally, before I can articulate my research
problem, I must first know and articulate my truth, or how I view and interpret my social
reality.
Grix writes that ontology or ontological claims are “claims and assumptions that
are made about the nature of social reality, claims about what exists, what it looks like,
what units make it up and how these units interact with each other.” In short, Grix
confirms, “ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social
reality” (pg. 177). It is necessary that we understand, acknowledge, and defend our
ontological position because it is deeply personal. It is, in essence, the knowledge of
one’s academic/professional self.
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I am aware that my personal background plays a significant role in my research
interests and educational pursuits. I was a refugee immigrant from Central Africa who
arrived in the U.S. at a young age, I had a varied educational background, and took on
household responsibilities while attending school in order to help my family as we
navigated our new lower socio-economic status. These traits have shaped my identity
and colored my socio-political stance as I have been educated and reared in the U.S.
Cue: CCS.
Because CCS is unbounded in its structure and design, it marries well with the
complex research process undertaken by a former refugee and naturalized CongoleseAmerican womyn conducting dissertation research in West Africa. The process is messy
and at times non-linear; there are multiple streams and content to contextualize. What
CCS allows for is an approach to research that considers the horizontal, vertical and
transversal axes necessary for such comparison. This comparison goes beyond time and
space, compares and contrasts between and within various social, political and economic
contexts over time and through it.
Navigating the horizontal, vertical, and transversal axes of a multilayered study
such as this requires an analysis that examines the “interconnections across dispersed
locations” to provide fruitful directions for comparison (Vavrus & Bartlett, 2017, p. 14 &
102). This is essential in the “articulation and dearticulation of networks and actors over
time and space” (p. 29). What Vavrus and Bartlett (2017) note is the processual
gradation of various avenues, which they call axes. A horizontal axis, they argue,
compares how similar policies are socially “produced and complexly connected” in
distinct locations (p. 13). A vertical axis commits to a simultaneous analysis “to and
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across scales,” what they call “assemblage” to provide a multiscalar examination of
several factors. A transversal comparison, utilizes the horizontal and vertical axes and
incorporates historically situated processes to further enhance social research (p. 99).
Recognizing the multitude of experiences and locations inherent in my life and
participants’ lives while incorporating these axes allows me to engage in nuanced
complexities.
Researcher subjectivity and language
Conducting a research study in two linguistically varied landscapes illustrated that
language is a non-neutral medium (Duranti, 2009). As previously mentioned my
background and closely related narrative significantly affected how I approached and
interacted with my study. I wanted to make sure that I presented students’ and activists’
voices as they chose to be heard. For example, during transcriptions, I made sure to
transcribe all interviews in French first and then, after another listen, transcribing and
translating to English. Such that, when I provide quotes in the ensuing chapters, the
translations are placed side by side for transparency and clarity. This allows for their
words to be seen as is, with limited edits to grammar, structure, and/or style.
Even with these precautions navigating language and the use of it in transcriptions
proved to be challenging. First, though I spent one year studying Wolof in Dakar, I was
not fluent enough to conduct interviews with participants. As such, I had to rely on
French, which marked a level of differentiation between myself and Yenamarristes who
spoke to each other in Wolof. In Abidjan, the lack of a local language automatically made
French the focal language we used for interviews. Yet, more often than not, participants
interlaced their French with Nouchi and/or other ethnic languages, making it harder to
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fully understand their context. This would result in their translating and explaining to me
what they meant.
Césaire (1939, 1955), Smith (1999), and Ngugi, (1980, 1987), recognize the
inherent power in language and forefronting the voices of the colonized in their language.
Duranti (2009) acknowledges not only the inherent linguistic biases we have assumed but
also how much language socializes us (p. 16). I was frustrated that I could not fully
communicate with my participants, my limited knowledge of Wolof and Nouchi
emphasized my outsider status and revealed gaps in our discussions that I have yet to
dissect. This means that during interviews participants translanguaged. When it came
time to transcribe interviews, I encouraged my research assistants to highlight Nouchi or
Wolof words but to transcribe in French while not changing any grammatical or
structural nuances to read as formal French. I wondered if I was doing myself a disservice
in only using French to make my research more accessible. Would Ngugi accuse me of
“europhonism?”
Utilizing a CCS approach allows for me as a researcher to recognize that time and
space are “closely connected” and as such I must consider the sociohistorical factors that
privilege one language over another (Vavrus & Bartlett, 2017, p. 93; Ngugi, 1987). My
choosing to provide both French and English is a push to demystify and expose
assumptions inherent within any linguistic transaction (Denzin, 1994; Ngugi, 1987). And
yet, even with this in mind, I am aware that I fall short in providing nuance with my
limited mastery of Nouchi and Wolof. Which is why, I used biographical counterstories,
to promote, as Solórzano and Yosso (2002) maintain, the dialogue to speak to the social,
historical, and political realities and speak to the research to “creatively
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challenge…[various] forms of subordination” (p. 11). Conducting semi-structured
interviews gave participants and I the flexibility to talk openly and allowed participants to
navigate the dialogue and their narrative.
As a Congolese-American, my background and social framework are tightly
connected to my roots. I am sensitive to the plight of young Africans within and outside
the continent and I continuously wondered whether this attachment would adversely
affect the study. Because I have been so aware of my “otherness,” I have spent a
considerable amount of time studying, analyzing, and dissecting my identity in relation to
my surroundings. By navigating several academic disciplines to come to a better
understanding of the social, cultural, and political implications of my journey, I have the
benefit of correlating the personal and academic; a balance I think is necessary to conduct
qualitative research.
Selecting the Case Study Sites
Pre-dissertation research for this study began in 2016 while studying abroad in
Dakar as a Boren Fellow. This fellowship, funded by the National Security Education
Program, promotes language and cultural expertise for American students as a pipeline
into the federal government workforce. We were four women in the Senegal program,
wherein we were to engage in intensive French and Wolof language training and courses
on Senegalese history, art and culture. Of these four women, I was the sole black woman
and the only one above 30 years old. Navigating racial and gendered experiences within
the fellowship challenged me to consider my position and my identity. Though I was
privileged to have been selected for this prestigious award, my privilege was at once
challenged and celebrated. I believe that navigating these dichotomies and contradictions
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acutely prepared me for the challenges I would face as a Congolese-American woman
conducting research in Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal and with a majority male run
organization.
After undertaking intensive Wolof and French classes and taking courses on
Senegalese history, I spent the remaining eight months meeting with M23 and Y’en a
Marre (YEM) members and visiting the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD). My
initial meetings and visits with these various participants allowed me to think critically
about the direction in which I wanted to take this research. Upon arriving in Abidjan,
Côte d'Ivoire, as a Fulbright-Clinton Fellow, I realized that focusing my investigation on
university students and civic organizations would provide an interesting contrast to this
comparative study. This was feasible given my appointment as a Fellow was with the
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. This allowed me access to public
universities and their administration and considerable ease to gain access to FESCI. As
such, the case study sites selected were the headquarters of FESCI at the Université Félix
Houphouët Boigny in Abidjan (UFHB), and the headquarters of YEM and the UCAD in
Dakar. Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire provided a rich, nuanced, and challenging landscape to
assess how young people have navigated division, new political and economic power
structures, civil war and social inequality.
Senegal
Why Senegal? The collectivistic nature of Senegal, creates a communal mood that
sees education as the means to success and social ascendance (Babou, 2003; Banya &
Elu, 2001). Yet the country is woefully constricted when it comes to the management of
its social, political, and economic reality. Like many sub-Saharan countries, the
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economic crisis of the 1980s, critically impaired the political and economic strength of
Senegal. Relief from debt meant the reduction of spending on public services such as
health care, infrastructure, and education were severely cut to allow for external aid from
(mostly) western countries and/or agencies (Kane, 2010; Banya and Elu, 2001). Since
then, the country has been stuck in a vicious cycle of dependency that persists to this day.
What makes Senegal unique within this context is that it stands as one of the few
stable countries in West Africa surrounded by politically tumultuous states. Never
having experienced civil war, Senegal has been hailed as an example of democracy in
West Africa and has been one of the few countries in the region to maintain a solid
relationship with the West. Yet, it too suffers its own social and political uncertainties
which, compounded with weak governance in neighboring countries, creates
complications for the already struggling country. Senegal’s inability to fully invest in
education brings a plethora of questions confronting its colonial past, its sociopolitical
structure, and its current modern-state apparatus within the global framework.
Dakar.
Founded in 1857, the city of Dakar has grown to become the political, economic
and social center of Senegal. This desertic, partly modern and partly traditional city is
one full of contradictions. Here, one will find chic neighborhoods catering to expats,
wealthy Senegalese, and other immigrants, low-income neighborhoods, and everything in
between. After the economic boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the city expanded
at a rapid and spontaneous pace as a result of internal migration and job opportunities
(Kireyev, 2013; Kane, 2010). This development, part of the “Plan Sénégal Emergent,”
has not only brought about economic and social growth but has resulted in massive
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income inequality and continued poverty decline (Kireyev, 2013). During my time in
Dakar, I was in the privileged position to live in a middle class neighborhood, but I only
needed to turn a corner to find others living vastly different lives from my cozy space.
Dakar, like much of the country, is a city heavily influenced by Islam, Sufi Islam
to be specific and the influence of the four major brotherhoods but it is also a modern,
technologically advancing city. As such, it is not uncommon to see a young man in a fly
boubou bobbing his head to Lil Wayne, while sporting his Yeezy’s. Welcome to ‘The
New Africa.’ Yenamarristes, university students and everyday folk around the streets of
Dakar, walk around with this international patchwork that has now become part of their
identity. This was the Dakar, I was first introduced to in 2016.
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire has endured a complex history, from its heyday as the “miracle”
economy post-independence and into the 1980s, to an unstable, post-war-torn country.
Past economic crises and the civil war of 2002 and the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011
have had adverse effects on the social fabric of Ivorian life. Sany (2010) writes that
besides intensifying economic disparities and ethnic differences, which have impacted
access, quality resources, and organization, “the conflict has had a more subtle and
pernicious sociopsychological impact on individuals, particularly on students” (p. 7).
According to Sany, the failure of the state to provide educational opportunity to young
people, has “undermined their self-esteem” leaving them vulnerable to criminal behavior,
violence, and drug use (p. 7).
Young people in Cote d’Ivoire face tremendous and seem to question their future
(Abbink, 2005). Even though there has been some gains in education, migration, and job
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opportunities, the rapid population increase and limited resources within a failing state
context have “led to a relative decline in the well-being and social advancement of young
people in Africa” (p. 1). As such, young people must navigate high unemployment,
health crises, and limited education and skills to be competitive in the job market. Given
Côte d’Ivoire’s distinct history and sociopolitical structure, the country is an obvious site
to consider the intersections of Hip-Hop, education, and engagement.
Abidjan.
“Abidjan est doux!” That is the common phrase among Ivoirians and
Francophone West Africans in general. Abidjan is sweet. Unlike Dakar’s desert,
oceanlined, landscape, Abidjan is green, humid, and vibrant. Most of all, Abidjan is
cosmopolitan...and they know it. The city is divided in three by the lagoons; from the sky
scraping downtown Plateau, chique Riviera, Deux Plateaux and Cocody areas and the
popular areas: Yopougoun and Abobo; each of these regions having their own distinct
style, personality and reputation. Though once hailed as Africa’s economic miracle, even
after economic decline and the effects of the crisis, Abidjanais wear that moniker with
pride.
Unlike Dakar, Abidjan is diverse ethnically/nationally, religiously, and
economically. The city has both a strong Christian and Muslim presence, along with
extreme income and social disparities. But, the general mood seems to be that of
optimism and hope. Seven years after the post-electoral crisis of 2011/2012 and the 2010
civil war, Ivoirians and Abidjanais, specifically, hope to once again regain their status as
a leading economic power in the region. Abidjan is like a dream. You can see everything
and yet it is blurry all at one. but what really got me was the food and the ambiance
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around food. Maquis (open-air restaurants) are everywhere serving cheap food and
drinks. I couldn’t resist the grilled fish, seasoned to perfection, served with attieke,
grilled onions, fresh tomatoes and homemade piment, hot sauce; it was my first and last
meal in Abidjan. But it was also through sipping cold Ivoire beer and listening to
Zouglou or coupé décalé, that I started to learn more about this enigmatic city. This is
the Abidjan I stumbled upon in 2017.
Comparing two Francophone West African countries with varied socio-political
histories provides for a rich and subtle examination of the role and influence of Hip-Hop
in engaging and mobilizing youth in Abidjan and Dakar. Young people have played a
mixed role in organizing and challenging the State. The emergence of Y’en a Marre and
the continuing influence of FESCI, illustrate radical views of engagement. What they
also illustrate is the dramatic engagement of a new, young type of African espousing a
new African identity while denouncing western influence in their everyday lives.
Data collection methods
Although my research looks at the sociopolitical structures of two West African
countries, My focus is on two cities; Abidjan and Dakar; and two institutions; Université
Félix Houphouët Boigny and Université Cheikh Anta Diop. This investigation examines
horizontal, vertical, and transversal axes to provide a multilayered analysis of youth
engagement in West Africa.
As previously mentioned, data was collected within a 23-month timeframe.
Fieldwork for this project was conducted at the Université Félix Houphouët-Boigny
(UFHB), which houses the headquarters of FESCI in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; and
headquarters of Y’en a Marre (YEM) and the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD) in
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Dakar, Senegal. Data collection was possible through the rich connections I made during
my work with the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, UNESCODakar and my interactions with faculty at the UFHB, UCAD and the West African
Research Center (WARC).
During my pre-dissertation work in Senegal, I had established connections and
relationships with professors from UCAD and program specialists in UNESCO’s Dakar
office, as a student and Boren Fellow at the West African Research Center (WARC). It
was during Mme. Sidibe’s class, where I was first introduced to M. Mbodji and M. Ibez,
coordinators of the M23 movement, during a class trip to their headquarters. That was
the day that I gained firsthand background information on the student protests I vaguely
remembered reading about. During that first meeting and subsequent individual meetings
after, I learned about what happened leading up to the protests of June 2011. Fed up with
rampant power outages and compounded with then president Abdoulaye Wade’s illegal
bid for a third term, young people took to the streets. Initially groups like M23, led by
seasoned and influential veterans, rose as a mouthpiece for the people. But it soon
became clear that young people were not only fed up, but fed up doing things their
parents’ way. Enter Y’en a Marre.
From this contact and my growing relationship with professors Sidibe and
Sambou, I was fortunate to be introduced to other members of M23 and Fadel Barro, cofounder of Y’en a Marre (YEM). Working closely with Y’en a Marre members allowed
me to see just how they worked to engage and mobilize people to oust president
Abdoulaye Wade. Through participant observation and interviews with activists, I
engaged with members, observed their pedagogical tools for social engagement, and
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examined their influencing role within the social landscape of Dakar and Senegal. As
YEM utilizes and involves Hip-Hop culture for engagement and is made up of a
relatively young membership, the goal was to discuss the role of Hip-Hop and education
in their social activism. Table 3.1 shows the data collection sites and methods used.
Table 3.1 Data collection used in Dakar, Senegal
Location
Y’en a Marre (YEM)
headquarters

Data collection method
Observation, interviews, photos,
videos, journal

Université Cheikh Anta Observation, photos, surveys, journal
Diop (UCAD)

Time frame
10 months
3 months

As mentioned above, In Abidjan, fieldwork was sponsored under the FulbrightClinton Fellowship, which required a professional commitment to the Ministry of Higher
Education and Scientific Research. Through this post, I was able to establish contacts
with the administration, students and faculty at the local university and gain access with
local organizations through my work at the university and connection to various
ministerial departments. It is from my work at the university that I gained access to
FESCI members and other student organizations at the university and around Abidjan.
Through participant observation and interviews with ministers, scholars, and students, we
discussed the impact of the war, social division in the country, and how education has
been perceived since the conflict. I also tried to engage with organization members in
order to observe their pedagogical tools for social engagement and examine their
influencing role in Abidjan and in West Africa. Table 2 shows the data collection sites
and methods used in Abidjan.
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Table 3.2 Data collection used in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire
Location

Data collection method

Time frame

Université Félix
Houphouët-Boigny (UFHB)

Observation, surveys, photos,
surveys, journal

8 months

FESCI headquarters

Observation, interviews, photos,
videos, journal

4 months

The ambitious intentions of this study made it “too vast to interview everyone or
to observe everything associated” in this research project (Glesne, 2011, p 45). To
provide depth, I utilized snowball chain sampling. Patton (1990) writes that
snowball/chain sampling “identifies cases of interest from sampling people who know
people who know people who know what cases are information rich, that is, good
examples for study, good interview participants” (p. 176). This sampling method
provided variation within participants in order to “search for common patterns” if any, to
investigate the social reality of students in Abidjan and Dakar. Table 3 illustrates the
breakdown of participants in Senegal.
Table 3.3 Number of Research Participants in Senegal
Research method

Number of participants

YEM members (interviews, participant observation,
document analysis, discourse analysis)

6 activists

TOTAL

6 participants

With this project, I was able to interview 12 participants—six YEM activists and
six FESCI members. I was able to further analyze this data through participant
observation, conducting semi-structured interviews, keeping a research journal and
analyzing documents such as newspapers, journals and social media. Table 4 shows the
participant breakdown at the UFHB/FESCI.
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Table 3.4 Number of Research Participants in Cote d’Ivoire
Research method

Number of participants

FESCI (interviews, document analysis,
discourse analysis)

6 activists

TOTAL

6 participants

After 23-months of active engagement with schools, ministries, and organizations,
my goal was to provide a nuanced look at educational tools used in culturally relevant
pedagogical outputs, the role of Hip-Hop culture, and engagement among young people
in Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire.
Deconstructionism: Data analysis and validation
The strengths of a qualitative data set are firmly impacted by the “competence”
with which they are analyzed (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). As such, when it
comes to studying Hip-Hop as a pedagogical tool for social engagement in Senegal and
Cote D’Ivoire, my research must not only follow certain prescribed steps for rigorous
analysis (Liamputtong, 2009 and Frost et al., 2010) but it must also require reflexivity
and triangulation since my approach is decolonizing in nature. Frost et al. (2010) write
that discourse analysis requires reflexivity because the approach “recognizes that
knowledge claims are ideological, political, and permeated with values
and…acknowledges that the researcher’s interpretation is a privileged one which silences
possible others” (p. 444). Frost and his crew encourage us to be considerate of our
privilege and position as researchers such that we are able to make meaning of
multiscalar understandings. Hatch (2002) adds that, “[d]ata analysis is a systematic
search for meaning. It is a way to process qualitative data so that what has been learned
can be communicated to others” (p. 148). This in effect means that through data analysis,
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the researcher can provide an in-depth interrogation of data to locate patterns, identify
themes, recognize relationships, explain, interpret, critique, and generate new theories on
collected data.
As this study is framed within a poststructural critique, emphasizing
deconstruction, and utilizing a CCS methodology, I incorporated a hermeneutics of
suspicion (also known as radical hermeneutics or deconstructionism) analysis as an
overarching framework of analysis. A radical hermeneutics, aims to demystify, tear apart
and reveal internal hierarchies within a text (Denzin, 1994; Caputo, 1987). Informed by
Derrida (1987) and Foucault (1972), Deconstructionism challenges what we purport as
the truth, seeks to expose assumptions, and is ambiguous in revealing meaning.
Deconstructionism is thus well suited to engage in the struggle that is dismantling
majoritarian narratives and Eurocentric epistemologies, as noted by Mignolo (2009),
Ngugi (1987), and Fanon (1963), “to reveal and undermine what is most invisible and
insidious in prevailing practices,” in order to reclaim, respect, and listen to indigenous
histories (Graham, 2005, p. 4).
A poststructural framework seeks to deconstruct our truths and assumptions,
which complements deconstructionism and thus allows for me to incorporate a variety of
methods to provide what Glesne (2011) calls for a “thick description.” In so doing, I
chose to employ discourse and document analysis, ethnographic methods, interviews,
participant observation, and surveys. I chose these methods to uncover “how the socially
produced ideas and objects that populate the world were created in the first place and
how they are maintained and held in place over time” (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p. 6).
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The goal is to find, what Vavrus and Bartlett (2017) call a “heterologous” investigation of
the role of Hip-Hop, education, and young people’s engagement.
Just as CCS promotes flexibility and fluidity, so too does data analysis within this
methodology follow such a malleable and transparent agenda. Given the multiscalar
nature of this study, a process-oriented approach is also necessary in this analysis. Vavrus
and Bartlett (2017), urge their readers to remember that data analysis in CCS “requires an
emergent, iterative approach to analysis…[in order to be] more explicit about our initial
data analysis plan, our intention to remain flexible as data analysis unfolds, and the logic
we expect to use to process our methodological decisions” (p. 122).
In order to provide variation in my analysis, I transcribed and translated
interviews, used a mix of simultaneous/embedded, descriptive, versus, narrative and
pattern coding in my first and second cycles of coding to find themes, patterns and
relationships in words, phrases, or perspectives (Saldaña, 2009, p.46). I also relied
heavily on document analysis to provide context on the international, national, and local
stage from sources such as the weekly journal “Jeune Afrique” and local newspapers.
Vavrus and Bartlett (2006) call this a “vertical” approach to case study analysis that
“seek[s] to disrupt dichotomies, static categories, and taken-for-granted notions of what is
going on” (Vavrus & Bartlett, 2017, p. 49). Moreover, I relied on what Saldaña (2009)
refers to as “analytic memos” or research journals during my time as a participant
observer as a means to “dump [my] brain” about the participants, experiences, [and]
process under investigation by thinking and thus writing and thus thinking even more
about them” (Saldaña, 2009, p. 32).
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Role of researcher
During my time in Abidjan and Dakar, I hired research assistants and student
workers to help me gain access to students, to conduct interviews, collect surveys, and
transcribe. In Abidjan, I hired a research assistant and six student assistants; one who had
participated in the study, the rest had not. My research assistant, M. Kanate, was the
department student technician and was well known and well connected on campus.
Given that M. Kanate worked and had an office on campus, it was easy to meet daily and
weekly to discuss interviews and survey collections. It was also helpful to have him
around to navigate university politics and gendered/ethnic microaggressions I
encountered or overlooked as I was busy focusing on reaching my research and academic
targets. In Dakar, with the help of M. Sambou and my host brother’s friends at UFHB, I
was able to hire two research assistants to help in gathering and collecting surveys. M.
Gaye and M. Hajj were former graduate students who now worked around campus.
Our roles were clearly defined; after meeting and having them read my shortened
proposal, we went over my goals. In Abidjan, we were to collect student surveys and
from there, inquire those students for interviews. We were to locate FESCI members and
interview them as well. We would then call them, ask them if they were still interested
and set up a time to meet and talk. Though he helped in dispersing and collecting surveys
and scheduling interviews, I conducted all interviews myself and we all transcribed,
myself, M. Kanate, and six student assistants. In Dakar, the objective was to hire
research assistants to conduct surveys and from there ask those students whether they
would be interested in participating in an interview. Just as in Abidjan, I intended to
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follow up after the surveys by calling students and asking them if they were interested in
being interviewed.
As a Congolese-American womyn, conducting PhD research in West Africa, even
with allies such as my research assistants, proved to be a monumental experience filled
with a bevy of affronting emotions. It seemed that I always functioned with my guard up,
wary of the sexual politics, annoyed at the stares of my “foreignness,” and my eagerness
to engage in activism work by proxy. My position as a quasi-insider, afforded certain
opportunities but several obstacles. I was privileged to have post-baccalaureate degrees
from U.S. institutions, lucky to have been funded to conduct research, and fortunate to
have an American passport that afforded ease of travel. My assistants were always
irritated when I stated I was Congolese first; having an American passport, seeming to
supersede all other nationalities. I worried that my French was not up to par, or too
accented to be fully understood, but aside from minor grammatical mistakes, we seemed
to get along fine. But mostly, I was worried about the position I was in and conducting
research on behalf of a colonizing entity, doing what were once colonialist’s methods of
knowledge seeking. It was rough.
Gaining Trust and Reflections on data collection
“research is far from an apolitical and ahistorical activity; it occurs within a set of
historical, political, and social relations of power. However, these power relations
are encountered differently by those of us who are historically and politically
positioned, and crucially, resist our construction as well as the construction of the
subjects (rather than objects) of our research as the “other” of these
epistemologies” (Al-Hardan, 2014, p. 63).
I have learned to be comfortable being uncomfortable. I think it is because I have
spent most of my life being an outsider than an insider. Since the age of six, I have not
known my home country. Even though I was raised in a strongly Congolese, Lumbubist
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household, it would be fifteen years before we would see our home again. And so, I’ve
learned to adapt. Thankfully, I’m curious and I like to eat. It would not be long before
ugali & sukuma wiki; githeri; ceebujen; runza’s; and green bean casseroles would
become a part of my diet as much as Kiswahili, Wolof, and American Southern English,
have become a part of my linguistic skills. With all this in mind, I didn’t think twice
about traversing to Senegal and then later to Cote d’Ivoire to conduct research.
You are not really a Congolese girl. That was the refrain that seemed to come up
once my background was revealed. Are you sure you're not just American or something?
From my manner, my dress, and my demeanor, I came to the area, a hybrid of all my
experiences; frustrating some, enthralling others, and confusing the rest. It also didn’t
make sense, to my colleagues at the MESRS, students and professors at the universities,
or participants, how I was also able to come back to West Africa just to “do research.” I
was an oddity even to my friends and I wondered to what degree it affected my research.
Did it limit what my participants could tell me? Did my nomadic background alienate
them from me? I tried to be as easy going as possible; open, curious and accepting. But,
how many nomads study othered others? And for once, I was uncomfortable.
When I conducted interviews with participants, I made sure to answer and to be as
open as possible about my research and my intentions. I felt it necessary that they knew
that this was a means to an end and I needed their cooperation in order to achieve this.
Given that many of them were students or former students, they fully understood the
stress of conducting and defending a dissertation and were, for the most part, supportive
of my endeavors. Of course this was always followed by an aside, but why Africa? Why
West Africa? Why us? You are in the U.S., you could do anything there! Some said this
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in confusion, many more out of frustration; as though I was squandering something great.
Could I be trusted, given my ill-conceived choices? And how much of these subconscious
dilemmas impacted our exchanges? I didn’t realize how sensitive I would be to this
dilemma.
It is usually at this juncture where “naive” researchers find themselves with limited
guidelines and literature on what to do under these circumstances (Gokah, 2006; BeokuBetts, 1994). Prevailing critical and poststructural research encourages self-reflection as a
way to “alleviate some of these moral dilemmas” forcing us to challenge issues of power,
privilege, ethnicity, nationality, and gender. And so, I spent a lot of time journaling and
coming to terms with my fears and my concerns. I wanted to make sure that I was
working towards producing nonhierarchical, nonmanipulative, and interactive research
relationships that do not objectify research participants but permit them to voice their
own accounts of their own lives” (Betts, 1994, p. 427).
I was aware and further made aware by participants that, after having lived in the
U.S. for over 20 years, I have developed “Americanized” tendencies that at times may
have alienated my participants who found fault in my actions and behavior. As such,
though I pride myself in navigating the line between an insider—as someone born and
raised in Africa and conversant in French, Lingala, Wolof, and Kiswahili, I also
understand that because I have spent a considerable amount of time in the West, I have
acquired physical traits that set me apart—my accent is no longer as pronounced, I do not
dress in traditional clothes on a regular basis, and I do not practice all social/cultural
customs that may potentially endear me to both male and female participants who have
recently arrived to the city from rural areas. I wondered if they would not give me honest
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answers or muddle the truth so as to affect the outcome of my study. As a woman who
identifies as a feminist, I also became aware of the fact that my non-marital status and
lack of title made it that much more difficult to earn respect from male participants who
at times chose not to participate or use an invitation for an interview as an opportunity for
amorous pursuits. Honesty, whether appreciated or not, was my key to survival. I made
sure that with all participants, they knew my background, my research intentions, and my
motivations for doing so. Many more times than not, students were receptive to my
academic pursuits. Many of them having had to complete a thesis for their undergraduate
or masters degrees.
Those of us who intend to research colonized or stateless others from within
imperialist states’ academies while upholding decolonizing commitments, have a decided
disadvantage, so asserts Al-Hardan (2014) in her gripping account on “Decolonizing
Research on Palestinians.” This disadvantage sheds light on the colonial power relations
within the academy, one that positions and elevates Western ways of knowing above and
against all othered knowledge systems, seemingly devaluing and cleaving at once. It is
clear that society places value on certain types of knowledge; what is considered
acceptable, rigorous and valid or true. As such, research that focuses on narratives of the
“other” and conducted by those “othered” is questioned, marginalized, and devalued
within academia. Bernal & Villalpando (2002) call this an “apartheid of knowledge,”
that is, the domination of a “Eurocentric epistemology” has engendered an “apartheid of
knowledge in academia” that legitimates one way of knowing and understanding of the
world over others. This ideology has therefore worked to stifle, disregard, and invalidate
the research of faculty of color (p. 169, Al-Hardan, 2014, p. 68). What was vexing in this
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matter, however, was navigating these academic preoccupations while functioning in a
state of perceived privilege as a PhD student who was funded and supported by the U.S.
State Department.
Navigating Sensitive Topics
It is never easy to talk about war or ethnic violence or one’s discontent for their
country to a complete stranger. I took it for granted that I could easily break down
sensitive topics such as war and ethnic violence in two, 30-60-minute interviews with
complete strangers. Was this my colonized self imposing my will on the very people I
had ensured would be heard? The conversations I willed students to have, are
conversations we are told not to have at the dinner table and definitely not to discuss with
strangers. I wanted to make sure that if students or administrators did not want to talk
about it, we wouldn’t. What helped when talking to students, was that the “crisis” as it
was known throughout the country, occurred when many were young, either in
elementary or middle school age. As such, the trauma that was felt or avoided by older
participants did not resonate as much. However, just because we didn’t talk about it,
didn’t mean I didn’t gain a reputation around campus. This was especially evident once I
started interviewing FESCI members.
It is one thing to talk about war, it’s another to talk about the inner workings of a
contested organization that has both positive and negative characteristics attributed to it.
Initially FESCI members were open to talk with me until they learned that I was not there
to sing their praises glibly but instead to figure out exactly what goes down on campus.
Often I was met with hesitation or given the run-around; especially with senior members
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of FESCI. Could this explain why I got so much run around from the secretary general
and other FESCI members?
Limitations of the Study
My subjectivity and positionality played an integral role as a researcher. My
background as a refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo, raised in Kenya and
the U.S. affected how I was viewed and accepted within certain circles. Because I have
moved so much, I have become comfortable being uncomfortable. My nationality as a
U.S. citizen provided me certain privileges that simultaneously created roadblocks in
gaining trust as an “insider.” Additionally, given my age and ethnic background, the fact
that I am unmarried, agnostic, and do not have children, grossly impacted my legitimacy
as a “serious” woman even though my level of education and perceived social class
perpetuated the “rich American” stereotype of those in the diaspora.
Additional limitations and challenges to the study included navigating a perceived
and even named insider/outsider status as a researcher. Given certain topics discussed
during interviews or casual conversation as a participant observer, I had to learn to
delicately navigate sensitive topics that included war, displacement and loss of family
members. I sometimes wondered too, if my gender and status precluded me from fully
integrating into the two case study groups, YEM and FESCI. I was living alone in
Abidjan and Dakar, with no family and few friends, but given my work and research
needs, I found myself navigating male-dominated environs throughout my time in the
field. As one of the few women in various settings, I encountered gender politics in the
office setting or field site on a daily basis. This led to mental exhaustion and an
ambivalence to working every day and interacting with participants. As a “naive”
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researcher there was much to learn during those 23 months in terms of navigating
“fieldwork,” but what my journals, documents, interviews, photos, and videos show,
through it all, there was a desire to investigate; a passion for young African youth; and a
need to get to the how.
Concluding Discussion
This chapter has attempted to illustrate why comparative case study was an
appropriate methodological tool to collect and engage with my data. I argue for Vavrus
and Bartlett’s (2017) comparative case study to illustrate the role of Hip-Hop, perceptions
of education, and the proliferation of civic engagement among young people in Senegal
and Cote d’Ivoire. Functioning within a post-structural, transnégritude paradigm, I argue
that much like Hip-Hop this lens is appropriate to provide “an apparatus of enunciation”
to counter the narratives often told about young people in West Africa. Are they a ticking
time or an opportunity source for the continent?
In the coming chapters, I will show the conditions in which young people have
approached Hip-Hop and Hip-Hop pedagogy and how they have utilized this tool as a
form of engagement, resistance, and mobilization. First, I will provide context leading the
creation of FESCI and YEM, then provide my findings and analyses on their approach
and employment of Hip-Hop as pedagogy.
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CHAPTER 4
MAD CREW: FESCI AND Y’EN A MARRE
Introduction
Young people have played a critical role in the political history of many African
countries but more often than not, the image that has been projected of them by the media
can be contradictory. On the one hand, young people are shown either being recruited to
fight such as during the Liberian civil war, or there is an assumption of their being
“puppets for warlords who have wreaked havoc” in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Angola, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone (Abbink, 2005; Lambert, 2016, p, 34).
These images of young people in sub-Saharan Africa portray them as being easily duped
through “charisma, drugs, violence, and even food to do the bidding of some of the most
nefarious adults on the continent” (Lambert, 2016, p. 34).
On the other hand, young people are seen as cultural entrepreneurs (Strong &
Ossei-Owusu, 2013), innovating and challenging dominant narratives of wayward or
listless youth (Abbink, 2005; Ungruhe & Esson (2017). Young Africans in this case, have
been hailed as an opportunity source, an economic and political potential that can
potentially alter the course of the continent. Much as Ngugi (2009) has encouraged us to
decolonize our minds and detach from “Europhonism,” so too do we see Y’en a Marre
and FESCI attempting to de-link and reassert their autonomy. What this chapter intends
to show is that young people, specifically Y’en a Marre and FESCI, have chosen to
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mobilize and engage in authentically Senegalese/Ivorian ways that are both
unprecedented and challenge business as usual on the continent.
The rise of social media and the adoption of Hip-Hop, specifically, illustrates that
young people have much more agency than is perceived by the Western media. And, their
engagement and methods for liberation and ownership for a new type of Africa are a
direct result of their cultural and sociopolitical contexts. To illustrate their engagement, I
will first introduce the two organizations, FESCI in Abidjan and Y’en a Marre (YEM) in
Dakar. I will provide necessary sociohistorical context to situate their origins, mission
statement, and their methods of operation. I will then summarize initial themes that will
be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
FESCI
Social and historical roots of the organization
L'homme naît bon...et la société le corrompt -Zatto1
Young people in Cote d’Ivoire were fed up. The “sacrificed generation,” as
Schumann (2012) would call them, who had enough of the lack of representation,
resources and support, rose and organized forming several student-led organizations.
One such group organized by youth in Côte D’Ivoire was FESCI (Fédération estudiantine
et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire, or the Student Federation of Côte d’Ivoire). FESCI was
initially created in 1990, in “response to repression by President Houphouët-Boigny’s
government, a failure of dialogue to address the increasing demand for political freedom
and rights in Côte d’Ivoire” (Sany, 2010, p. 9). Although formed in response to political
circumstances, FESCI claimed to be apolitical, and carried out their struggle within and
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Man is naturally good but society corrupts
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outside the campus of the Université Felix Houphouët Boigny, to challenge the
government on political and social issues; organizing strikes and antigovernment protests
(Sany, 2010).
Historically, youth have organized around perceived inequity of educational
opportunity (Lambert, 2016, and Federici et al., 2000). Whether it was to challenge
access to education during the colonial era or denouncing the effects of the structural
adjustment programs on African universities, young people have been at the center of
these movements (Lambert, p. 38). In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, education has been at
the center of the country’s development. During colonial rule, young black Ivorians
known as the Compagnons de l’Aventure de 1946, were sent to France to receive their
higher education since that did not exist at the time in Cote d’Ivoire. Many of these
students who were educated overseas and came back, would end up working in the
“higher echelons of the state administration…[thus] establish[ing] the link that connected
education not only to social mobility, but also to a career in state employment
(Schumann, 2012, p. 537).
By 1965, Houphouet-Boigny’s PDCI party--and the sole political party at the
time--, declared education “the priority of priorities” and declared “education for all” as
one of the country’s initiatives. To make teaching more attractive, the party provided
teachers with free housing, free transportation for professors and students, and a monthly
stipend (p. 537). For young people of the freedom era, these were the “good old days” of
prosperity, employment, and stability.
This would change however in the 1980s, when the country’s cash crop economy
was severely impacted and adversely affected the university-government relationship. As
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the country relied heavily on the export of its cash crops, this crisis severely limited
output and profit; destabilized by unequal terms of trade and an over reliance on foreign
investments (Oumar, 2015 and Konate 2003, Schumann, 2012). This in turn then led the
government to turn to the Bretton-Woods institutions for Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAP) between 1980-1986, leading to a decrease in government spending in social
sectors, a freeze in civil service salaries and employment, and an increase in prices which
impacted “city dwellers and particularly the youth, a vulnerable component of the
population, people with low capital” (Oumar, 2015, p.191). Young people coming of age
during this time, experienced harsh realities that, compounded with the political climate,
set the stage for a clash.
Though “Education for All” was an initiative promised by the government postindependence, by 1980 with the economic crisis and the SAPs enacted, the education for
all initiative was severely undermined. Schumann (2012) notes that the decrease in
funding in the education sector made it “extremely difficult for Ivorian youth to complete
their education and leading to ever larger numbers of school drop-outs…[and]
unemployment for those who made it through the education system and who had become
school and university graduates” (p. 536). Students graduating at this time, carried
diplomas that bore little weight, social mobility through education was now denied and
became a matter of inheritance, and school drop-outs became the norm. Moreover, it was
becoming apparent that the current political system was not meeting the needs of the
people, and calls for democracy and multi-party systems fell on deaf ears.
On February 19, 1990, a student revolt started in the university village in
Yopougon after “repeated electricity cuts” interfered with students studying for exams.
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To students, it seemed as though the government cared little for their well-being or their
education. Students were fed up. The protests eventually spread to campus and by
February 23, 1990, a student led protest led to the imprisonment of 137 student leaders
and garnered support from the teacher/professor union SYNARES (Syndicat National de
la Recherche et de l’Enseignement Supérieur) (Schumann, 2012, p. 538). This did
nothing to quell student protests such that by March 2, 1990, the state was forced to
decree the closure of all “school and university establishments, and the prohibition of all
meetings and demonstrations…,” among other things (p. 538). By April, after a student
was shot by a soldier, the government announced the année blanche, cancelling the 1990
academic year altogether. This is the stage in which the Fédération estudiantine et
scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI), was birthed. As Zatto, one of the FESCI members I
interviewed quoting Rousseau would note, man is born good, it is society that corrupts
him; FESCI, according to him, was born good and later corrupted by society:
Zatto: L’homme naît bon et la
société le transforme. La FESCI
est née bonne puisque,
puisqu'elle est née à l’église. La
FESCI est née à l’église. Elle n’a
jamais eu d’ambition de
violence ! Mais le pouvoir, je
dirai, le pouvoir de dictature
d’avant a commencé à mettre la
FESCI...sinon les bâtons dans les
roues de la FESCI. Depuis 90,
jusqu’à 99... je dirai même 2000,
parce que les gens ont commencé
à financer les étudiants (Z, July,
2018).

Zatto: Man is born good and
society changes him. FESCI was
born good because, because she
was born in the church. FESCI
was born in the church. She has
never had violent ambitions! But
the power of previous leaders, I
will say, began to put
FESCI...began to place
roadblocks in FESCi’s way.
Since ‘90 to ‘99; I'll even say to
2000, because people started
funding students (Z, July 2018)

FESCI was founded on April 25, 1990 at the church, Sainte Famille de Cocody
Riviera. Because the university was closed due to strikes, the church became a meeting
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place where “several meetings, including those of the Ivorian League for Human Rights
(LIDHO), [were] born in the same movement2” (Konate, 2003, p. 50). Though the PDCI,
had tried to control students through the state supported MEECI (Mouvement des
étudiants et élèves de Côte d’Ivoire, created in 1968), they were met with a population
that was hostile and supported an oppositional logique. Siaba, another Fescist would
contextualize the organization’s creation as such: FESCI’s birth at a church at a time
during the rise of multiparty systems, by students from the banlieu, or low-income;
working-class neighborhood, was reason for their mobilizing for students’ rights. He
would continue:
SIABA: Ok, Ok. Je dirai que la FESCI a été fondée le 21 avril 1990, en 1990.
C'était une combinaison de plusieurs organisations d'étudiants qui ont vu que,
compte tenu de leur situation à ce moment-là, ils devaient changer leur façon de
réagir aux problèmes. Parce que, à ce temps, la FESCI est venue remplacer une
autre organisation. Une autre organisation appelée MEECI, MEECI à l'époque
était affilié à un parti politique; PDCI/EDA. Et oui, dans 1990, en 1990, c'était ...
la révolution était dans l'air, le système multipartite se préparait en Côte d’Ivoire,
tu vois? Et ainsi, les étudiants, les jeunes, ils ont organisé eux-mêmes de voir
désormais comment ils peuvent exiger leurs droits des autorités et leur droit de
vivre simplement comme des étudiants. Ainsi, la FESCI est née dans ces
conditions, aux dortoirs universitaires à Yopougon. Voilà. Donc, dans le village
de dortoir de Yopougon, oui les dortoirs de Yopougon, les jeunes ont commencé à
se mettre en mouvement cette nouvelle organisation qui lutterait désormais pour
les droits des étudiants, c’est donc qui Je parle de la FESCI. Il a été fondé, et c’est
aussi un aspect unique de sa création, FESCI est née dans l'église, dans l'église
catholique Sainte Famille de Cocody. Oui. (2018).
-SIABA: Ok. Ok. I will say that FESCI was founded on the 21st of April 1990, in
1990, it was a combination of several student organizations who saw that given
their situation at that time, they needed to change the way they responded to
problems. Because, at that time, FESCI came to replace another organization.
Another organization known as MEECI, MEECI at that time was affiliated with a
political party; PDCI/EDA. And so, in 1990, in 1990, this was...revolution was in
2

“plusieurs réunions, notamment celles de la Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l’homme
(Lidho), née dans la même mouvance.”
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the air, the multi-party system was coming into Cote d’Ivoire, do you see? And
so, students, young people, they organized themselves to see from now on how
they can demand their rights from the authorities and their right to live simply as
students. So, FESCI was born under those conditions, at the university’s dorms
(quad/village) in Yopougon. There you go. So, in the dorm village in Yopougon,
yeah the dorms in Yopougon, young people started to, started to put in motion this
new organization that would from now on fight for students’ rights, so this is who
I’m talking about, FESCI. It was founded, and this is also a unique aspect of its
creation, FESCI was born in the church, in the Catholic church, Saint Famille of
Cocody. Yes.
(2018)

FESCI grew out of this political rush to leadership and notoriety and rose to
become the most powerful and feared student union. FESCI would grow and publicly
align itself with the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) led by Laurent Gbagbo “who not only
was their godfather, but discreetly assured their political training3” (Akindes and Fofana,
2011, p. 216).
After months of almost uninterrupted protests and demonstrations from February
to April 1990, the PDCI party, pressured by national and international forces was “forced
to accept multi-party elections, the liberalization of the press, the creation of independent
(anti-government) student union FESCI, and the disbandment of the governmentcontrolled student union...MEECI” (Schumann, 2012, p. 538; Konate, 2003). FESCI was
recognized as an independent student organization and Ahipeaud Martial was named the
first Secretary General.
Akindes and Fofana (2011) argue that the beginning of the multiparty system,
resulted in the heavy recruitment of young people into politics. They write,
“Dans un tel contexte, la dynamique de recrutement politique concurrentiel qui
s’est engagée et le besoin pour chaque leader politique de pénétrer l’espace public
3

“qui non seulement était son parrain, mais assurait discrètement sa formation politique.”
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firent du monde estudiantin un champ social particulièrement convoité. Le monde
scolaire et universitaire était désormais envisagé comme le vivier d’une énergie
sociale politiquement nécessaire pour les luttes sociales et politiques. C’est la
raison pour laquelle les campus universitaires et les établissements scolaires ont
été très rapidement transformés en hauts lieux de revendications sociales, de
mieux en mieux structurés sur la base des griefs liés aux frustrations nées de la
réduction des transferts sociaux de la part d’un État de moins en moins social du
fait de la réduction des ressources fiscales” (p. 216).
--"In this context, the dynamics of competitive political recruitment which had
begun and the need for every political leader to penetrate the public space made
the student body a particularly coveted social field. The school and university
world was now seen as a breeding ground for social energy politically necessary
for social and political struggles. This is the reason why university campuses and
schools were very quickly transformed into places at the center of social action,
more and more structured on the basis of grievances related to the frustrations
created by the reduction of social programs from a state that was less and less
supportive due to the reduction in financial resources” (p. 216)
When Ahipeaud Martial entered office, “students were in the streets protesting
more than they were in lecture halls and labs. Schoolchildren, pupils, university students,
unionists, and workers in the public and private sectors beat the pavement to oppose
measures to reduce wages …4” (Konate, 2003, p. 51). FESCI’s influence and power was
unforeseen. With one summon Martial, the Secretary General (SG) could mobilize
thousands of students to the streets, destabilizing the city. Naturally, this level of
influence did not go unnoticed by leaders of new, emerging political parties, notably a
former teacher at the university turned leader of the FPI, Laurent Gbagbo (Konate, 2003).
It was not long before the ruling party first under Houphouet-Boigny, and then under
Bédié, began to target FESCI not only for their use of violence (some would argue in
retaliation to government forces) but for their reach and their support of the opposition.
4

“les étudiants fréquentent plus la rue et les manifestations que les amphis et les salles de
travaux dirigés. Écoliers, élèves, étudiants, syndicats, travailleurs des secteurs public et
privé battent alors le pavé pour s’opposer aux mesures de diminution des salaires.…”
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Konate writes, “The PDCI then accused the FPI of manipulating the young people of
Fesci who, for their part, played the role of the hardline opposition…,5” and those
suspected of aligning with the PDCI were quickly kicked out of the organization (Konate,
2003, p. 52).
The government banned FESCI in 1991, though this had little effect and its
members continued to meet. Upon assuming control of FESCI in 1995, Soro made
it his mission to get the organization re-registered, a feat he accomplished despite
being arrested multiple times (Corey-Boulet, 2015).
A Human Rights Watch Report (2008), noted that by 1991, FESCI would be
banned as a student organization due to violent and deadly clashes against government
security forces (HRW, 2008). Akindes and Fofana (2011) write that due to the
government’s extreme repression of FESCI and their continuous challenge to their
autonomy, FESCI grew more violent as time passed (p. 216). But their influence was
irreversible and the PDCI rationalized that the organization needed to be shut down.
Though many of its members went underground or were imprisoned, continuing strikes
and protests on the university campus in Abidjan, “made clear that FESCI could not be
repressed out of existence” (HRW, 2008). It was evident that despite their reputation,
FESCI’s presence and influence on campus was unmistakable. Even with the ban Fescists
continued to lead protests that challenged the lack of scholarships and overcrowding
(HRW, 2008). It is no wonder that by 1997, under Guillaume Soro, the organization
would be reinstated and its role as both a political tool and a student organization would
continuously be challenged. This dichotomy would be tested, questioned, and dissected
first during the civil war of 2002 and then after the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011.

5

Le PDCI accuse alors le FPI de manipuler les jeunes de la Fesci qui, pour leur part,
jouent à fond la carte de l’opposition pure et dure….”
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The causes surrounding the civil war of 2002 and the post-electoral crisis of 2010
are varied and nuanced but what is accepted is that ethnic and religious differences
became central (HRW, 2008, Akindes & Fofana, 2001). Much like the internal tensions
within FESCI members, “In a loose way, the divisions within FESCI during the "war"
took on the regional and ethnic character that has come to characterize the Ivorian crisis
up through the present day, with the FPI drawing its supporters from the largely Christian
south and the RDR from the largely Muslim north.” (HRW, 2008). Today, FESCI reflects
the socio-political makeup of the country, both its ethnoreligious tensions and its “strong
man” political methods. Part of this continues to be a result of the hierarchical makeup of
the organization; many of the former and current leaders were children of politicians in
the PDCI and other political parties. Siaba, for example, was quick to mention this during
our interview to not only contextualize FESCI’s roots but its hierarchy.
SIABA: Je préciserai que
certains membres de la FESCI
sont issus de familles au pouvoir!
Donc, leurs parents étaient
PDCI, RDR, je parle de ...
Ahipeaud Martial, dont le père
était membre du PDCI, mais lui,
en tant qu'étudiant, il a rejoint la
FESCI et c'était quelqu'un qui
était opposé au PDCI. tu vois?
(Siaba, 2018).

SIABA: I will specify that there
are certain members of FESCI
who came from families that
were in power! So, their parents
were PDCI, RDR, I’m talking
about...Ahipeaud Martial, whose
father was a member of the
PDCI, but he, as a student, he
joined FESCI and he was
someone who was opposed to
PDCI, do you see? (Siaba, 2018).

Though FESCI has made attempts to quell their once notorious reputation, the
effects still linger. Quoting former SG Augustin Mian, the Human Rights Watch 2008
report on FESCI states, “Objectively, it’s true that there have been violence and other
problems...However, it’s not with a magic wand that I can get rid of eighteen years of bad
habits. The international community needs to help us. I want a new, mature FESCI that
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turns its back on violence.” (HRW, 2008). In 2016, this sentiment was once again echoed
by the most recent SG Fulgence Assi, known as AFA. Upon assuming office in 2014,
AFA promised to “reactivate FESCI” (Tiemoko, 2016; Freland, 2016). Today, FESCI is
known as a “mafia” type organization able to mobilize and engage, while at the same
time, extort and threaten students as well as use their might to destabilize the
administration. From demanding free services from restaurants and taxis, to taxing
student scholarships for their own enrichment, to control of the dorms and a levied tax for
non-Fescists, FESCI continues to struggle with its past as it navigates a conflicting
present (HRW, 2008).
This “mafia” type behavior as discussed in the HRW report and rumored around
campus, was not the reputation FESCI members wanted me to focus on. However, it was
difficult for me not to question some of their methods of engagement. But, despite their
reputation, Fescists appeared to be in agreement of their relative draw and effectiveness.
What was clear was this: there was a lack of educational infrastructure, scholarship, and
employment opportunity and FESCI has continuously stepped in to provide these
services. And, although it is perceived as a school for leadership training and
transformation, these benefits can be extortive.
When I spoke with Siaba, Zatto, Angra, Mohammed, Hie and F, I started to see
and hear similarities and complexities in their story. I wanted to find out why they joined
FESCI, what was the organization’s mission/goals, their influence/effectiveness, and their
methods. After reading FESCI’s preamble, I wanted to know why students, professors,
and everyone in between, had nuanced critiques against these young folk. I was

125

repeatedly told that though not perfect, FESCI has been a much needed if not tolerated
organization that attempts to fight for students’ rights even if it benefits their own agenda.
Mission and organizational structure
Call and response: FESCI!..Toujours! (FESCI...Forever!)
Today was the meeting with the General aAssembly of all FESCI student groups
in all universities in the country. According to the SG, this takes place at least
once a year or in special cases such as strikes, elections, etc.
Before the meeting today, I came in early to meet with the SG, and walked around
campus since he was running late. As I walked around, I saw groups of men,
students, I presumed, dressed in matching red t-shirts; running and chanting on
campus. Then another group doing the same thing. Students on campus either
encouraged them or ignored them, but since no one seemed fazed, I took this to be
a normal occurrence. When I ran into M. Assi, the SG, he told me that they were
in fact FESCI members and that their march through campus was extremely
common before meetings to get students on campus excited in anticipation.
We were hanging out outside one of the major lecture halls while members filled
up the space. It was interesting to see a young student so bold and fearless on
campus. Even professors were in deference to him. All students who greeted him,
did so in a sort of salute style, calling each other “comrades,” this was more so
evidence once we entered the lecture hall. M. Assi and other senior FESCI
members I met would refer to Mao and Stalin but I didn’t want to rush into
making those assumptions. Their actions and language, however, were telling.
Once we went inside, it was a loud, rambunctious crew of students who, upon
seeing the SG walk in, erupted in cheers and applause. It was like the president
was on campus.
The population is mostly male with a smattering of women in the organization.
The meeting is extremely lively with representatives from student organizations in
Burkina Faso also in attendance in support (Field notes, July 7, 2018).
FESCI, as the Human Rights Watch Report notes, is “a rigidly hierarchical
organization,” which consists of a national bureau, in Abidjan, and then a number of
“sections of equal rank” (HRW, 2008). Sections can be formed either by colleges within
the university (ex. Criminology, modern letters, STRM), university residential complexes
known as cités, or high schools. The national bureau is led by a Secretary General (SG),
elected by FESCI members during elections, who then appoints all of the secretary
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generals of the various sections. At the bottom, you have the “rank-and-file members”
who are not part of the bureau of any section and are known as "antichambrists" (ATC)
or "foot soldiers," these are the members “sent out as part of “mass mobilizations for
protest in favor of the government, or to do the ‘dirty work’” (HRW, 2008).
Beyond the strict hierarchy, status within FESCI is often influenced by a number
of informal factors. Within FESCI, there is a system of patronage whereby nearly
everyone acts as protector to someone, and in turn is protected by someone else.
Subordinate members who are under the political cover of a superior are referred
to as a ‘bon petit.’ Being the "bon petit" of a high-ranking leader is often a ticket
to a leadership position within the organization, together with the power,
prominence, and often wealth, derived from the FESCI-run extortion and
protection rackets that go with it. At the same time, leaders seek to maximize the
number of members under their protection to extend their influence.” (HRW,
2008).
This organizational structure is not by accident. FESCI members are well aware
of their organizational structure, their roles, and the impact their organization has not
only on campus but on Fescists themselves. Hie, a senior member at the national office,
gave me a glimpse of how the structure worked in deference to student and member
support.
Hie: Hmm..eh bien je dirai que la FESCI dans son ensemble est très structurée,
nous avons un secrétariat, tout comme dans la fonction publique, il y a un
secrétariat, ici à la FESCI nous les appelons le secteur de la logique et de la
formation, c'est un secrétariat en charge des professionnels l'environnement, ce
sont eux qui dirigent la formation et qui s'entraînent même à se révolter, et puis
nous avons le secteur en charge de la communication, il faut que [un étudiant] soit
bien parlé, et utilise les meilleures pratiques de communication pour lutter pour
les droits des étudiants, et ici nous vous formons sur la façon d'être un bon orateur
public même si vous n'êtes pas votre majeur, peut-être que vous êtes dans les
sciences humaines, inscrit dans l'histoire, mais à la FESCI vous êtes en charge de
la communication, donc cela signifie que vous apprendrez vous-même, vous
apprendrez à mener une conversation car à chaque fois que vous serez mis sur
place, vous devrez communiquer, envoyer / écrire un message de telle manière
que ceux qui reçoivent comprennent ce que vous disent. Donc, si vous remarquez
qu'il y a beaucoup d'apprentissage auto-dirigé. C'est aussi pratique. Ce qui
signifie, si on vous dit que vous êtes en charge de la communication, cela signifie
que vous êtes celui qui appelle la réunion, l'ordre de la réunion, vous voyez? C'est
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plus pratique. C’est pourquoi nous disons que la FESCI est une école de
formation (2018).
--Hie: Hmm...well I will say that FESCI in its whole is very structured, we have a
secretariat, just like in civil service, there is a secretariat, here in FESCI we call
them the logic and training sector, this is a secretariat in charge of the professional
environment, they are the ones who man the training and who even train on how
to revolt, and then we have the sector in charge of communication, it’s necessary
for [a student] to be well-spoken, and to utilize the best communication practices
to fight for students’ rights, and here we train you on how to be a good public
speaker even if you it’s not your major, perhaps you are in the humanities,
enrolled in history, but in FESCI you are in charge of communication, so this
means that you will teach yourself, you will learn how to lead a conversation
because at each time you will be put on the spot, you will have to communicate,
send/write a message in such a way that those who receive understand what you
are saying. So, if you notice there is a lot self-directed learning. Also, it’s
practical. Meaning, if you are told you are in charge of communication, it means
you are the one who calls the meeting, the order of the meeting, you see? It’s
more practical. That’s why we say FESCI is a training school.
For Fescists, this is a “training school.” This is more than just fighting for
students’ rights, but it is also a means by which to apprentice as a future politician.
Bearing in mind the political lineages of former members, was it ever possible to separate
the social justice work from FESCI’s political relationships? Worse yet, was this all a
front to pluck future political progeny? When I examined this “school” further, I realized
that it was more complex than that.
“Benefices”
Being a part of FESCI means being a part of a family-like organization that looks
out for one another (Angra, 2018; Hie, 2018). Members brought this general trait up
when they discussed their motivations for joining, FESCI’s mission, and the influence the
organization had on and off campus. Scholars have mentioned that former FESCI
members cited economic incentives, including “access to free university housing, free
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food, and free transportation that membership in FESCI often assures, essential
commodities for survival that other students must struggle to obtain” (HRW, 2008).
Additionally, FESCI garners students respect, confidence, and a way into politics (Angra,
August 2018; HRW, 2008).
“In addition to economic incentives, other former FESCI members cited the
respect and power accorded to members: "When I joined in 1998, FESCI was a
way to express myself. Coming from a poor family of farmers, this gave me a
way to organize, be respected, and try to solve problems."[77] As has been said in
the context of another pro-government group, the Young Patriots, for many
students FESCI constitutes a sort of "counter-society where students flunking out
can be called 'professor,' and unemployed youth, thugs even, become 'deputy' or
'general,' and will be recognized as such by their peers (HRW, 2008).
When I brought these “benefits” into conversation, I was first told firmly and
clearly that there were no such thing, but they would then ask me, “is it bad to do a small
favor” for someone who has helped you? Zatto was adamant that these “benefits” were
really a result of their work to improve student conditions. When I first asked him about
the “benefits” of being a Fescist, he was a bit offended and taken aback.
ZATTO : Tu sais… quand tu dis bénéfices moi je ne suis pas d’accord, je ne sais
pas de quoi tu veux parler. Parce que moi, pour le seul bénéfice que moi je puisse
acquérir à la FESCI, c’est la formation.
BN : donc il n’y a pas comme qu’il y a des endroits privilégiés, dortoirs
privilégiés des choses comme ça ?
ZATTO : il n’y a pas de dortoirs privilégiés, il n’y a pas de dortoirs privilégiés.
La FESCI n’est jamais allé dans une administration pour dire je veux tels nombres
de places, peut être ça existe. Mais à ma connaissance là ça n’a jamais eu lieu, à
ma connaissance je n’ai jamais vu. Tu peux avoir quelqu’un, une amie, vous avez
eu le BAC ensemble peut être qui est inscrite dans la même faculté que toi, dans
la même filière que toi qui vit chez ses parents, qui vit chez ses parents, qui
travaille bien à l’école. On fait admission de chambre, lui, il souhaite toujours
rester chez ses parents, pourtant s’il postule, il pourrait avoir la chambre. Tu peux
lui dire tout simplement de te prêter ses papiers, la chambre est en son et puis tu
es dedans. Voilà. Mais certains peuvent dire, bon, comme moi je suis syndicaliste,
cède moi la place je vais m’assoir. Je n’ai jamais, je n’ai jamais, moi je n’ai
jamais … si je suis arrivé dans le bus, je rentre dans le bus, et je vois que je mérite
la place, je m’assoie. Mais dit à lui-là non faut te lever je vais faire chose… mais
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c’est… il est quand même bon, il est quand même bon de rendre un petit service
aux gens qui ont, qui ont, qui ont décidé de lutter pour toi. Tu sais ça non ?
(2018).
--ZATTO: You know ... when you say benefits, for me, I do not agree, I do not
know what you want to talk about. Because the only benefit I can get at FESCI,
is training.
BN: So there are no privileged places, privileged dorms, things like that?
ZATTO: There are no privileged dormitories, there are no privileged dormitories.
FESCI has never been in an administration to say I want such numbers of places,
maybe it exists. But to my knowledge, it never happened, to my knowledge I
never saw. You can have someone, a friend, you went to high school together,
who is enrolled in the same department as you, in the same way that you who
lives with his parents, who lives with his parents, who works well in school. One
has housing but he still wishes to stay with his parents, nevertheless if he applies,
he could have the room. You can just tell him to lend you his papers, the room is
in his name and then you're in it. That's it. But some people can say, well, like me
I'm a unionist, give me your place [on the bus] I'm going to sit down. I never,
never, never, if I get on the bus, I get on the bus, and if I see that I deserve the
place, I sit down. But to tell someone to get up, I'm going to do something ... but
it's ... it's still good, it's still good to... to do a small service to people who have,
who have, who decided to fight for you. You know that, right? (2018).

It seems as though Zatto was trying to bypass a known reality. No, he affirms,
FESCI does not receive any sort of privilege or extort any form of payment from
students/administrators. But, he demurely inquires, does it hurt to take care of those that
support you? There is a certain disconnect in the work and the application in their
justification for des petits services. Take the example of the bathroom wars in the Earth
Sciences department (STRM).
Today, I spent the day on campus on the STRM side of the university doing data
entry, calling students, and conducting interviews with the help of M.
Kanate. ...We maintain an active intellectual/political conversation on the plight
of the modern day Afrcain,as we speak in both local and pan-African terms. He is
always quick to note the laziness within the Ivorian population, and the apathetic
nature of doing nothing while expecting to be paid. This is the reason he uses to
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justify closing the bathrooms for the entire department. We get into a heated
discussion on his closing the use of the toilets for students.
As I was walking towards the department and his office especially this morning, I
noticed male students urinating outside the lecture hall. I mentioned this to him in
passing as I assumed the restrooms were in use. He casually mentioned that he
shut them down to teach “them” (the students), a lesson. Incredulously, I ask him
if he is joking. Matter of factly, he says; no. Why? I ask? Because they don't
respect the bathroom, or public spaces. Here in Côte d’Ivoire, people do not
respect public spaces. What? I re-ask? He says, do you want to go and see how
the bathrooms are?
M. Kanate continues: I have asked and implored and made signs for students to
respect the toilets. The women flood the toilets, the men treat it like a dump. It’s
become unbearable and I’ve become a dictator of the toilets so I shut it down. He
continued, I could have the Fescists handle and manage the toilets and it would be
handled but I do not want to get them involved because they bring too much
trouble. What? I ask.. . well, some departments/colleges have Fescists manage
toilets by charging 50cfa per admission to toilet and this ensures its cleanliness.
Even though it would make his life easier, he doesn’t like the presence of FESCI
on campus. He doesn't dwell too much on that and I do not want to press him so,
we move on and continue with our data entry and phone calls to participants (field
notes, July 25, 2018).
I didn’t want to believe that the university was also not providing adequate
janitorial support around campus such that students were taking it upon themselves to
mobilize and clean up. It seemed to parallel closely to what young people did in Senegal
in the late 1980s with the Set/Setal movement of neighborhood cleanliness and ownership
(Havard, 2013; Nelson, 2014). Young people once again were taking matters into their
own hands and stepping in where the leaders failed. When I interviewed Zatto, he knew I
was going to ask him the “toilet” question. It was all over the department and parts of
campus: FESCI had taken over the toilets and were charging admission for students to
use. Zatto had to explain what was going down. According to him, one of the low ranking
Fescists reported to him that while he was looking for cleaning materials to clean the
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stalls, he saw a student urinating on the grass near one of the lecture halls. Zatto
interceded and continued:
ZATTO : ...Maintenant quand je suis arrivé, j’ai dit bon, va, va l’appelé. Il est
allé l’appeler, j’ai dit ce qui… puisque lui-même il dort, l’étudiant dort, dort, il
dort… comment on appelle ça ? … il dort au sous-sol de géologie. Lui il dort à
côté. Il y a un sous-sol à côté. Il dort là. Je dis mais toi tu dors ici et tu es en train
d’uriner partout. Tu es un être humain quand même, ça-là ça va l'affecter
demain.Il faut dire que la société pour l’entretien de l’espace universitaire ne fait
pas son boulot. Il y a des toilettes ici, tu es une fois arrivée là-bas ? Très, très
sale ! Il y a deux toilettes, très, très sale ! Là-bas au moins il n’y a pas, il n’y a pas
truc, y’a pas porte. Tu peux aller toi-même tu vas voir. Comme les toilettes qui
sont en haut, sont au milieu de la faculté. Si… on ne prend pas soin de ça, puisque
à chaque fois on envoie des mots à la SIMDCI, la société qui s’appelle SIMDCI.
On envoie des mots à cette dernière pour l’assainissement des toilettes. Mais
rien ! Quand tu vas débarquer dans le bureau du Boss, ils vont dire que tu es
violent. Bon… nous, nous on a décidé comme ça, nous on a décidé comme ça de
ne plus les emmerder. Puisque depuis début, début 2017, jusqu’en avril on a
décidé comme ça de prendre les toilettes en mains. Puisque ça y est au milieu.
Sur les sols aux urines commence à faire chose-là, ça va, ça va polluer l’aire
environnementale. Donc on a préféré … prendre les choses en main...On se
connaît, nous étudiant-là, on sait que si on ne te dit pas fait chose-là, tu vas venir
uriner-là, t’as pas versé l’eau. Tu ne me crois pas là, demain matin, à 6h, tu vas
t’arrêter devant les toilettes, toi-même faut essayer de pisser, tu vas voir ce qui est
dedans. Or quand on verse l’eau, on nettoie, les gens viennent gâter. Ton
camarade étudiant qui fait ça-là, tu lui donne quoi ? la FESCI ne paie pas, la
FESCI ne paie pas. Donc de façon volontaire, si on te dit de donner une pièce de
25f pour pourvoir aller au toilette pour uriner, si tu vois ça en mal, bon… je ne
sais plus comment on va te traiter. Je ne sais plus comment on va te traiter.
--ZATTO: ... Now when I arrived, I said good, go, go call him. He went to call
him, I said ... since he sleeps here, the student sleeps...... what is it called? ... he
sleeps in the basement of the geology department. There is a basement next door.
He sleeps there. I told him, you sleep here and you are urinating everywhere. You
are a human being, this will affect us tomorrow. It must be said that the university
custodians are not doing their job. There are toilets here, have you seen them?
Very, very dirty! You can go yourself you will see. If ... we do not take care of
that, since each time we send words to the SIMDCI, the company called SIMDCI.
We send word to the latter for the sanitation of toilets. But nothing! When you go
to the President’s office, they'll say you're violent. Well ... we, we decided like
that, we decided like that not to annoy them anymore. Since early, early 2017,
until April we decided to take the toilet issue in our own hands. Because that's in
the middle of campus...on soil with urine which affects it..it will pollute the
environmental area. So we preferred ... to take things in hand...We know each
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other, we study here, we know that if we do not say you do something, you'll
come pee there, you did not pour water. You do not believe me there, tomorrow
morning, at 6am, you'll stop in front of the toilet, you have to try to pee yourself,
you'll see what's inside. But when we pour water, we clean, people come to spoil.
Your fellow student who does that, what do you give him? FESCI does not pay,
FESCI does not pay. So voluntarily, if you are told to give a 25f piece to go to the
toilet to urinate, if you see that as bad, well ... I do not know how we will treat
you. I do not know how we will treat you (2018).
It makes sense, according to Zatto, that your fellow student, who spends his time
and energy cleaning up after you; fighting on your behalf, should be somehow
compensated. Zatto brings up a lot of factors: the university’s custodial support was
lacking, students did not have enough lavatory facilities, his comrades monitor the area
for him and present any news. Is this the different type of school they mean? How then
do they envision school and what purpose does it serve Fescists? For whose struggle are
they fighting?
Concluding discussion
Fescists, today are in a complex position. On one hand they maintain they are
fighting for the rights of young people, on the other they consider the organization a
training ground for leadership, identity formation, and one of beneficial exchange.
Despite their 28 years of existence, there are hints of FESCI using the “old way” of doing
things as a means to gain control and influence. Y’en a Marre is also struggling with
growing pains, fighting for the rights of young people, while navigating Senegalese
sociopolitical structures.
Y’en a Marre
Social and historical roots of the movement
“...Au Sénégal, ce sont les jeunes qui ont mis Wade au pouvoir. En Indonésie,
c’est la jeunesse qui a combattu le dictateur Suharto. Il en a été de même au Mali
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où les jeunes ont chassé Moussa Traoré du pouvoir. Aujourd’hui, qui peut dire
que ce n’est pas la jeunesse qui a combattu et fait partir Bédié? Et surtout la
dictature de Gueï. On a pensé qu’avec les armes, on pouvait avoir raison du
peuple. Mais nous avons montré qu’avec les mains nues, on peut changer un
pays” (former FESCI SG, Blé Goudé, as quoted in Konate (2003), p. 70).
--"... In Senegal, it is the young people who put Wade in power. In Indonesia, it is
the youth who fought the dictator Suharto. It was the same in Mali where young
people chased Moussa Traoré out of power. Today, who can say that it is not the
youth who fought and sent away Bédié? And especially the dictatorship of Gueï.
We thought that with weapons, we could be right of the people. But we showed
that with bare hands, we can change a country " (former FESCI SG, Blé Goudé,
as quoted in Konate (2003), p. 70).
Senegal, a paragon of political stability in West Africa, was placed in an
unprecedented situation in June 2011. It seemed like the country was on “the precipice of
social rupture” (Bryson, 2014, p. 33). Citizens took to the streets in anger, protesting then
president Abdoulaye Wade’s attempt to secure a third term. In retaliation, law
enforcement, struck back; firing tear gas, arresting civilians, and violently dispersing
people (p. 33). It would take a group of rappers, journalists, and students, calling
themselves Y’en a Marre ([We’re] Fed up), who “succeeded in arousing the dormant
social consciousness of Senegalese society through community organization, written
manifestoes, social media, thundering oratory, striking visual imagery, and unifying hiphop anthems, attracting enough followers to ensure Wade’s defeat and his peaceful exit
from office” (p. 33).
When I met with Fadel, Aliou, Thiew, Thiat, Sophie, and Moriba, they discussed
how the genesis of the movement came about organically. Much like in Abidjan, young
people in Dakar (and across the country), experienced the consequences of a single party
system, first under Leopold Senghor and then his chosen successor, Abdou Diouf.
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Moreover, the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, severely impacted social sectors
including healthcare, infrastructure, and education (Bryson and Enz, 2014). Y’en a marre
would develop as a result of these deficiencies to become an alternative school to teach
leadership, democracy, and ownership.
In Senegal as in Cote d’Ivoire, political power was consolidated under a strong
president, Leopold Sédar Senghor and his political party Union Progressiste Sénégalaise
(UPS) (Lambert, 2016, p. 36). Senegal, a rare exception in West Africa, was neither
plagued by military rule or coups d’état, and as such was heralded as the “Senegalese
exceptionalism,” even though, “it would have been difficult to herald this small nation as
a full democracy, as neither legal opposition nor contested presidential elections were
allowed by the constitution from 1966 to 1976” (p. 36). In 1974, under pressure Senghor
slowly introduced a multiparty system when he allowed Abodoulaye Wade, among
others, to form the Parti democratique senegalais (PDS) (senegalese democratic party)
while changing UPS to the Partie socialiste (PS) (p. 37). Though these changes seemed
sufficient in the eyes of the government, they proved to be more for show than political
efficacy, as it became abundantly clear during the economic crash of the 1980s.
Facing economic decline, political discontent, drought, and debt, Senghor stepped
down and ceded the presidency to Abdou Diouf, his prime minister “whom Senghor had
groomed for more than a decade to assume the presidency…” (Lambert, 2016, p.37). As
Senghor’s successor, Diouf faced the consequences of the Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs) adopted by many African countries during this time, which led to a
decrease in government spending not only on the arts but also on government services
such as health, education, culture, and sanitation, “resulting in the deterioration of the
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city, massive urbanization, an increase in prices, election corruption and university strikes
on campus” (p. 42).
By 1988, the impact of the austerity measures enforced by the IMF and World
Bank was felt everywhere especially by students as the “informal educational contract
that the state had long respected, which provided government employment to students
who managed to earn a university degree in Senegal’s education system,” was no longer
a viable path to social mobility or economic security. This was especially “jarring for
students, particularly those who were preciously close to earning this prize” (Lambert,
2016, p. 38; Bryson, 2014). Given that the university in Dakar was seen as a “site of
political mobilization” and students organized and aligned with organizations and
political movements that centered on reforming educational infrastructure, it was evident
as Lambert notes that students had a “vested interest in the status quo and wanted to
secure jobs in the ever expanding administrative apparatus” (Lambert, 2016, p. 38).
The austerity effects were palpable and widespread. From 1975-1984, the annual
growth of Senegal’s civil administration shrunk from 6% to 2.5%, at the same time,
enrollment at the University Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD), went from 1,012 students in
1960, to almost 15,000 in 1988, constricting the already limited resources available
(Lambert, 2016, p. 38). Much as in Abidjan, whereby there was no discernable
difference in academic achievement or dropping out, so too did Senegalese students, after
the late 1980s, recognize that “[t]he contraction in state employment opportunities meant
that university students often did not perceive themselves as having economic prospects
that differed significantly from those of their generation who did not have the same
access to educational opportunities” (p. 39). Young people were fed up.
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Rising inflation, stifled multiparty political expression, and cuts to employment
and opportunity saw the emergence of youth as “politically salient and disruptive,” and
made Senegal, for the first time, look like other West African countries (Lambert, 2016,
p. 39; Bryson, 2014). Lambert (2016) argues that it is no wonder that “Senegal was not
alone among West African nations to see youth projected as an increasingly disruptive
political force” (p. 39). This is also where we see the eventful rise of Abdoulaye Wade
even more so than before.
Bryson (2014) writes that the postelection protests of 1988, “enhanced [his]
political stature,” he was arrested and convicted for his part in “postelection
disturbances” (p. 39). This also happened to coincide with the university’s année blanche
where once again, student protests heavily destabilized the state forcing the university to
be shut down for the entire academic year. From that day until his election to the
presidency in 2000, Wade and his PDS party came to be seen as the “political face of
Senegalese youth” (p. 39). His slogan, Sopi (Change), became a “rallying cry for youth
and an expression of frustration with the stagnant economy and the Socialist Party”
(p.39).
When Wade was elected president in 2000, the alternance was heralded as a
victory from over forty years of one-party rule and a victory for the young voters who
had supported him. The irony, however, was not lost on anyone that the “candidate who
was seen to represent the hopes and aspirations of the youth was no less than seventythree years old, and most believed that he was much older than that” (Lambert, 2016, p.
43). However, despite Wade’s constant call for change and overt courting of young
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voters during the 2000 elections, these same young citizens were the ones who would
eventually turn on him ten years later (Bryson and Enz, 2014, p. 3).
Senegalese citizens were shocked and disappointed by how Wade handled the
country’s social, cultural and economic policies. Though he called for sopi, his
administration brought anything but change. Lambert (2016) asserts that Wade did little
to move Senegal forward politically, during his time in office, instead “[he] returned
Senegal to the old party politics of the Senghor era, in effect undoing some of the
democratic political reforms that had been enacted during the second half of Diouf’s
presidency” (p. 44). In his attempt to separate himself from his predecessor, Wade
committed to investing heavily in the arts, something that dramatically diminished under
Diouf (Bryson and Enz, 2014). However, instead of concretely supporting the arts, Wade
used “hollow rhetorical maneuvers and unfeasible plans of cultural construction” to
consolidate his power and to enlarge his personal coffers.
Early in his first term he announced seven grands projets culturels, of which only
two were ever completed during his twelve years in office: the expansion of roads
throughout parts of the country and the controversial Monument de la Renaissance
Africaine. (Lambert, 2016, p. 44). These projects seemed to primarily benefit wealthy
elites, while many Senegalese went without work, confronted daily power outages,
crumbling public utilities, and several other problems (p. 44). Though Wade “attempted
to mask his failure to create jobs by promoting wrestling, dance, and music, which are
extremely popular, especially in urban areas,” smoke and mirror show, unfortunately, did
little to hide the glaring inconsistencies happening in everyday lives and the construction
of and spending on the monument was an affronting reminder to these injustices (p. 3).
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Lambert (2016) writes that because of the monument’s prominence, it became a
particularly easy target to attack from a variety of directions (p. 44). People did not care
for the “scantily clad figures, the use of North Korean labor in its construction, its cost,
and the claim that Wade had made intellectual property rights to the monument that
would have given him rights to 35 percent of the profit generated by it” (p. 44). To add
insult to injury, the man who had promised change, was now trying to secure a
“patrilineal transfer of power” in which his son Karim would assume the presidency” (p.
44).
In trying to prime his son, Karim to take over after him, Wade had him run for
Dakar’s mayoral race, where he crushingly lost. Undeterred he then appointed Karim to
the position of Minister of State for International Cooperation, Regional Development,
Air Transport, and Infrastructure. At one point, “Karim held the largest portfolio ever by
a minister in Senegal, estimated at 46 percent of the national budget” leading many to call
him the “minister of heaven and earth” (Lambert, 2016, p. 44; Gueye, 2013, p. 27).
As the 2012 elections drew near, Wade proposed some disconcerting changes to
the constitution. First, he proposed lowering the percentage of votes a candidate needed
to win in the first round from 50% to 25%, ensuring his first round victory. Second, he
created the new post of vice-president, which many assumed Karim Wade would inherit.
Lastly and most egregiously was that although he added term limits when he was elected
president to two terms, by his second term, he argued that “he could run for a third term
because term limits were not in effect when he was elected to his first term” (p. 45;
Gueye, 2013, p. 26). To wit, Senegal’s Constitutional Council affirmed his right to run
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for a third term and therefore setting the stage for a showdown. Senegalese were fed up
and had had enough of the same old ways of doing things.
Mission and organizational structure
“Y’en a marre de moi6”
Y’en a Marre, like many civic movements, “developed simultaneously out of the
survival strategies and cultural systems which [had] nurtured people, their values and
their beliefs within their own communities, reserves, tribes and nations” (Smith, 1999, p.
108). During another power outage, a group of friends; some journalists, musicians, and
students, were hanging around in an apartment in Parselles Assainies (a popular banlieu
of Dakar), drinking tea and talking.
Fadel (2018) told me that that night, the conversation came from a place of
“despair.” There had been a power outage, again, and once again Fadel and his friends,
were talking. Except this time, the talk became louder and more urgent. The conversation
changed from “denouncing” what had been going on “doing something” about it.
Dans la nuit du 15 au 16 janvier 2011, dans une chambrette de la Villa n°07 du
quartier populaire des Parcelles Assainies de Dakar, des jeunes ont décidé de
rompre d’avec le fatalisme : deux Artistes engagés (Thiat et Kilifeu du groupe
Keurgui de Kaolack), deux journalistes (Fadel Barro et Aliou Sané), un étudiant
(Elh Hadj Abdoulaye Niasse), une cadre de banque (Marie Ndella Guèye), une
technicienne en informatique (Denise Sow) et Amath SECK. Autour du thé, l’idée
de créer un mouvement social du nom de « Y en a Marre » fut arrêté au bout de
plusieurs heures d’intenses débats sur la situation du pays (yenamarre.sn).
--On the night of January 15th to 16th, 2011, in a small room of the Villa n ° 07 of
the popular district of Parcelles Assainies Dakar, young people decided to break
with fatalism: two committed artists (Thiat and Kilifeu of the Keurgui group of
Kaolack), two journalists (Fadel Barro and Aliou Sané), a student (Elh Hadj
Abdoulaye Niasse), a bank executive (Marie Ndella Guèye), a technician in
computer science (Denise Sow) and Amath SECK. The idea of creating a social
6

“Fed up with myself”
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movement called "Y’en a Marre" happened during tea time, and stopped several
hours of intense debates on the situation of the country (yenamarre.sn).
When interviewed by Gueye in 2013, Fadel noted that the creation of the movement was
a “cathartic idea, which emerged” as they sat in his apartment waiting for electricity to
return after a “twenty hour blackout” (Gueye, 2013, p. 25). They had had enough and
after debating, journalists versus rappers, it was clear that both sides needed to do
something. As Fadel recalled to me, of what use were they, rappers and journalists,
denouncing things when they didn’t even have electricity?
Y’en a Marre was co-founded in January 2011 by Cheikh Omar Cyrille Touré aka
Thiat (the last born), and Mbessane Seck aka Kilifeu (the authority/elder), from the rap
group Keur Gui (The House) of Kaolack, and activist journalists Fadel Barro and Aliou
Sané. They were later joined by Malal Tall aka Fou Malade (Crazy Sick), from the group
Bat’haillons Blin-D [Armored Beaten Rags or Armored Batallion], and other rappers,
students, and activists,” including Denise Safiatou Sow aka Sophie (Gueye, 2013, p. 25;
Bryson, 2014; Lambert, 2016).
When I met Sophie, I did not know what to expect. As the sole woman and cofounding member of YEM, I wanted to get a gendered perspective of the movement and
why she felt drawn to it. Sophie, like so many Senegalese women, is tall and slim but
unlike many Senegalese women, Sophie is a “jeans and tee” kind of girl, with long
layered locs. I never once saw her in any traditional print, dresses, or with her head
wrapped/covered, even on Fridays. Her participation and introduction was, much like
Fadel states, organic. They were at Fadel’s apartment and as usual they were discussing,
talking politics. This time however, something was different:
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SOPHIE : Et j’étais là dans cette salle à l’unité 7, de l’appartement de Fadel... Et
on était en train de discuter avec Thiew, Thiat, Fadel, Aliou Sané, Ahmad sef et
Oumar Aladji dans l’appartement de fadel. On discutait on discutait et là je me
suis senti concerné…Ce qu’on s’est dit là je me suis dit Wep, c’est vrai, à nous de
faire quelque chose, c’est à nous de nous engager il ne faut pas attendre les autres
pour venir le faire à notre place. Et on était toujours là à nous lamenter et tout, et
regarder les vieux du troisième âge se battre à notre place...Et je me suis dit c’est
lâche de notre part, à nous de prendre notre destin en main, et c’est là qu’est venu
le décret… (2016)
--SOPHIE: And I was there in the living room of unit #7, Fadel's apartment... And
we were discussing with Thiew, Thiat, Fadel, Aliou San, Ahmad sef and Oumar
Aladji in fadel's apartment. We were talking we were talking and I felt
concerned ...What was said there I told myself, Welp it's true, we have to do
something, it's up to us to commit we should not wait for others to come do it for
us . And we were always there wailing and watching old people fight in our
place...And I said to myself it's cowardly for us not to take our destiny in hand,
and that's where the decree came ... (2016)

Y’en a Marre’s movement above all centers on transformation. In my initial
interviews with Fadel, Aliou, Thiat, Sophie, and Moriba, and Thiew, it became evident
that they were fed up with the old way of doing things, fed up with their elders, and even
fed up with themselves. As Aliou would relate to Nelson (2014), YEM was fed up “with
the citizen who sees the problems in the community around him but stands idly by, who
does nothing to change things, who takes no action to try to move forward and goad the
state to act, who doesn’t demand that the state fulfill its side of the contract” (p. 14). This
sentiment is clearly stated in their website’s mission statements:
Faire émerger un Nouveau Type de Sénégalais (NTS). Ce citoyen qui, à travers
les demandes impérieuses qu’il formule et adresse à l’État, aux acteurs politiques
et à l’ensemble des acteurs sociaux, devrait porter le projet de transformation
sociale en vue de bâtir une société de justice, d’équité, de droit, de paix et de
progrès pour tous. Amener l’élite politique à mieux prendre en compte les
préoccupations des citoyens en érigeant la Bonne Gouvernance en règle de
conduite dans la gestion des affaires publiques (yenamarre.sn)
--142

To bring out a New Type of Senegalese (NTS). This citizen who, through the
imperious demands he formulates and addresses to the State, political actors and
all social actors, should bring the project of social transformation to build a
society of justice, equity, rights, peace and progress for all. Bring the political
elite to better take into account the concerns of citizens by building good
governance in good standing in the management of public affairs (yenamarre.sn).
When Fadel and Aliou speak of a New Type of Senegalese, it was, as Fadel asserts to
inspire Senegalese to take responsibility, question their elders/power, and adopt a
heightened sense of citizenship (Fadel, June, 2016; Lambert, 2016, p. 48). This was a
responsibility that Fadel and other YEM members took seriously. For Fadel, his
leadership style had to also be one of exemplarity. He says:
FADEL : Mon rôle c’est de
sortir le mieux de chacun pour le
conjuguer en fait, energie énergie
constructif. Et c’est pour ça
qu’après l’intégration, on s’est
dit qu’il nous faut l’émergence
d’un nouveau type de sénégalais.
Dans le comportement, après le
constat de Y’en a Marre c’était
que l’échec vient de nous même !
Qui dénonçons mais qui ne
proposons pas Et qui dans notre
façon de prendre la parole n’est
pas exemplaire, et il fallait être
exemplaire. J’ai toujours pensé
que ce pays n’a pas besoin
d’argent, le pays a soif
d’exemplarité. Comme tous les
grand de ce monde n’ont pas
apporter autre chose que de
l’exemplarité.

FADEL: My role is to get the
best out of everyone for...
constructive energy. And that's
why after the birth [of the
movement], we said we need the
emergence of a new type of
Senegalese. Through behavior, it
became clear from Y’en a
Marre’s perspective, that the
failure comes from ourselves!
Who denounce but do not
propose in our way of speaking
is not exemplary, and it was
necessary to be exemplary. I
have always thought that this
country does not need money, the
country is thirsty for an example.
Like all the greats of this world,
many brought nothing more than
exemplarity.

Members often saw themselves as activists taking on the role of their elders to
promote a new way of approaching citizenship. In their words and actions the members
of YEM emphasized a radical shift in mentality. Members were fed up with themselves
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and sought to lead by example. This was, according to Barro, one of the ways in which
they could separate from their elders and adopt a new way of doing things.
Since the movement was created, they established esprits, “spirits,” but
understood as local chapters throughout the country, and now internationally, to deal with
local issues. Ideas and projects of the esprits are decided by their respective membership,
“independent from the national leaders” (Lambert, 2016, p. 50).This was the general
sentiment when discussing members’ multifaceted roles as leaders or sages “going
against traditional relationships between young people and seniors,” especially with
Moriba.
Citizenship and democracy
Moriba, like many of the students who got involved with the movement, was a
college student, studying history when he joined. Tall, dark, with an infectious smile,
Moriba is the embodiment of the NTS and of the pan-African youth I have seen
throughout the continent. On any given day, Moriba can show up with cool Nikes, jeans,
a tee or boubou top, and an updated Kufi cap (similar to the Taqiyah worn in other
Muslim countries). He easily goes back and forth between French, Wolof, and English, at
once connected to social media and also committed to his attaya tea hour session with the
crew.
But Moriba was also very clear about why he was a yenamarriste. Unlike what I
heard from FESCI members, YEM did not promise benefits or status, what they did
espouse was authenticity, democracy and ownership. Most members still had full-time
jobs on top of their social justice agenda and encouraged students to pursue their studies
while holding l’esprit of YEM.
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MORIBA : non, je suis yenamarriste parce que moi je veux régler le problème de
la saleté dans mon quartier.. Tu n’es pas besoin de venir, envoyer ta carte
d’identité, signer, il faut dire au QG, de formaliser, non. Tu as un problème en
face, tu veux le résoudre, tu es yenamarriste, et ça, ça permet de donner aux
jeunes de notre adhésion à cette nouvelle conscience citoyenne qui naissait...Le
plus important, c’est que le système qui était là, a fait refuser de prendre en charge
les vraies préoccupations des populations...nos états sont des états qui n’agissent
pas que quand il y a campagne, on te promet, on ment mais quand il y a campagne
les gens en profitent pour régler leur situation. Et 2011, 2012 c’était ça au faite,
les gens ont plus adhéré parce que les étudiants n’allaient plus à l’école, les
professeurs n’étaient plus payés, la santé etc, etc et ils ont dit, ok, on enlève. Et
par la suite aussi les gens ont adhéré au mouvement parce qu’ils sont dits aussi,
c’est une nouvelle manière de prise de parole, de prendre la parole… ( 2018).
--MORIBA: no, I'm a yenamarrist because I want to solve the trash problem in my
neighborhood. You don't have to come, present your ID, sign, tell HQ, to
formalize, no. You have a problem in front of you, you want to solve it, you are a
yenamarrist, and that allows us to give young people our support for this new
citizen consciousness that was born. The most important thing is that the system
that was there refused to take care of the real concerns of the people.. our states do
not act until there is an election, They make promises, they lie but when there is
an election, people take advantage of it to settle their situation. And 2011, 2012
that was it, people joined more because the students no longer went to school, the
teachers were no longer paid, health etc, etc. and they said ok, let's get him out.
And thereafter people joined the movement because...it was a new way of
speaking…. (2018).

Moriba is clear that one becomes a yenamarriste by simply taking ownership of
something that is important to them and doing something about it. It is about working and
leading by example in order to raise a new civic consciousness (Fadel, 2018; Moriba,
2018). What YEM does not want to be, is another political tool; wherein they “make
promises, lie” until an election. Given then that they are not elected officials, YEM is in
the position to develop projects that push their agenda forward.
Since 2013, YEM has undertaken several civic and democratic projects in the
banlieu to promote Sunu Gox (our neighborhood), dox ak sa gox (walk with your
community), and Citizen Mic - all projects centered on citizenship, governance, and
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community engagement (yenamarre.sn). Sophie explains this calmly, as she discusses the
various projects and citizenship and democratic efforts in which YEM has engaged. It is
necessary, as Sophie notes, to have Senegalese know their civic rights, know and
question their elected officials, and even challenge their parents. Consider Sophie’s
reflections:
SOPHIE : Parce que les gens intéressés par la brutalité, les manifestations et
autres… mais y’en a marre n’est pas que protestation et autre, aller s’y dans les
propositions, les activités et tout ça...Et ce que veut y’en a marre c’est amener les
populations à s’intéresser plus de ce qui se passe dans leur pays. C’est ce genre
d’activités qu’on a lancé depuis 2012...Dans certaines localités, par exemple on a
été à l’observatoire de la démocratie et de la bonne gouvernance, on est allé
installer des bureaux dans des régions, et on a mis par exemple… on a organiser
des… comment je dirai… des meetings entre des populations et leurs maires. Et
installer un genre de dialogue entre eux... Faire comprendre aux populations que
vous avez des droits de connaitre ce qui se passe dans les mairies, de connaître les
budgets, de parler à votre mère de ce qui ne va pas il faut que ça change ; installer
le dialogue entre eux pour que travail soit mis… voilà aussi voir les députés, pour
invités les députés de l’assemblée avec les populations et discuter avec eux. C’est
ça que vous défendez dans l’assemblée, ça il faut que ça change (2018).
--SOPHIE: Because people are interested in brutality, demonstrations and so on ...
but there's not enough of it just protest and so on, go get into the proposals, the
activities and all that ... and what does it mean? is fed up is to get people to take
more interest in what is happening in their country. This is the kind of activity that
has been launched since 2012 ... In some localities, for example, we went to the
observatory of democracy and good governance, we went to set up offices in
regions, and we put, for example ... we organize ... how will I say ... meetings
between populations and their mayors. And install a kind of dialogue between
them ... Make people understand that you have rights to know what is going on in
the town halls, to know the budgets, to talk to your mother about what is wrong
change; to install the dialogue between them so that work is put ... here is also to
see the deputies, for invited the deputies of the assembly with the populations and
to discuss with them. That's what you defend in the assembly, it must change
(2018).
What is clear is this: seven years since the group helped oust Wade, YEM has
sustained their tremendous momentum and have “become an intractable institution within
Senegalese social, political, and cultural life” (Bryson, 2014, p. 33). To this day, the
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group still maintains an informal, open house meeting to the general public in the
Parcelles Assainies neighborhood, and initial headquarters of YEM on Tuesdays at 6pm
(Niati, fieldnotes 2016; Bryson, 2014, p. 33). I witnessed these informal “open houses”
during my first meeting with the crew, as they told me to come on a Tuesday at 6pm.
That day, they had a gentleman who had a grievance with a neighbor and was seeking
YEM’s intervention and a group of activists from their satellite office in Fatick
requesting support, among other things (Niati, field notes, 2016).
Concluding Discussion
Like much of sub-Saharan Africa, Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire have a young,
vibrant and connected population. Young people in Africa today, have asserted
themselves as a “formidable political presence” using their large numbers as a
destabilizing presence (Lambert, 2016, p. 34). There is no question that young people in
Africa have been “exploited by a wide range of political leaders, often to questionable
ends” but this notion of young people lacking agency or choosing only negative means of
organization, does not tell the entire story (p. 35).
Though similar in their experiences and plight, what this chapter intended to show
was that given their number and power, young people across both sites are choosing or
attempting to choose positive means of mobilization and engagement. Of course, we also
see how the two organizations, FESCI and YEM, deviate in their methods of
engagement. One espouses non-violence, transparency, transformation, and citizenship,
the other, FESCI, attempts to meet these ideals but as described to me, seems stuck in the
old ways of doing things even as they move forward. This illustrates the complexity,
nuance, and challenges in functioning within a decolonizing narrative while fighting
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postcolonial ideals. Ngugi (1980) dedicated his powerful book, Devil on the Cross, “to all
Kenyans struggling against the neocolonial stage of imperialism” (Ngugi, 1980). The
book offers a scathing retribution to Kenyan elites and International financiers and
organizations who still play a considerable role in Kenyan politics.
Ngugi’s book illustrates the challenges of postcolonial entities navigating
neocolonial realities. Through the eyes of Jacinta Wariinga, we are provided with the
ease, challenges and contradictions many experience in navigating these realities. YEM
and FESCI seem to emulate the contradictions that Ngugi illustrated. They may espouse
the same ideals, navigate similar lived experiences, but in the bus to Ilmorog where
Wariinga finds herself surrounded by workers, revolutionaries, bosses, politicians and the
like, she is able to recognize just how complicated the “delinking” process can be. If, as
Touré (forthcoming) considers transnégritude to be the multiple roots of the diaspora and
the imagined community that binds them, then we must recognize that these roots
manifest differently given the conditions in which they are nourished. In this context,
some make concessions, some outright choose to favor their donors, others consider
liberation and a few even attempt it; YEM and FESCI are no different.
This chapter attempted to forefront young people’s agency and autonomy even if
how it is done is highly contested. In the ensuing chapters, I will first discuss how FESCI
and YEM espouse Hip-Hop as a pedagogical tool and then I will further examine how
they have applied this tool. Lastly, I will discuss what has been their impact and
implications for approaches to non-formal schooling.
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CHAPTER 5
“STOP FRONTIN’”
Il faut que l’africain se soigne7 - Fadel Barro
Introduction
The growth of FESCI and YEM in Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal was inevitable.
Young people were fed up and tired of the old way of doing things. They had come to
distrust their leaders and even too, their parents. Given the continent’s rapidly growing
youth population, sociopolitical changes, and economic growth, it is evident that young
people will play a crucial role in the growth and development of the continent.
Considering that the economic development plans of Francophone West Africa illustrate
a push for autonomy and self-determination to invest on the continent (Kazeem, 2019 &
Sindreu, 2019), and YEM and FESCI members push for authenticity, why not then
support educational initiatives that promote self-determination, authenticity, and
transformation? This and the following chapter present my findings and analyses on how
YEM and FESCI approach Hip-Hop as pedagogy and how it is employed as a tool to delink and transform.
In my discussions and interactions with members, I observed that participants
continuously discussed ideas of authenticity, “keepin’ it real” and of young people being
“lost;” that greatly informed their views and visions of social transformation. In

7

Africans must heal themselves
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particular, both organizations espouse Hip-Hop as a transformative tool. As a result, HipHop in this case was used as a means to promote socialization, language, citizenship
engagement and leadership training. My analysis will first examine how YEM and
FESCI approach Hip-Hop as pedagogy from their perception as a “sacrificed”
(Schumann, 2012) or “lost” population. How they understand their status in society
informs their views of Hip-Hop and is manifested through socialization and challenging
formal schooling.
Hip-Hop culture, as manifested by FESCI and YEM, promotes a counter to
schooling and education that encourages a transformative, communal, and healing
pedagogy (Jenkins, 2013, hooks, 1994). The classroom, as Jenkins suggests, is contested
and challenged as the ways in which young people come to know is thusly reshaped into
a creative and conscious endeavor. As I will show in this chapter, Y’en a Marre and
FESCI have created spaces that challenge formal schooling and access to education.
Through their embodiment of Hip-Hop culture, they have become “a new type of school”
that attempts to challenge the status quo as they promote a “new type of African”
advocating for leadership, language, and knowledge of self, and panafricanism that is
typically germane to their lived experiences.
“Lost” ones: Coming to Hip-Hop
Concert Pédagogique
For young people who feel “lost” or marginalized, Hip-Hop provides a discursive
space for them to cultivate and reinforce their identity, advocate for social change, and a
way to participate in “local and global debates” (Gueye, 2013, Ntarangwi, 2009, Park et
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al., 2019). Though Hip-Hop has been adopted by young Senegalese who felt othered, its
genesis began in a space of privilege.
Hip-Hop in Senegal had more of a top-down genesis, compared to its U.S.
counterpart; mainly due to class and access. Hip-Hop came to Senegal via youth in
Dakar’s affluent neighborhoods who had encountered the culture through media and
family members abroad (Appert, 2016, p. 237). First, they formed dance crews and
battled using U.S. Hip-Hop songs before transforming and making their own groups and
performing in Wolof and French. It wasn’t until 1992, when the group Positive Black
Soul, opened for Senegalese-French rapper MC Solar at the French Cultural Center in
Dakar that brought Senegalese Hip-Hop to the masses and paved the way for
international record deals and tours for other artists such as Pee Froiss and Daara J
Family (p. 237).
It was in 1998, when the group Rad’Adio, from the popular Medina
neighborhood, released a Wolof only album, providing a “hard-hitting social commentary
that struck a chord with Senegalese youth,” that is considered to be the birth or hardcore
or underground hip hop movement in Senegal. Appert (2016) argues that unlike their
predecessors, the majority of underground rappers hail from Dakar’s quartier populaire
and the banlieueu (working class/low income neighborhoods), “where their experiences
of their failures of colonial and postcolonial modernizing projects are all the more
immediate” (p. 239).
These neighborhoods illustrate lack of access; access to education, she argues,
“means that many—particularly the youngest newcomers to the scene—are not fluent or
even conversant in French, the official national language, and one that would be more
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accessible to international audiences” (Appert, 2016, p. 240). It is this connection, she
writes, that separates Senegalese rappers from their African counterparts in Ghana or
Somalia. Senegalese rappers, instead, would rather emphasize Hip-Hop’s roots in the
U.S. “grounding their claim to Hip-Hop not in a sense of historical racial or aesthetic
connectivity between Africa and its diaspora but rather in a keenly experiential awareness
of socioeconomic marginalization and urban struggle” (p 240).
Much as Touré’s (forthcoming) transnégritude troubles the multiple roots of the
“Afrodiaspora” stretching between oceans fighting for existence, so too does Appert posit
the transnational connections of Senegalese Hip-Hop. In effect, Senegalese engagement
with Hip-Hop is “much about local musical and popular culture as it is about
transnational, continental or global connections” (Appert, 2016, p. 243). Appert notes
that Hip-Hop in Senegal serves as a medium for young people who are disempowered by
a combination of traditional and postcolonial power structures that leave them
“voiceless” socially, economically and politically. Hip-Hop is therefore appealing to
Senegalese youth and is reified as a culture that speaks to the struggles of
underdevelopment (p. 250).
Even though today’s purists, much like in the U.S. lament that the Hip-Hop
culture has lost its consciousness in favor of celebrity and financial gain, Senegalese
artists, however, still espouse its pure ideals as a means to address unemployment,
flooding, power outage, illegal, migration, and poverty. Hip-Hop in this sense has
become an informal educative tool attracting young people in Senegal and beyond who
face “processes of urbanization and modernization that have contributed to the ongoing
destabilization of traditional familial structures without providing adequate educational
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alternatives” (p. 251). Hip-Hop has thus been adopted in Senegal as a crucial tool for
activism and engagement among young people, especially those coming from the banlieu
or quartier populaire.
When I spoke with members of Y’en a Marre, Fadel, Sane, Sophie, Moriba,
Thiew, and Thiat, it was noted that Hip-Hop was simply who they were and how they
expressed themselves. In order to spread the word on Wade’s illegal presidential bid and
citizenship rights, they decided to develop “pedagogic concerts.” Why these pedagogic
concerts? Because, as Fadel notes, though the young movement was financially weak,
they had a panoply of artists who were not only sympathetic but members of the
movement. This was their wealth and continues to be so.
FADEL : C’est quoi un concert
pédagogique ? c’est un concert,
seulement qui est articulé des
discours, de discours citoyen, de
discours de sensibilisation pour
éveiller et fouetter la conscience
politique chez les jeunes. Donc
au-delà de la production il
y’avait aussi ou n’importe quel
concert d’artiste pouvait servi
pour sensibiliser pour toucher les
jeunes. C’était ça en fait le but
des concerts pédagogique (Nov.
2018).

FADEL : What is a pedagogic
concert? it is a concert...it is a
concert that focuses on discourse,
on citizenship, on awareness to
awaken and whip political
consciousness among young
people. So beyond the show
aspect there was also the part
where any artist’s concert could
be used to raise awareness to
reach young people. That was in
fact the goal of these pedagogic
concerts (Nov. 2018)

Pedagogic concerts have been, as stated by members, one of the most successful
and useful tools in marrying Hip-Hop and civic engagement. Each project YEM has
organized is framed within a chant/song that is introduced during these concerts and
disseminated via social media (YouTube, Facebook, and WhatsApp, etc.) by young
people as the song/chant and the message gained ground. Once small and contained to
local spaces, these pedagogic concerts have grown to become an international expression
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of music and civic education, as evidenced in the first Université Populaire de
l’Engagement Citoyen, held in July 2018. This was a four day conference that saw the
meeting of nine movements from eight countries come together in Dakar to discuss, raise
awareness, support, and teach. YEM’s innovative approach to engage, to school, and to
mobilize access through the use of Wolof and French was formidable. Given that around
28% of the population speaks French, Wolof and Wolof education should be forefronted.
The Citizen Mic competition illustrates the mix of Hip-Hop and engagement by inviting
young people to battle over issues about democracy and good governance. YEM
members were sure to note that these pedagogic concerts developed naturally, because,
according to Fadel, it was not so much about doing Hip-Hop but also about being HipHop as well that generated these concerts. Fadel states:
FADEL: Le hip hop sénégalais a toujours à mon… moi par contre je suis
satisfait, en ce sens qu’ils ont toujours porter des discours contestataires, des
discours revendicatifs, des discours d’éveille que j’entendais. Tu vois ça m’a
toujours accompagné dès le bas âge. Tu vois, on a juste été un rappeur d’une
manière ou d’une autre. Tu vois, donc c’est notre génération…Et donc le hip hop
sénégalais en tout cas, a toujours porter cette préoccupation d’abord en moi à titre
individuel. Elle a toujours porté ma préoccupation, d’éveiller, de sensibiliser, de
revendiquer ! Tu vois, donc voilà ça c’est… donc je me considère forcément de
cette génération du hip hop (Nov. 2018).
FADEL: Senegalese hip hop always has to... me on the other hand I am satisfied,
in the sense that it has promoted protest speeches, speeches that awake….You
see, it always accompanied me from an early age. You see, we were rappers in
one way or another. You see, so this is our generation ... And so Senegalese hip
hop in any case, has always brought this concern first in me as an individual. It
always carried my concern, to awaken, to raise awareness, to claim! You see, so
here it is ... so I necessarily consider myself a member of the hip-hop generation
(Nov. 2018)
Fadel and Thiat told me that Hip-Hop spoke to them as young children growing
up in Kaolack, as it related to the lived experiences of their surroundings. It only made
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sense, then, that given a platform to speak out on these injustices, a Hip-Hop based
method of organizing would be utilized. As previously discussed, Hip-Hop culture not
only speaks to the lived realities of its adherents but encourages action towards selfdetermination (Akom, 2009, Seidel, 2011, KRS-One, 1989). Fadel, along with the other
founding members of YEM, much like Afrika Bambaataa espoused knowledge of self to
discover the purpose of one’s life, so too did YEM envision a movement that would not
only decry and denounce, but also reveal and instigate change. Alluding to Ngugi’s
concepts of decolonization (1987), what Mignolo (2003; 2009) calls epistemic
disobedience, and Medina’s (2013) discussion of an epistemology of resistance, YEM
pushes for both an epistemic and physical delinking. Their engagement stems from a
shared epistemology; one that challenges and separates from the status quo. For young
people who had grown disillusioned with politicians, Hip-Hop was the antidote. In Cote
d’Ivoire on the other hand, what we see is the development of an Ivoirian tradition that
parallels and challenges how we approach and view Hip-Hop.
Génération Zouglou
Echoing the origins of Hip-Hop in the Bronx, Zouglou, one of Cote d’Ivoire’s
popular musical styles, developed from a state of disillusionment and deterioration. In her
gripping investigation of the Zouglou generation, Schumann (2012) notes that Zouglou is
a cultural production birthed from the “young men who have come of age in the context
of declining employment possibilities in the formal sector” (p. 535). Young people,
feeling left out of the socioeconomic production of the country, felt marginalized and
thus created a musical form that “created a discursive space to communicate their
demands for social inclusion and intergenerational justice to a national audience” (p.
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535). Once again, we see a shared struggle; one of a “sacrificed youth,” who chooses to
engage through a musical style that speaks truth to power.
Zouglou was birthed on university campus housing by the “sacrificed generation,”
that is young people who had been left to their fate due to a series of structural
adjustment crises that severely impacted educational access and achievement, economic
crises and political upheaval (Schumann, 2012). The musical style spread like wildfire
throughout the city as young people (in and outside of school) were drawn to its frank,
outright, and brazen lyrics decrying the state, its leaders, and the conditions in which they
live. Zouglou has grown to become the “prime vehicle” for prime debates on issues
deemed to be of “national importance” (p. 541). This direct approach, Schumann (2012),
argues, developed an “aesthetic of urgency” and an outspoken approach to their lyrics (p.
541).
Zouglou music and its urgent lyrics has risen to become the voice of the
“sacrificed generation” who are able to express their experiences but moreover, Zouglou
has become a platform of “collective catharsis.” Schumann (2012) writes,
[z]ouglou artists have acted as cultural agents and as active producers of meaning,
and they have become social commentators and transmitters of social
knowledge...Through their music, young Ivoirians have contributed to the
formation of a cultural identity, as their music went from being the art of
marginalized youth to become part of Ivoirian national culture. In other words, it
is Zouglou music that, as a communicative medium, has allowed the 'abandoned
generation' to 'be visible, to be heard, to belong (p. 552).
Abbink (2005), Lambert (2016), and Schumann (2012) mention the “palpable social
death” that excluded young people from economic and political participation and isolated
from social mobility and access (Schumann, 2012, p. 542). Zouglou, Schumann
concludes, is the music of this “abandoned generation,” who have been abandoned by
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their elders, and politicians “becomes apparent through the many Zouglou songs sung to
console such (metaphorical) orphans” (p. 542).
Given its genesis, its unique musical style and its message, I wanted to know how
can we not consider this Ivorian style as a part of Hip-Hop pedagogy? Zouglou, like HipHop, manifested organically from a shared struggle (Smith, 1999; Schumann, 2012),
speaks to the lived realities of Ivorians, and challenges young people to be autonomous.
In Abidjan, participants suggested that Zouglou was/is a necessary means by which to
utilize its cultural style as a pedagogical tool for a young population who feels forgotten
and disregarded.
Zouglou, as many would say, is “typically Ivorian,” and it embodies the sound,
style, and mannerisms of the youth who created it. When I spoke to FESCI members,
Zouglou’s genesis was framed amid the political struggle of the 1990s and the protests
occurring on campus. Given its genesis, it is no wonder then, that FESCI and Fescists
adopted Zouglou. This musical style would grow to become a cultural, aesthetic
expression that would be aligned with a young, vociferous population that was fed up.
Just as Tiken Jah Fakoly (2002) sang, people were fed up with empty promises, lack of
resources, and corruption (Fakoly, 2002).
Zouglou, they attested, spoke the truth. This would all start on the bus. On their
way to the campus housing village of Yopougon, students started singing about “issues.”
This, as Siaba would note, was happening around the same time of the birth of FESCI.
There are several parallels to the genesis of FESCI and Zouglou; these were young
students who recognized the issues and took up various forms of engagement that easily
married. Look at how Siaba frames the birth of Zouglou:
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SIABA: Oui ... je dois vous
parler un peu de la naissance de
Zouglou et de la naissance de la
FESCI. Nous sommes en 1990 et
quand vous voyez 1990, la
naissance de la FESCI,
Zouglou ... voyez-vous? Donc les
étudiants sont à l'église Saint
Henri, ils descendaient du bus,
chantaient, dansaient ... Si vous
prenez le bus 86 pour Yopougon
la nuit, vous verrez et entendrez
des étudiants danser et chanter,
les gars de ce village de dortoirs
[Yopougon] chantait, au début,
ils chantaient simplement les
problèmes auxquels ils étaient
confrontés. Ils chantaient sur les
problèmes auxquels les étudiants
étaient confrontés en matière de
transport, de logement, etc. C'est
ainsi que Zouglou a commencé
(Aug. 2018)

SIABA: Yes...I have to tell you a
little about the birth of Zouglou
and the birth of FESCI. It was in
1990 and when you see 1990, the
birth of FESCI, Zouglou...do you
see? So the students are at the
church, Saint Henry, they would
get off the bus, singing,
dancing...If you take the 86 bus
[line] to Yopougon at night, you
will see and hear students
dancing and singing, the guys
from this dorm village
[Yopougon] would sing, initially
they just sang about problems
they were confronting. They
would sing about the issues
students were facing from
transportation, housing etc. So
this is how Zouglou started (Aug.
2018).

Innocuous, germane, and organic; this is how Zouglou was birthed, much as
Smith (1999) suggests that indigenous movements are born out of various frustrations,
and yet “the need to tell our stories remains the powerful imperative of a powerful form
of resistance” (p. 108; 35), much like Hip-Hop began. The cries and protests rose in song,
first to God and then to “real things,” to what they were living and seeing on their daily
bus rides. This marriage between young people and Zouglou seemed inevitable. Zouglou
would serve as the engine that young people needed to voice their frustrations and it grew
to dominate the sociocultural landscape of youth protest music.
ZATTO : Tu sais le Zouglou, en même temps qu’il décrit, il est humoristique. Il
décrit l’université et réconforte. Avant que le Zouglou traverse les frontières
universitaires, on dit « Zouglou CI » c’est un peu comme un journal d’une
école… Ça parle uniquement de l’école. Il racontait un peu ce qui se passait dans
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le campus. Donc dénonçait ce se passait dans le campus. Mais lorsqu’il a dépassé
les frontières universitaires, le Zouglou a commencé à relater, ça commencé à
dénoncer les problèmes sociaux que connaissait même l’ivoirien. Consoler
l’ivoirien, apporter du réconfort à l’ivoirien d’après eux l’ivoirien nouveau,
conseiller l’ivoirien...ce n’est pas le Zouglou de maintenant…où il y a un peu de
coupé-décalé dedans, non (July, 2018).
ZATTO: You know the Zouglou, at the same time as it describes, it is humorous.
He describes the university and comforts. Before Zouglou crosses university
borders, we say "Zouglou CI" is a bit like a school newspaper ... It only talks
about school. He was telling a little bit about what was going on on campus. So
denounced what was happening on campus. But when he crossed the university
borders, the Zouglou began to relate, it started to denounce the social problems
that all Ivorians experienced. Consoling the Ivorian, bringing comfort to the
Ivorian according to them the new Ivorian, advising the Ivorian ... it's not the
Zouglou of now ... where there is a bit of coupé décalé in it, no…(July 2018).
As Zatto alluded, Zouglou was Abidjan’s CNN. It broadcasted to all listeners the
realities of campus and everyday life. It was a necessary engine to “denounce, comfort”
and create a new Ivorian. All the FESCI members I spoke with, firmly stated that they
were of the Zouglou generation. Zouglou was for them, by them and spoke to and about
them. Echoing Appert (2016), when I interviewed Siaba, he noted that American HipHop at the time, was for the upper class, as it was too expensive to buy cassette tapes.
“Why buy a cassette for 3,500CFA [7$ equivalent],” he posited, “whereas here you are at
night, [making tapping noise], tapping on the drums, and that’s it, you have Zouglou”
(Siaba, 2018). Just as the words and sounds of Hip-Hop developed from limited
resources, so too did Zouglou evolve from the tam-tam and grow to a unique cultural
expression with its own distinct language and style.
Participants conveyed to me the power that Zouglou had over them. This culture
had grown to be a source of guidance and a way to “build up” the individual (Angra,
2018). And, much like Hip-Hop, the culture resonated beyond campus housing and into
the streets of Abidjan and beyond. The culture had now taken over as the people’s
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“newspaper” reporting on current ills. It was palpable and germane to Cote d’Ivoire in
much the same way YEM embodied their own Senegalese Hip-Hop.
H: Bien sûr, le Zouglou est un style musical qui est et a été orienté pour l'ivoirien
en Côte d’Ivoire, par exemple, le reggae est né quelque part, il est né en Jamaïque.
C’est le style musical utilisé par les Jamaïcains pour exprimer les problèmes dans
lesquels ils vivaient, au sein de la société jamaïcaine. Donc, le Hip-Hop est un
style musical afro-américain, et c'était donc un moyen pour les Afro-Américains
d'exprimer et de traduire leurs émotions et c'est ainsi qu'ils ont utilisé ce style.
Donc, chacun a son style. Et ce style résonne. Il résonne. Et donc vous voyez,
quelqu'un qui aime Zouglou, est quelqu'un qui est susceptible d'aimer Hip-Hop, le
reggae ... ce qui signifie que ces styles se lient quelque part. Ils ont un trait
commun, et vous voyez donc que c'est pour ça que j'écoute le Hip-Hop, j'écoute
du reggae, mais mon style musical et mes préférences, je dois dire que c'est
Zouglou (Aug. 2018).
H: Of course, Zouglou is a musical style that is from and was oriented for the
Ivorian in CDI, for example, reggae was born somewhere, it was born in Jamaica.
It’s the musical style that Jamaicans used to express the problems they were living
in, within Jamaican society. So, Hip-Hop is an African American musical style,
and so it was a way for African Americans to express and translate their emotions
and that’s how they used this style. So, everyone has their own style. And this
style resonates. It resonates. And so you see, someone who loves Zouglou, is
someone who is likely to like Hip-Hop, reggae...so that means that those styles
bond somewhere. They have a common trait, and so you see that’s why I listen to
Hip-Hop, I listen to reggae, but my musical style and preference, I’d have to say
is Zouglou (Aug. 2018).
In discussing Hip-Hop’s manifestation in different contexts, it is necessary not, as
Fadel warns, to assert American Hip-Hop’s dominance on all expressions of Hip-Hop. It
belittles the principles and the power of its cultural transmission (Fadel, 2017) . Zouglou
was birthed amidst seeming nothingness. Those of the Zouglou generation saw
themselves as belonging to a community that went beyond campus much like Césaire
(1939); Magro (2016); and Opsahl & Røyneland (2016), imagine. Broken promises,
failed institutions, and a lack of resources engendered a cultural shift that saw young
people speaking up through makeshift instruments and dance that at once affronted their
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elders and inspired masses. If we are to revisit Mignolo’s (2009) discussion of a shared
“wound” and its impact in knowledge making. Then Zouglou provides an excellent lens
into decolonizing knowledge because, as Mignolo asserts, “[k]nowledge-making
presupposes a semiotic code (languages, images, sounds, colors, etc.) shared between
users in semiotic exchanges” (Mignolo, 2009, p. 18). Zouglou would allow for a new
semiotic code that encouraged young people to take matters into their own hands.
Mobilizing Hip-Hop Pedagogy
A different kind of school - “une école differente”
FESCI may be many things, but FESCI is out to transform and mold a certain
type of young Ivorian. As I went about talking to Fescists, it was apparent that it was not
only the struggle for students’ rights that got them there; though an initial draw. What
kept them there, however, was the socialization, leadership training, the sense of “self,”
and the confidence to challenge ‘elders.’ In talking to Zatto and co., it was indisputable
that FESCI was a school within a school, providing an avenue and training that the
university seemed unable to impart. One member clearly stated the organization's mission
was not only to fight for students’ rights but to train the future leaders of tomorrow and to
promote “socialization, political education, and professional development” (F, 2018). F
told me:
F: D’accord... La FESCI a dans ses objectifs premiers, lutte pour le bien-être des
élèves et étudiants de Côte d’Ivoire pour des intérêts matériels et moraux sur tous
les élèves de Côte d’Ivoire ; ça c’est le début originel de la FESCI maintenant à
côté de ça aussi la FESCI se veut être creusée de formation des hommes de
demain et pour ce fait, il faille qu’on puisse former tous ceux qui sont militants de
la FESCI parce que il y a la formation que l’on reçoit à l’école et puis il y a la
formation de la vie active et il y a aussi la formation politique y a plusieurs
formations donc la FESCI se veut le projet, la formation de tous les élites de
demain. Voici si on veut dire le but de la FESCI (2018).
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F: Okay...FESCI has as its first objective, to fight for the well-being of pupils and
students of Ivory Coast for their physical and moral wellbeing, This is the
original goal of FESCI, now besides this FESCI also delves into training of the
men of tomorrow and for this, it is necessary that we train all those who are
FESCI members...because there is the education that we receive at school and
then there is socialization, and there is also the political education... there are
several professional development [projects that] FESCI promotes, the training of
all the elites of tomorrow. If we want to say the purpose of FESCI (2018).
Recognizing the organization’s reach and influence, it was evident that FESCI
members stayed because of the potential benefits to which membership afforded. It made
me wonder whether students registered to university to actually “enroll” in FESCI? When
I spoke to Angra, Zatto, and Hie, those were the reasons they noted for joining FESCI as
high school students “I saw what they were doing…” they would say. They appeared to
be effective. And moreover, they were respected and heard. For some coming from the
“sacrificed generation” (Schumann, 2012), FESCI could be everything. They could be the
“elite,” the “leaders of tomorrow,” as F told me. But more so than that, as Hie would
describe to me, they were training the future leaders of tomorrow to combat the
“injustices directed towards students.” Hie would continue:
Hie: Tout d’abord, je parlerai de son contexte existentiel: la FESCI est ici parce
qu’il ya des injustices envers les étudiants, la FESCI est ici parce que le système
éducatif n’est pas à la hauteur / performatif, je peux donc dire que nous aidons le
gouvernement à perfectionner système éducatif, mais en plus de cela, la FESCI
est une école / terrain de formation, où nous enseignons à nos étudiants nos
valeurs, telles que l'art de parler en public est enseigné ici, la gestion d'une
organisation ou d'un groupe, est enseignée ici, donc pour nous, nous disons que la
FESCI est une école de formation, où les gens viennent apprendre de la FESCI,
car aujourd’hui, la FESCI a formé tant de personnes, aujourd’hui, la FESCI est
devenue une référence en termes de mouvements d’étudiants, grâce à toutes les
personnes qu’elle a formées. Beaucoup de gens sont passés par la FESCI et sont
aujourd'hui sur la scène politique, et d'autres encore… En fait, nous sommes un
peu partout aujourd'hui, vous pouvez voir que de nombreux étudiants s'intéressent
aux méthodes de la FESCI et qu'il y a beaucoup d'autres organisations qui essaient
de nous imiter.
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Hie: First, I will talk about it’s existential context for being, FESCI is here
because there are injustices directed towards students, FESCI is here because the
educative system is not up to parr, so I can say that we help the government to
perfect the educational system, but on top of that, FESCI is a training
school/ground, where we teach students our values, such as the art of public
speaking is taught here, the management of an organization or a group, is taught
here, so for us, we say that FESCI is a training school, where people come to
learn from FESCI because today, FESCI has trained so many people, today
FESCI has become a reference in terms of student movements, because of all the
people it has trained. Many people have passed through FESCI and today they
are in the political scene, and others...really, we are a little bit everywhere today,
you can see that many students are interested in the FESCI ways, and there are a
lot of other organizations who are trying to emulate us (2018).
With such a pedigree, how could one not attempt to enroll in such an exclusive
institution? FESCI, for many students, is the school the government and the university
should have provided. An institution that teaches critical thinking, vocational training,
and liberation. This evokes Jenkins (2013) discussion of school and schooling and the
potential for a transformative educational approach (p. 14). This sentiment was stressed
by all Fescists but especially Zatto, who was adamant that FESCI was a necessity in order
to function in the real world. FESCI, he would reiterate, was a “different type of school,”
one that was necessary for graduating to the real world. FESCI, Zatto would add, would
“wake you up,” he continues:
Zatto : Je dirai une école différente de l’école où elle se trouve. Pourquoi je dis
différente ? A l’école, on te donne que la formation académique. Tandis qu’à la
FESCI on réveille ton leadership. La FESCI te permet de sortir de toi-même, de
parler à des milliers de personnes sans avoir peur. La preuve en est que Soro le
fais bien n’est-ce pas ? C’est la FESCI qui l’a formé. Charles Blé Goudé le fais
bien ? C’est la FESCI qui l’a formé...Cette école donne une formation autre que la
formation académique. Là-bas tu as les diplômes, et ici tu as une formation, un
esprit de gestion. Car tu peux avoir des diplômes et si on te confie un groupe de
personne, tu ne pourras pas gérer. Car tout simplement parce que tu n’as pas fait
la FESCI (2018).
Zatto: I will say a school different from the school where it is. Why do I say
different? At school, you are given only academic training. While at FESCI we
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wake up your leadership. FESCI allows you to go out on your own, to talk to
thousands of people without fear. The proof is that Soro does it well, does he not?
It's FESCI that trained him. Charles Blé Goudé does he do it well? It was FESCI
who trained him....This school provides education other than academic training.
There you have the diplomas, and here you have a training, a management spirit.
Because you can have diplomas and if you are entrusted with a group of people,
you will not be able to manage. Because simply because you did not attend
FESCI (2018).
If you did not “attend” FESCI, how could you be “entrusted with a group of
people” to manage and lead them, inquired Zatto? FESCI, for Zatto, was a necessity if
you wanted to develop your leadership, public speaking, self-directing skills.
Additionally, he mentions FESCI’s most divisive leaders, Guillaume Soro and Charles
Blé Goudé, the former, is currently the president of the National Assembly and second to
the presidency, the latter, a former Minister of Youth and Sports and currently being held
at ICC for crimes against humanity.
I vividly remember the first time I went to FESCI headquarters. Their
headquarters is on campus, near the university residential village in Cocody; across from
the office of student disabilities and a large open air cafeteria. That day, I met with
Fulgence Assi (AFA), then Secretary General, other members of the cabinet and his
‘comrades’ as they are called. I waited outside while they conducted their meeting, once
they were done, I was invited in, introduced and given permission to conduct interviews
with members. This is how I met Hie.
Hie was extremely kind and accommodating. It seemed his eyes were always
smiling even when he was not; this did not mean his words did not come with a punch.
At 35 years old, Hie is pursuing his Master’s degree in psychology and also serving as
the secretary of professional development and entrepreneurship. His job entails him
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working to help other students find internships and employment during their studies and
after graduation (Hie, 2018). Not only is this position satisfying but it allows Hie to
develop his leadership skills in the process. I asked him if there was an office that should
be in charge of this, as FESCI’s version of career services, should not be their
responsibility.
Hie: Je trouve des stages pour
des étudiants qui le souhaitent,
j’en ai trouvé à la SOTRAC, au
COPEC, même si c’est le
système qui devrait en organiser.
NBN: C’est ce que je pensais, ce
n’est pas ton travail, non?

Hie: I find internships for
students who want them, I’ve
found some at SOTRAC, at
COPEC, even though it’s the
system that should arrange this.
NBN: That’s what I thought, this
is not your job, right?

Hie: Ce n’est pas mon travail.
Lorsqu'un étudiant termine ses
cours, il doit se rendre dans une
entreprise pour effectuer un stage
afin d'ajouter de l'expérience
dans son CV, après avoir appris
toutes les bases théoriques. Tu
vois? Mais puisque les
responsables ne le font pas, et
que nous les faisons, nous
devenons une nuisance et, par
conséquent, les gens vont
chercher des raisons et des
arguments pour expliquer
pourquoi nous ne devrions pas
exister ... tout ça. Ça arrive. Et
donc, c'était juste une petite
raison pour justifier cela. La
FESCI est destinée aux jeunes.
Dans sa composition, la FESCI
est là pour aider les étudiants,
aider le système à s’améliorer,
telle est sa mission (2018).

Hie: It’s not my job. When a
student finishes their coursework,
they need to go to a company to
do an internship to add some
experience in their CV, after
learning all the theoretical stuff.
You see? But since the people in
charge do not do this, and since
we do them, we become a
nuisance, and so, people will go
find reasons and arguments for
why we should not exist...all that
stuff. It happens. And so, this
was a just a little reason to justify
this. FESCI is for young people,
FESCI, in its composition is here
to help students, help the system
to improve, that is its mission
(2018).

When I spoke to Hie about FESCI’s work, he was very clear that all their actions
and methods were in providing services and opportunities for young people because the
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“people in charge do not do this.” But, therein conflict would ensue, according to Zatto
and Hie, Fescists were called “nuisances” and “violent” when encroached on the
responsibilities of those in charge. These negative targets, Hie would add, would support
anti-Fescists sentiments that the organization “should not exist.” Hie also had a lot of
connections and access for a graduate student. As I spent time with Hie, F, Zatto,
Mohammed, and Angra, I noted that unlike many students I spoke with, these FESCI
members had access and privileges not afforded to the average student; some had cars,
many had dorms to themselves, and others could ride buses for free (Niati, fieldnotes,
2018). This further muddied the political relationship and social justice work they
claimed to do.
It suddenly occurred to me why FESCI’s behavior could be considered “mafialike” (HRW, 2008). According to members, they were providing a service they were not
obligated to provide and as such, a small tithe was the least students could do to help this
“different type of school” function within the university system. FESCI was a different
type of school functioning within the university system while simultaneously challenging
their approach to schooling. YEM works outside of the school system using their
pedagogic concerts and workshops as a tool for socialization.
Socialisation
If, as Petchauer (2009), Hill (2009, 2013), and Low et al. (2013), argue that HipHop is a radical form of socialization wherein youth “interpret, represent, and negotiate
aspects of their sociocultural identities…” then YEM provides a space that affirms this
socialization (Low et al., 2013, p. 119). When I asked participants about the educative
role of their projects, many attested to the fact that YEM serves as an addendum to
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schooling. If schooling, as Fadel asserts, is a place of socialization, then that socialisation
must be explicit for the students’ development. Unfortunately, he continues, schools have
failed students and as such YEM has stepped in to not only teach but also to train and
inform in a manner that is counter to “dominant” ideals.
FADEL : Si l’école faisait son travaille on en serait pas là. Donc le peuple
développe des réflexes pour combler les manques et considérer que y’en a marre
et les mouvements semblables sont un peu dans ça. C’est des peuples qui l’ont
sécrété, il y’a eu des manques d’influence à des niveaux, ça c’est un. Deuxième
élément, c’est que y’en a marre est forcément une école en ce sens qu’on devient
un élément ou une instance dans le processus de socialisation. Vous savez dans
chaque peuple, dans chaque communauté il y’a des instances de socialisation où
les gens se forment. Avant au Sénégal jusqu’à présent d’ailleurs les gens se forme
à l’école parce que c’est quand même une instance de socialisation, il y’a les
daaras c’est des regroupements religieux qui est une instance de socialisation, il
y’a les ASC les associations sportives et culturels qui sont des instances de
socialisation, et aussi… voilà des associations du quartier, où souvent les gens se
rendent compte qu’ils parlent de ce qui se passe et ils proposent des actions. Mais
souvent c’est ce processus de socialisation là, ils sont tous formaté et moulé par
un modèle, le modèle dominant. Y’en a marre est un petit peu haut que ça, il sort
un peu de ça il propose une autre instance de socialisation. Ou on discute, ou
interagit et c’est même intéressant aujourd’hui de voir la même porter au niveau
africain. Ou y’en a marre est un incubateur de leader, comme d’ailleurs la
plateforme Afriki université populaire de l’engagement citoyen. ...mouler d’une
certaine manière différente de ce que la société à proposer jusque-là. Toute nos
causeries que nous faisons dans nos quartiers, tout ça parce que nous avons une
idéologie je le mets entre guillemet ‘’différente du dominant’’. Et nous
développons à notre niveau et mettons des jeunes en convergence, en
contradiction et en synergie et c’est ça qui permet d’ailleurs à y’en a marre
d’avancer (Nov. 2018)
--FADEL: If the school did its job we wouldn't be here. So people are reacting to
fill the gaps and consider y’en a marre and similar movements to be a bit in that.
It’s the people who developed it, there was a lack of influence in [our] leadership,
that’s one. The second element is that y’en a marre is definitely a school in the
sense that it has become an element or a step in the socialization process. You
know each person, in each community there are instances of socialization where
people are shaped/taught. Before in Senegal until today, people are taught in
school because it is still a place of socialization, there are the daaras, these are
religious groupings which are places of socialization, there are the ASC sports
and cultural associations which are places of socialization, and also ... there are
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neighborhood associations where often people realize that they are talking about
what is going on and they suggest action. But often the socialization processes
there, are all formatted and molded by a model, the dominant model. Y’en a
marre is above that, we move away from that to offer another form of
socialization. Where we discuss, or interact and it is even interesting today to see
the same support on the African level. Where y’en a marre is a leading incubator,
like the Afriki popular university platform for civic engagement…[we] mold in a
certain way different from what society has to offer even today. All our talks that
we do in our neighborhoods, all because we have an ideology, I put it in quotes
“different from the dominant.’’ And we develop at our level and put young people
in convergence, in contradiction and in synergy and that is what allows for y’en a
marre to move forward (Nov. 2018).
Schools serve a functional purpose in not only providing curriculum based
instruction but also in socializing young people to the sociocultural norms of a given
society. Yet, Fadel clearly asserts that YEM’s existence is a direct result of the failures in
leadership and more specifically in educational leadership. A lack of civic education
where young children “do not know the national anthem,” or their constitutional rights
means a lack of full participation in the democratic process. According to him and other
members, it is because of these failures that YEM exists to counter and to develop
informed and engaged citizens to go against “dominant” ideals.
As Sané would say, young people are “lost” (2018). Because of this, Sané would
tell me that YEM was intentional in developing civic action projects that would allow
young people to find their way. When I attended the final ceremony in which they
announced the winners of the rap battle, they made sure to start the ceremony with
Senegalese national anthem (Niati, fieldnotes, 2017). This was something that occurred at
each project, conference, or workshop. They were intentional in promoting citizenship; a
crucial part of the socialization that Fadel and Moriba discussed.
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SANE : … oui, en fait c’est ça, c’est l’un de nos chantier, chantier de l’action
citoyenne, on se dit que le discours qu’on sur la citoyenneté qui s’adresse à notre
génération ; notre génération est plus ou moins un peu perdue. Mais on se dit
que si on veut que ce soit dans la durée et que de générations en générations on
puisse aboutir à cette qualité de citoyenneté, il faut agir sur les plus jeunes. Et
nous par exemple, le premier projet qu’on a voulu mettre en œuvre quand Macky
SALL est arrivé au pouvoir, c’était le projet d’introduction de clip citoyen dans
les écoles. Mais malheureusement comme à l’époque on avait décliné la
proposition de Macky SALL de participer à la gouvernance, de le soutenir, donc
n’ont pas voulu du projet, ils ont bloqué sous prétexte que y’en a marre veut
rentrer dans les écoles pour endoctriner les jeunes…(Nov. 2018).
--SANE: ...yes, in fact that's it, this is one of our projects, the civic action project,
we say that the discourse we have on citizenship that is addressed to our
generation; our generation is more or less a little lost. But we tell ourselves that if
we want it to be long-term and that from generation to generation we can achieve
this quality of citizenship, we must act on the youngest. And we, for example, the
first project that we wanted to implement when Macky SALL came to power, it
was the project to introduce civic educational music videos in schools. But
unfortunately as at the time we had declined the proposal of Macky SALL to
participate in [his] government, to support it, they did not want the project, they
blocked it on the pretext that y'en a marre wants to come into schools to
indoctrinate young people… (Nov. 2018)
Sané (2018), Moriba, and Fadel would assert that young people are lost and it
seems as though the country’s leaders wish to take advantage of this weakness
(Schumann, 2012, Gueye, 2013, Lambert, 2016). YEM members felt compelled to step in
and promote socialization and citizenship in schools. And, just as with FESCI, Y’en a
Marre’s encroachment into the government’s duties, are vilified for “indoctrinating” and
taking advantage of their role. As a prominent organization, YEM members were poised
to enter the upper echelons of government. The current president owes his popularity and
general support to YEM’s organizing and engagement. And, in return, offered several
founding members posts in his cabinet. They all refused. Would the government have
viewed them otherwise had they joined? “We didn’t do it to enter politics...we wanted to
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be the example that could do this outside of those in power and change the system,”
Fadel would say (Nov. 2018). This too, was echoed by Sané, Thiew, Moriba, and Sophie.
Their primary objective has been and maintains to elevate the consciousness of young
people and challenge political elitism. Had they entered office, Sané alerted me, many of
their projects would have come to an end.
Y’en a Marre has been intentional about their authenticity and one of the ways to
promote this was to refuse requests to join the president’s cabinet. Their refusal to enter
politics illustrated Fadel and Sané’s push to be an example and a leader to other young
people throughout the continent. The intention was to promote YEM’s objectives and
engender a population that was aware. This however came at a price, as their refusal to
join the president’s cabinet resulted in their civic action music videos (akin to Channel
One News in the U.S.), being denied use in schools as president Macky Sall, once a YEM
supporter, deemed the videos a form of “indoctrination.” What we now see, as Thiew told
me, was a generation of young people who cannot recite the national anthem and have
limited knowledge of the “political life of the country” (Thiew, 2018).
THIEW : On chantait l’hymne national après, après avoir chanté l’hymne
national, on se mettait en rang pour entrer dans la salle une par une. Mais
maintenant tout est gâté, on ne fait pas, on ne fait plus dans les écoles. Donc
souvent tu vois un jeunes par exemple qui va jusqu’à, jusqu’à la classe de CM2 et
qui n’arrive pas à comprendre et qui n’arrive même pas à écrire correctement.
Donc ça veut dire que, par exemple, je ne sais pas, comme le dit, la lutte, la
danse, les trucs de folklore quoi, qu’on fait dans les écoles. Et puis les jeunes au
lieu de s’intéresser, au lieu de s’intéresser réellement à la vie politique de leur
pays, mais ils préfèrent par exemple rester scotcher à la télé pour suivre Beyonce,
des Jay-Z ou bien suivre la lutte. C’est peut-être dû à ça. Donc on s’est dit qu’à un
moment donné, il faut aller vers eux, il faut les sensibiliser à notre méthode, à
notre manière aussi (Nov. 2018)
---
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THIEW: We sang the national anthem after, after singing the national anthem,
we lined up to enter the room one by one. But now everything is spoiled, we don't
do it, we don't do it anymore in schools. So often you see a young person for
example who goes up to, up to the 5th grade and who cannot understand and who
cannot even write correctly. So that means that, for example, I don’t know, as I
say, wrestling, dancing, folklore stuff, is what they do in schools. And then the
young people instead of being interested, instead of really being interested in the
political life of their country, but they prefer for example to remain glued to the
TV to follow Beyonce, Jay-Z or follow [Senegalese] wrestling. It may be due to
that. So we said to ourselves that at some point, we have to go to them, we have to
make them aware of our method, in our own way too (Nov. 2018).
Leadership, transparency, engagement, and socialization embody the ideals that
were revealed to me by YEM participants. They were concerned with the coming
generation and worried that dominant imported ideals hindered the progression of the
country. It was necessary that YEM be more than a force of contestation but too, they
needed to come with receipts. How does one teach and emit action and leadership in a
field of protest and misleading facts? As Sophie would succinctly put it, YEM pushes to
be proactive to teach young people to fish for themselves:
SOPHIE : …on continue la
sensibilisation, parce que dès le
début, on a compris que...on s’est
dit que y’en a marre n’est pas
que contestation. Il est aussi dans
la proposition et tout ça, et en
dehors des contestations aussi, on
propose des solutions, on aide les
jeunes à pouvoir se prendre en
charge….on mène plusieurs
activités, on a même des projets
ou ce sont les jeunes qui ont
bénéficiés pour pouvoir pêcher
leurs propres poissons…. (Nov.
2018)

SOPHIE : ... we are continuing
to raise awareness, because from
the start, we understood that ...
we told ourselves that y’en a
marre is not just protests. It is
also proactive and all that, and
apart from the challenges too, we
offer solutions, we help young
people to be able to take care of
themselves. We carry out several
activities, we even have projects
where young people who
benefited to be able to catch their
own fish… (Nov. 2018)

Sophie, Moriba, Fadel, Thiew, and Sané were quick to agree that YEM worked to
socialize young people to develop critical attuned and socially engaged citizens who were
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self-determined. Knowledge of self is a crucial element of Hip-Hop culture and one that
seems to challenge Hip-Hop heads the most; it requires the most work. And yet, even as
they embark on this difficult work, much like Hip-Hop, the road ahead is messy.
In each organization there is a period of growing pains in which said organization
must establish itself. Hip-Hop went through this growing pain and it forever challenged
the way we looked at and approached the culture. Yet today, Hip-Hop is one of the U.S.’s
greatest cultural exports. Is there hope that FESCI will evolve from their past? What
about Y’en a Marre? What growing pains will they experience? And how will that
change the ways in which young people engage in this new era? What about the role of
women? Given women’s achievements on the continent, why is it that they are not as
prominent in these organizations? These are questions policymakers and educators must
consider when implementing programs and policies that focus on young people,
engagement, leadership, and peace education initiatives.
Concluding Discussion
In challenging the concepts of pedagogy and schooling, Akom (2009) and Jenkins
(2013) encourage us to revisit how Hip-Hop cultivates “organic intellectuals” who bring
theory and practice together (Akom, 2009, p. 53 & 55). Hip-Hop as a pedagogical tool
goes beyond lyrics and rhymes but instead is embraced as a critical pedagogy of
“imagination, humanism, agency, and becoming” allowing us to reshape the act of
learning, from a “structured, “mechanized” experience into a creative, imaginative, and
socially conscious endeavor.” (Jenkins, 2013, p. 14). Epistemologically, a critical HipHop pedagogy creates spaces for organizations such as YEM and FESCI to create
counternarratives, delinking from majoritarian structures and encourage young people to
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“turn their sociological gaze back toward the community and begin to solve everyday
problems…” (Akom, 2009, p. 55).
The next chapter will examine FESCI and YEM’s push for authenticity; keepin it
real, a form of epistemic disobedience that is negotiated through language, leadership
training, and identity formation. Recognizing the limitations Low et al., (2013) warn of
keeping it real, let us consider how YEM and FESCI negotiated authenticity given their
sociopolitical contexts. Thiew would reiterate that young people in Senegal continuously
aligned themselves with Hip-Hop culture, as such, they needed to “keep it real,” that is to
be distinctly Senegalese. In Abidjan, Fescists noted that they espoused a “typically
ivorian” identity that was unique to Abidjan. The next chapter thusly discusses how YEM
and FESCI navigated these discourses of authenticity (Low et al., 2013) through
language, leadership training, and identity formation.
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CHAPTER 6
KEEPIN’ IT REAL
Introduction
Hip-Hop, as Magro (2016), Krs-One (1989), Low et al. (2013), and Corona &
Kelsall (2016), assert is about authenticity, “keepin’ it real,” and being true to the local.
This idea of authenticity, can be used as a challenge to dominant narratives and a tool of
“resistance in the public space” that becomes a necessary “vehicle of expression in HipHop” (Magro, 2016, p. 18). Speaking to the creative and adversarial genesis of Hip-Hop
in Norway, for example, Opsahl & Røyneland (2016), look at the ways in which the
global and local connect through a language of resistance and belonging to suggest that
“Hip-Hop also plays a decisive role in the creation and formation of a new,
multiethnolectal urban speech style” (p. 45).
This chapter provides my analysis of the discourses of authenticity as embodied
by Y’en a Marre and FESCI. Let down by their elders and leaders, FESCI and YEM
members kept it real as a means to counter deceitful politicians, to challenge their elders,
and to develop a new identity expression that was authentically Ivorian or Senegalese.
This allowed for a space of realness that was embodied in contrastive ways in these two
countries. The following examination first discusses how YEM and FESCI approached
and viewed this notion of “keepin’ it real” and authenticity. I will then discuss how they
challenged linguistic norms by either refusing to or manipulating French and instead
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using local languages such as Wolof and Nouchi, engaging in authentic Hip-Hop
leadership (Wilson, 2013), and negotiating their identity through a new slogan.
Informed by Césaire’s understanding of Blackness and his expression of négritude
as the “simple recognition of the fact that one is Black, the acceptance of this fact and of
our destiny as Blacks, of our history and culture” (Césaire, 1939 as cited in Sprague,
2018), this chapter builds from this perspective, to delve into Ngugi’s (2009) challenge of
“Europhonism,” of decolonizing the African mind and engaging in epistemologies of
resistance that are authentically African. As we see from FESCI and YEM, their
engagement is very much ingrained within their push for authenticity and in so doing,
they have created spaces to demonstrate epistemic disobedience through language and
identity.
Keepin’ it real
When considering the ways in which FESCI and YEM have used Hip-Hop to
organize and engage young people, what we see is an ideology that centers authenticity
and ownership in their promotion of leadership, identity formation and linguistic
expression. Hip-Hop is about authenticity, keepin it real and “being true to the local.”
This idea of authenticity, Magro (2016) argues, “is linked to specific linguistic varieties”
and thus, “membership in a global community of style may have as much to do with
ideologies of language and transidiomatic practices” as it does with local musical, artistic,
and linguistic forms (p. 18). For Y’en a Marre and those who attended pedagogic
concerts, Hip-Hop was the engine to promote YEM’s authenticity and a “vehicle of
expression,” was easier to understand and listen to unlike politicians as Fadel would say.
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In Abidjan, Zouglou, with its distinct dance and language enraged and enthralled
at the same time. Young people relished in forefronting their new found strength, identity
and expression through a new linguistic expression known as Nouchi. Their
parents/leaders saw them as vagabonds with no direction and disrespecting traditional
and standard norms. This conflict would and continues to be magnified through the
development of Nouchi, a “contact language” that began on the streets of Abidjan in the
1970’s and 1980’s (Sande, 2015, p. 243).
Y’en a Marre’s push to be ‘authentically’ Senegalese in their manifestation of
Hip-Hop was evident not only in how they chose to use Hip-Hop pedagogy to engage
young people but also how they utilized language to reach the country. Senegal, like
many African countries, oscillates within and around its colonial past. As I will discuss in
the section below, the use of Wolof over French was an intentional method to once again
promote Senegalese identity, de-link from accepted norms, and create knowledge that, as
Smith (1999) writes, “reclaim[s] land, language, knowledge, and sovereignty” (p. 33).
Mobilizing Hip-Hop: Language
Wolof and French
As a former colony of France, French is the official language and the language of
instruction of Senegal. But, Mazrui (2000) and Fal (2000) among others, argue that
roughly only 28% of the population speak the language. What is widely spoken
throughout the country is Wolof, which is spoken by about 80% of the population, along
with other languages including Pulaar, Jola, Serer, Mandinka, and Soninke (Mazrui, 2000
and Fal, 2007). This begs the question, if the majority of the population does not actively
speak French, why not work to actively promote Wolof? If Wolof can be used to raise
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awareness on public health issues, why not use Wolof for civic education or K-12
instruction? (Mazrui, 2000).
When I asked participants about the use of Wolof over French, it was clear that a
mistrust in leadership and more directly, the power and impact of the French influence on
the country, was a source of discontent. The use of French in the political sphere made it
such that many were excluded and tuned out. What my participants revealed to me was
the need to be clear, upfront and not confusing like politicians who seemed to use French
in such a way to complicate and mislead the general population. As Sophie, Thiew, and
Sane would attest, they wanted to be sure to talk to people in an approachable, “down to
earth” manner that was familiar and approachable.
Below Sophie explains her take on the deliberate use of language. She mentioned
several times their deliberate use of Wolof and other local languages as a way to engage
with young and old; rich and poor alike. Wolof in this instance, became a sociopolitical
tool to counter standard conventional French and “politics-as-usual:”
SOPHIE : ….d’abord, il faut savoir qu’on leur parlait en langage terre à
terre...On sensibilisait plus de clients comme ça, dans les marchés, c’était pareil,
on avait par exemple des... je ne sais pas comment on appelle ça, des truc…des
hauts parleurs-là, oui…, pour… voilà, sensibiliser plus de gens…, on allait aussi
bien dans les maison, on faisait des portes à portes, on trouvait des gens devant
leur maison…, on leur parlait et tout et on utilisait un langage terre à terre ; par
exemple, on utilisait pas le langage des politiciens, qui utilisent des mots que les
populations ont du mal à comprendre . Alors qu’on leur parle le Wolof terre à
terre qu’ils ont envie d’entendre, et qu’ils comprennent aussi ….C’est le Wolof,
beuuu, chaque a sa langue, mais il y a une langue que tout le monde parle dans un
pays, il faut utiliser un langage terre à terre, des exemples terre à terre pour leur
faire comprendre, faire accéder , c’est plus simple, ici par exemple, c’est le
Wolof qu’on parle, mais quand on va au Fouta, ils parlent par exemple poular , il
y a Malal qui parle poular, alors,il leur explique ça avec des mots simples en
poular, pas des phrase extraordinaires, mais accessible, qu’ils puissent
comprendre ce qui se passe et tout…, on s’adapte au milieu au fait, il faut
s’adapter avec le milieu, parler avec les populations …. (Nov. 2018)
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--SOPHIE: ...first, you should know that we spoke to people in a down to earth
language that they understood...We raised more awareness from people that way,
in the markets, it was the same, we had for example, I don't know what you call
them... loudspeakers, yes, to educate more people…, we went to homes as well,
we went door to door, we found people in front of their house, we spoke and
everything and we used a down to earth language; for example, we did not use the
language of politicians, who use words that people have trouble understanding.
When we talk to them in an approachable Wolof that they want to hear, and that
they also understand…. It's Wolof, each has its own language, but there is a
language that everyone speaks in a country, you have to use a common language,
down to earth examples to make them understand, give access, it's simpler, here
for example, it's Wolof that we speak, but when we go to Fouta, they speak for
example Pular, there is Malal who speaks Pular, so he explains it to them with
simple words in Pular, not extraordinary but accessible sentences, so that they can
understand what is going on and everything…, we adapt to the environment, we
have to adapt to the environment, speak with the population… (Nov. 2018).
Language is powerful. What Sophie and YEM members conveyed to me was the
limitless and unbounded force of Wolof and other local languages that was not found in
French. Not only did the population not fully understand French, but when complemented
with political jargon and double entendres, many people felt excluded and forgotten. So,
YEM members actively chose to not only speak Wolof but, as Sophie stated, they used a
common Wolof spoken and understood by everyone in a jargon that was, as she notes,
accessible and simpler. This intentional effort, was as Alim (2011) notes, a push for
“counterhegemonic politics” that forefronted a “new type of Senegalese.”
What I heard from YEM members was this sense of being vrai senegalais (real
Senegalese), an echo that is seeped throughout Hip-Hop belief system, that of keepin’ it
real (Low et al., 2013, and Pardue, 2013). Thiew and Sophie both mentioned the maman
who they made sure understood their cause. And in order to do so, they made sure to talk
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to her in such a way that she was not only honored but understood. From this, Thiew
notes, they were able to be successful in gaining ground and attracting young and old.
THIEW : ...bon, parce qu’en fait au Sénégal, la langue qui est beaucoup plus
parlée c’est le wolof...Donc pour réussi ça aussi, il fallait faire des messages en
wolof. Même pour les inscriptions sur les slogans, on n’utilisait pas les slogans en
français, la plupart on utilisait des slogans en wolof. Il y avait seulement le slogan
« Faux! Pas Forcé! », on a… parce qu’en fait, on jouait sur les slogans pour
vraiment faire comprendre aux populations. Mais la plupart, on utilisait le wolof
pour que la population comprenne ce qu’on veut dire. Sinon si tu utilises le
français, la plupart des gens ne va pas comprendre, on était obligé de... C’est pour
cela que nos mamans ont vite compris le mouvement et que vraiment ils ont
vraiment… la population a vite compris le mouvement. Voilà, c’est pourquoi !
Parce que automatiquement ils ont vraiment compris, ils ont vu à travers le
message qu’on portait. Ils savaient que ce mouvement n’était pas… c’était des
vrai sénégalais, de vrai sénégalais qui croyaient en eux. Donc c’est pour cela aussi
(Nov. 2018)
--THIEW: ...well, because in fact in Senegal, the most commonly spoken language
is Wolof...So to succeed that too, you had to make messages in Wolof. Even for
the signs on the slogans, we did not use the slogans in French, for most of them
we used slogans in Wolof. There was only the slogan "Faux! Pas Forcé!", we
have ... because in fact, we were playing on slogans to really make people
understand. Most of the time, we used Wolof to make people understand what we
mean. Otherwise if you use French, most people will not understand, we had to ...
This is why our moms quickly understood the movement and .. they really ... the
population quickly understood the movement . That’s why! Because
automatically they really understood, they saw through the message we were
carrying. They knew that this movement was not ... it was real Senegalese, real
Senegalese who believed in them. So that’s why too (Nov. 2018).
Thiew emphasizes the importance of keepin’ it real within a Senegalese context,
something they felt their leaders were not demonstrating in their reliance on French and
political-economic reliance on France. The use of Wolof in this context as discussed by
Sophie and Thiew also highlights the continued struggle with Senegal’s colonial past,
class dynamics, and lack of political will to promote Wolof over French. This, to Thiew
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and other YEM members, exemplified a lack of authenticity that perpetuated the old way
of doing things and thus a maintenance of the status quo.
In their discussion of authenticity and keepin’ it real within Hip-Hop culture, Low
et al. (2013), contend that this belief system that sits at the core of Hip-Hop culture,
manifests in five distinct ways: “the ‘streets,’ ‘hard’ heterosexual masculinity, blackness,
the importance of representing the place and culture you are from, the importance of
being true to yourself, and politically conscious, ‘underground’ hip-hop” (p. 120). During
my time attending meetings, rap battles, concerts, etc., participants regularly emphasized
these six traits. As members of YEM, the rap group Keur Gui represented what the
authors note as politically conscious rap; members’ background from Kaolack (Gueye,
2013), acknowledged the “streets” aspect, and of course their expressions of authenticity
and “keepin it real” within their mission statement, confirmed Ngugi and Smith’s (1980,
1987, 2009) “decolonizing” perspectives, Mignolo’s “epistemic disobedience,” as a
means to validate and weaponize their engagement.
Nouchi and French
African youth languages have been studied in academic spaces to illustrate their
resistance (Sande, 2015; Kiessling and Mous, 2004) and their global, modern, and
international identities (Hollington, 2016). Nouchi, an urban language that started in
Abidjan, has grown to become the lingua franca of young people, and is generally spoken
by most everyone in Ivorian society. Given that 62% of the Ivorian population is under
25 years old (UN, 2019), Sande (2015) argues that the implications for its reach and
influence are significant. Yet, Nouchi is not recognized as an official language in Cote
d’Ivoire.
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This question came up when I asked FESCI members about their use of Nouchi,
their perceptions, and if they thought Cote d’Ivoire needed a secondary local language
along with French. First, I was reminded, I needed to know that there were over 60 ethnic
groups in Côte d’Ivoire and secondly, I needed to be mindful of the identity wars of
ivoirieté that occurred during former president Henri Konan Bédié’s tenure. These two
facts were crucial in understanding why Côte d’Ivoire did not have a secondary language
outside of French and to appease the masses, no ethnic language was promoted as a
lingua franca. It still did not answer, for me, why Nouchi couldn’t be the national
language.
BN: J'ai remarquée qu'ici en Côte d'Ivoire, il n'y a pas une langue nationale en
dehors du français. Comme le wolof au Sénégal ou le lingala en RDC, etc.
Comment expliquez-vous cela et pensez-vous que la Côte d’Ivoire a besoin d'une
langue nationale en dehors du français?
SIABA: Ok, merci pour la question. Je dois dire que dans la Côte d'Ivoire, il y a
66 groupes ethniques, 66 groupes ethniques en fait il y en a plus, il y en a
certainement plus et il pourrait y en avoir plus de 66, et avoir un groupe ethnique
qui supplantera tous les autres aurait été un un peu difficile. Cela aurait placé la
suprématie de ce groupe ethnique sur tous les autres groupes ethniques. Je ne sais
pas si vous comprenez. Par exemple, si vous prenez Bété, si Bété est la langue
nationale ou la deuxième langue, cela signifie que les Bété qui sont majoritaires
dans la Côte d'Ivoire, ou qu'ils pourraient dominer. Et si vous regardez l'histoire
du Côte d'Ivoire avec la crise d'identité (ivoirité), les gens ont manipulé tout
cela… (2018).
--BN: I’ve realized that here in Cote d’Ivoire, there is no national language outside
of French. Like, Wolof in Senegal or Lingala in DRC, etc. How do you explain
this and do you think that Cote d’Ivoire needs a national language outside of
French?
SIABA: Ok, thanks for the question. I have to say that in Cote d’Ivoire there are
66 ethnic groups, 66 ethnic groups actually there is more, there is definitely more
and it might be over 66, and to have one ethnic group that would supplant all the
other ones, would have been a bit difficult. It would have placed supremacy of
that ethnic group over all the other ethnic groups.. I don’t know if you
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understand. For example, if you take Bete, if Bete the national language or
second language, this means that the Bete who are the majority in Côte d'Ivoire,
or that they might dominate. And if you look at the history in Cote d’Ivoire with
the identity crisis (ivoirité), people manipulated all of that… (2018).
Though French is the official language in Côte d’Ivoire, only about 40% of the
population is literate in the language (Djité et al., 2007). This is due in part to high dropout rates, which result in a limited mastery of French and as such, young people
manipulate Standard French with the incorporation of local languages and other
vernaculars. This is how in fact Nouchi began and why it has gained notoriety within and
outside Côte d’Ivoire. When asked what language could be elevated to official status
along with French, many demurred on choosing one as tensions of ivoirité still impacted
inter-ethnic tensions. So, why not Nouchi? Zatto was quick to first define this linguistic
expression. “Nouchi,” he started, “ is a typically Ivorian language that consists of the
compilation of several languages without favoring any English is there, German words
are there...French comes in, Dida comes in, Dioula, Baoulé ... everything comes in…”
(Zatto, 2018). He continued:
ZATTO : ...Donc c’est une
compilation de langue. Ce n’est
pas ce que les gens voient dans
les rues aujourd’hui. « Je suis
Nouchi », on est pas Nouchi, on
parle le Nouchi. Il ne faut pas
que quelqu’un va voir un bandit,
un brigand dans la rue et le
considérer comme un Nouchi.
Très souvent dans les quartiers
les gens le disent, un gars est
sale, il est en forme et il aime
faire la bagarre dans le quartier,
on le traite de Nouchi. Mais en
réalité, il n’est pas Nouchi, c’est
un voyou. Le Nouchi c’est une

compilation de langues et donc
pour ne pas qu’il y ait, je ne dirai
pas problèmes en Côte
d’Ivoire...le Nouchi peut être
revu, recyclé pour donner un bon
produit fini. Je pense bien que ce
langage doit être parlé en Côte
d’ivoire.
ZATTO: ...So this is a collection
of languages.. This is not what
people see on the streets today. "I
am Nouchi,” One is not Nouchi,
we speak Nouchi. Someone
shouldn’t see a crook, a thief in
the street and consider them
Nouchi. Very often in the
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neighborhoods people say it, a
guy is dirty, he is in good shape
and he likes to fight in the
neighborhood, we call him
Nouchi. But in reality, he is not
Nouchi, he is a thug. Nouchi is a
compilation of languages so that

there is not, I will not say
problems in Côte
d'Ivoire...Nouchi can be revised,
recycled to give a good finished
product. I think that this language
must be spoken in Ivory Coast
(2018).

Côte d’Ivoire is in a linguistic quagmire. Though French is the desired and official
language, the majority of the population is not fluent or literate in French (OIF, 2012).
Additionally, the low status of dominant-African languages in the country, has also
resulted in a majority of young people who do not speak their own ethnic language. How
then can a country promote democracy and engagement when they are unable to reach
the majority of the population?
Nouchi, on the other hand, is democratic. It favors no entity or ethnic group and is
something truly unique to Côte d’Ivoire. Nouchi has also become the unofficial lingua
franca in Côte d’Ivoire and has seeped itself even into the vocabulary of business and
politics (Sande, 2015; BBC, 2019). In our discussions of Hip-Hop and keepin it real,
Nouchi provides a means of expression that embodies the interconnected, multilingual
and globalized youth culture that is shaping Côte d’Ivoire and West Africa, in general. In
doing so, it provides a means by which all, regardless of academic background, can “find
themselves.” When I spoke with Angra, he highlighted not just Nouchi’s oppositional
tone but also its benefit as a unifying language. He told me Nouchi “can be used to
benefit all families, even the father at home, if he has forgotten his language, if he finds
himself among friends they might feel more comfortable [speaking] Nouchi...whether
you are from North, South, East to West, you will necessarily speak Nouchi…” (2018).
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Inherent in Hip-Hop culture is the countering of majoritarian norms be it music,
art, and/or language. Nouchi, plays to what Alim (2011) Hip-Hop ill-literacy, a
counterhegemonic practice against a limited version of Standard French. Nouchi, in this
sense is limitless, unbounded and unrestrained. It is the language of the people and
disrupts elitist norms by using a language perceived as vulgar, crass, and uneducated
(Hollington & Nassenstein, 2017; Chonou, 2015). Nouchi also requires us to confront
issues of classism in Ivorian society.
What Zatto and Angra revealed to me was the ways in which the politics of
language and class intersected to create this new cultural expression. Because of its
origins and with who it was affiliated, Nouchi, has been perceived as the language of
delinquent youth and the illiterate (Chonou, 2015; Sande, 2015). Zatto alludes to this
when he tries to distinguish between Nouchi the language and “thieves/crooks.” One is
not Nouchi, he maintains, one speaks Nouchi. And, in that testament, he implores for its
autonomy and its uniqueness as an Ivorian language. So too, does Angra promote this
unbounded nature of Nouchi. Recognizing that even their parents may no longer speak
their ethnic languages, Nouchi has become the “second language” of Côte d’Ivoire
because everyone can “find themselves” there. Cue: Zouglou.
If Hip-Hop culture is a way by which “youth and young adults conceive of
themselves, others, and the world around them” then Zouglou represents a
reconfiguration of Hip-Hop in Abidjan to represent their lived realities (Petchauer, 2009,
p. 947). As Alim (2009) notes in Hip-Hop Nation Language, “Hip-Hop style does not
impose a homogenized ‘one–world’ culture upon its practitioners,” rather “the global
style community of Hip-Hop is negotiated not through a particular language, but through
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particular styles of language, these styles are ideologically mediated and motivated in that
their use allows for a shared respect based on representin’ one’s particular locality” (p.18
& p. 106, Alim; Keyes, 2004; Clark, 2018). Nouchi as such keeps it real, keeps it local,
and represents the emergence of a new Ivorian identity that is heavily promoted by
Fescists.
The use of Wolof and Nouchi, arguably promotes what Césaire (1939) envisioned
to be a cultural bridge, what Benedict Anderson (1983) ascribed as the “imagined
community” and what Adjirakor (2017) called for an “African City” that is, the shared
expressions and experiences of those othered, beastified, and denied their full Self
(Fanon, 1952; Clark, 2013; Ngugi, 1987). Ngugi writes that those who [try] to
communicate the message of revolutionary unity and hope in the languages of the people
become a subversive character. It is then that writing in African languages becomes a
subversive or treasonable offence with such a writer facing possibilities of prison, exile
or-even death” (p. 30). Nouchi and Wolof are therefore emblematic of a shared language
that is inseparable from their communities, “with a specific form and character, a specific
history, a specific relationship to the world” and are thusly used as a form of resistance
and engagement (Ngugi, 1987, p. 16).
Leadership/Identity Formation - un nouveau type de sénégalais
a culture that participates in an undertaking of disorganization that is also an
adventure of reorganization and of recomposition of several historical
lineages…is at the heart of the creation of a new historicity…It is, at the same
time, an undertaking of reorganization in the sense that it operates, through a
given reserve of images, towards a task of permanent mobilization, selection,
translation, and alteration (Mamadou Diouf, as quoted in Bryson, 2014, p. 45).
There is an intersecting relationship between the political actions of Yenamarrists
and the cultural forms that they use to express, to instigate, and to organize their actions
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(Bryson, 2014, p. 46). Words, Ngom (2016) writes, are not the only “form of
representation or expression. People establish and convey meaning through clothing,
dance, music, gesture, and through complex rituals which often defy verbal exegesis” (p.
7). Hip-Hop, therefore is such a cultural expression that goes beyond rap music and
embodies the artistic, cultural, and sociopolitical movements of its people (p. 13).
Hip-Hop pedagogy as practiced by YEM “becomes a political forum for the
sensitization of the population on their rights and duties” (Ngom, 2016, p. 13). Also, by
organizing civic activities throughout the country, rappers and journalists of the
movement “vie with professional politicians for the public space” (Ngom, 2016, p. 13).
As Mamadou Diouf is quoted above, adventures in reorganization can be disorganizing
and this can be very troubling to those comfortable with the status quo. This is at the crux
of the nouveau type de sénégalais, a concept embodied by YEM to denote a person who
leads by example, who does not steal, promotes citizenship and transparency (Fadel,
2016).
In their expression of a New Type of Senegalese, YEM uses social media, HipHop culture, social and political roots of négritude. Bryson (2014) argues that by
grounding their actions and rhetoric in “recognizable Senegalese cultural patterns,” YEM
was able to “subtly and carefully introduce transgressive political and social ideas,
including ones rooted in hip-hop culture, to a broad spectrum of people” (p. 36). In so
doing, members urged their countrymen and women and served as “catalysts for social
and political reform.” A New Type of Senegalese for Yenamarristes is one who helps
themselves and “seiz[es] the opportunities that are offered to them” (p. 4).
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Hip-Hop can provide counter-narratives that espouses an identity of leadership
and ownership. This was expressed to me when talking with participants about their
reasons for joining YEM and the benefits of YEM’s anti-dominant adherence. When I
spoke with YEM members about their work and their push for a new identity formation, I
was constantly told of the nouveau type de sénégalais, a new type of Senegalese (NTS)
that expected more from themselves and their elders. This NTS that the members
emphasized is mentioned several times in the Plan Sénégal Emergent (2011), the
Senegalese economic development plan which highlights this notion of the NTS.
However, when envisioned and discussed to me by YEM members, this seems to run
counter to what the government is actually doing.
SOPHIE : ...oui... un nouveau type de Sénégalais, c’est celui qui refuse de se
laisser, qui refuse d’être un fardeau par exemple, un Sénégalais qui se prend en
charge, qui se bat pour les mêmes choses, qui se bat pour son pays, qui n’attend
rien du gouvernement ... il faut être honnête, il y a un moment dans les écoles,
manque de civisme et tout ça qu’on n’apprend plus à nos jeunes frères , voilà,
et …on….le Sénégalais a plutôt tendance à être laxiste et comment dirai,
comment on appelle ça encore... Dieu va donner,…s’il y a un malheur qui arrive,
c’est parce que Dieu , si on….voilà, si on…(hésitation)…tout ce qui arrive, c’est
Dieu, on ne fait rien pour changer cela, et c’est ce qu’on veut inculquer aux
Sénégalais, c’est ce qu’on veut qu’ils comprennent ….Au lieu d’attendre
que…voilà…de se dire que Dieu va changer les choses, Dieu va changer... c’est à
eux même de changer les choses, le changement ne peut venir que d’euxmêmes….Ils ne doivent pas attendre à ce que les autres le fassent pour eux, ou
espérer à ce que les politiciens, les hommes au pouvoir le fassent pour eux. C’est
une façon de leur inculquer cela… (Nov. 2018).
--SOPHIE: ... yes ... a new type of Senegalese is one who refuses to let himself go,
who refuses to be a burden for example, a Senegalese who takes care of himself,
who fights for the same things, who is fighting for his country, who does not
expect anything from the government...you have to be honest, there was a
moment in the schools, lack of civic [education] and all that we no longer teach
our young brothers, that's it, and ... we ... the Senegalese tend to be lax and how
would we say, what do we call that again ... God will give, ... if there is a
misfortune that happens, it's because God, if we ... well, if we ... (hesitation) ...
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everything that happens is God, we don't do anything to change that, and that's
what we want to instill among Senegalese, that's what we want them to
understand ... Instead of waiting for ... you now ... to say that God will change
things, God will change... it's up to them to change things, change can only come
from themselves .... They should not wait for others to do it for them, or expect
politicians, men in power to do it for them. It’s a way of instilling that in them…
(Nov. 2018).
What Sophie brings up is not only the push for authenticity but ownership, pride,
and leadership. This, she maintains, is necessary to instill “a change” in mentality and in
action. Gone are the days of waiting for leadership to change or improve your life, the
onus, in an NTS mentality, is on the self. Fadel echoes this sentiment and builds on
Sophie’s testament by stating that this change in mentality is necessary to be an example
for oneself and to others.
FADEL : Mandela n’a pas construit l’Afrique du sud, si l’Afrique du sud en parle
encore c’est l’exemplarité qu’il a montrée ! Et puis voilà c’est 26 ans en prison, de
reste lui-même, de sortir et de recommander au gens de se réconcilier, c’est de
l’exemplarité ! Prend ailleurs n’importe où tu veux, Patrice Lumumba n’a pas fait
grand-chose… mais les exemplarités a été de dire la vérité du colon, de dire la
vérité devant les gens. Nos pays ont besoins de ça, c’est ça qui construit un pays
au fait. Et quand nous avons parler de nouveau type de sénégalais, c’est cette
exemplarité qu’on a voulue, montrer que les sénégalais soient exemplaire dans
leur comportement de tous les jours. Pourquoi, parce qu’il faut être en harmonie
avec sois même, mais l’africain a connu tous ces chocs… Tous les chocs que nous
avons connus fait que nous sommes dans un état bizarre...Donc il faut nous
retrouver avec nous même...Donc je pense que c’est ça, quand on parle de
nouveau type d’africain, cette qualité de citoyenneté est une façon d’être. C’est
une façon d’être, c’est une prise de conscience de ce que nous sommes ! Donc
tout ça c’est sont des formes de radicalisation mais cette fois-ci on le fait pour
améliorer dans le pays, dans une forme républicaine conformément aux lois et
règlements… Avec une meilleure implication, avec une participation beaucoup
plus actif en étant un acteur de son propre destin… (Nov. 2018).
--FADEL: Mandela did not build South Africa, if South Africa is still talked about,
it is because of the example he had shown! And then here he is 26 years in prison,
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by himself, to go out and tell people to reconcile, that is an example! Take
anywhere else you want, Patrice Lumumba did not do much... but the example
was to tell the truth of the colonizer, to tell the truth in front of people. Our
countries need that, that's what builds a country by the way. And when we talked
about a New Type of Senegalese, it was this example that we wanted to show that
the Senegalese are exemplary in their everyday behavior. Why, because you have
to be in harmony with yourself, but the African has experienced all these
shocks ... All the shock that we have known means that we are in a bizarre state.
So we have to find ourselves within ourselves... So I think that's it, when we talk
about a new type of African, this quality of citizenship is a way of being. It’s a
way of being, it’s an awareness of who we are! So all of these are forms of
radicalization but this time we are doing it to improve the country, in a republican
form in accordance with laws and regulations… With better involvement, with
much more active participation by being an actor of our own destiny…(Nov.
2018).
For Fadel, this change in mentality is urgent. In order for Senegal and the
continent, in general to advance, he affirms, the African must be honest with themselves
and find themselves. And, much like Mandela, Sankara, and Lumumba before them,
YEM hopes to lead by example by showing that they can walk their talk. Like Thiew
described young people in Senegal, Africans, Fadel states, are in a state of “shock” and as
such find themselves in a “bizarre” and peculiar situation. And, in order to find
themselves once more, they must heal themselves. The goal is to be an example for
themselves and their community. This is what Mandela and Lumumba did, and this is
what YEM aims to do. This is the form of radicalization that he espouses; a fervent zeal
to motivate, engage, and transform. YEM, once again is reclaiming as Smith (1999)
suggests their knowledge and, as Mignolo (2009) asserts, making space for knowledge
making and sharing.
As someone who embodies Hip-Hop and promotes a counter-hegemonic stance
on leadership, for Fadel and YEM in general, the NTS ideal is an essential tool to
advocate panafricanism and decolonization. If, as Mignolo (2009), Fanon (1965) and
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Tuck & Yang (2012) assert that the goal of decolonization is physical and epistemic
sovereignty, then the NTS as envisioned by YEM is an articulation of this ownership.
This is not a Senegalese struggle but rather a continental one and YEM is a necessary
leader and example towards this end.
FADEL : C’est-à-dire qu’on peut dire le nouveau type de panafricain ? Parce
qu’à travers le Sénégal nous avons voulu donner une exemplarité pour la jeunesse
africaine. Parce que ce combat ne se gagnera pas tant que nous restons confinés
dans nos micro nationalisme en dessous tracé par le colon ! Aujourd’hui gambien
sénégalais ça veut rien dire, nous sommes le même peuple. D’ailleurs si tu
regardes l’histoire du Sénégal, l’histoire du Sénégal est récente, c’est presque une
création française. A pensé le nouveau type d’africain, on pense le nouveau type
de sénégalais, parce que nous voulons façonner l’africain qui va construire
l’Afrique. Cheick anta Diop a dit (incompréhension) il faut donner à l’africain le
bâtisseur qui sont en eux, Moi je dis qu’il est temps, c’est le moment de construire
l’Afrique… (Nov. 2018).
--FADEL: In other words, can we say the new type of pan-African? Because across
Senegal we wanted to set an example for African youth. Because this fight will
not be won as long as we remain confined to our micro nationalism outlined by
the colonist! Today, Senegalese, Gambian, it doesn't mean anything, we are the
same people. Besides, if you look at the history of Senegal, the history of Senegal
is recent, it's almost a French creation. In thinking about the new type of African,
we think the new type of Senegalese, because we want to shape the African who
will build Africa. Cheikh Anta Diop said...we must give the African the builder
that is in them, I say it's time, it's time to build Africa … (Nov. 2018).
This New type of African is evident of the growing pan-africanism that informs
YEM’s activism and engagement. It is not just about instilling a decolonial thinking that
challenges borders and nationhood, it is also about “build[ing]” a new Africa; and with
the help of YEM, young people can have those tools. FESCI too espouses a new way of
thinking that focuses on leadership and a change in mentality.
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Leadership/Identity formation - l’ivoirien nouveau
The adoption of Zouglou and Nouchi has resulted in a new expression by Fescists
that echoed the administration’s push for a “new Ivorian,” after the civil war. The concept
has been promoted by the government with varying results and was later adopted by
FESCI as a means to change its image. Through FESCI, this concept is engulfed within
the ideas of “family,” “leadership,” and “a change in mentality” as described to me by
participants. Similar to what Kouadio (2017) describes as the ivorien nouveau, Hie first
defined to me the concept:
HIE: Ok, eh bien... le nouveau ivoirien est un concept qui est sorti après la
guerre, comme je l'ai dit plus tôt, c'est le changement de mentalité, donc le
concept de ce nouvel ivoirien est d'amener les ivoiriens à changer leur façon de
penser, leur conception du politique jeux, leur conception de la formation, de
l'éducation, de dire que toutes ces choses qui n'étaient pas bonnes, de changer les
comportements et les valeurs qui unissent la Côte d’Ivoire pour arriver à un
processus de réconciliation, pour amener la Côte d’Ivoire à [atteindre] son niveau
de développement. C’est le concept du nouvel ivoirien. Que chacun apporte sa
pièce à la table. Que chacun, en fonction de ses compétences, de son savoir-faire,
qu'il participe à la construction de l'État (2018).
--HIE: Ok, well the new ivorian is a concept that came about after the war, like I
said earlier, it is the changing of mentality, so the concept of this new Ivorian is to
get Ivorians to change their way of thinking, their conception of political games,
their conception of training, education, to say that all those things that were not
good, to change the behaviour and values that will unite Côte d’Ivoire to come to
a process of reconciliation, to bring Côte d’Ivoire to [reach] its level of
development. That’s the concept of the new Ivorian. That everyone brings their
piece to the table. That everyone, based on their competencies, their knowhow,
that they participate in the construction of the state (2018).
What this ivoirien nouveau did was to incite a sense of leadership and ownership
for Ivorians. Unfortunately, Kouadio (2017) derides the government’s failed attempt at
pushing for this “slogan,” which has come with empty promises and no follow through
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(JeuneAfrique.com). Cue: FESCI. FESCI, like Zatto told me, was a” different kind of
school.” In this school, students engaged in leadership training that taught them how to
be. Through FESCI, members gain training that they feel the school does not provide:
public speaking, leadership, negotiations, etc. This learning occurs in a “family” type
environment, where they can be “transformed from a shy, timid person,” to someone who
“makes decisions” and is “responsible” (Angra, 2018).
H: Oui, alors vous essayez de dire si cette organisation m'a aidé à atteindre mon
potentiel ou à me sentir fort en moi? Ouais, je peux dire oui. La FESCI m'a appris
à parler en public, à vivre avec différentes personnes qui ont différents niveaux
d'éducation, qui voient les choses différemment, la FESCI m'a appris à assembler,
m'a appris à être un meilleur négociateur. Moi, par exemple, pendant
l'interruption, j'ai fait une formation au CERHAP, où j'ai appris les techniques de
négociation, mais à la FESCI on enseigne comment négocier, comment traiter
avec l'administration, comment traiter avec les deux entités, comment trouver des
solutions pour mieux interagir avec les deux entités, donc il y a des choses que
nous enseignons / apprenons à la FESCI que l'école n'a pas enseigné, donc je vais
vous dire que la FESCI m'a appris beaucoup de choses (2018).
--H: Yeah, so you are trying to say if this organization has helped me reach my
potential or feel strong in myself? Yeah, I can say yes. FESCI has taught me how
to speak in public, how to live with different people who have varying levels of
education, who see things differently, FESCI has taught me to assemble, has
taught me to be a better negotiator. Me, for example, during the crisis, I did a
training at the CERHAP, where I learned the techniques of negotiation, but in
FESCI we teach how to negotiate, how to deal with the administration, how to
deal with the two entities, how to find solutions to better interact with the two
entities, so there are things that we teach/learn at FESCI that the school has failed
to teach, so I will tell you that FESCI has taught me a lot of things (2018).
Do not get it twisted, this assumption of leadership and ownership, did not come
without benefits for Fescists. Despite their attempts to distance themselves from their
past, Fescists were still eager to mention that several high ranking members of the
government were “trained” by FESCI. This was unlike any other school. And it was why
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it seemed to be the end goal for many members: stay in “training” until a political or
another adjacent prominent opportunity arose. Is it no wonder that once his tenure was
complete Fulgence Assi became executive director of a non-profit student movement?
FESCI has bragging rights. It trains the future leaders of Côte d’Ivoire and
continues to do so. There is a sense of pride and ownership when Siaba relates to me just
how influential membership in FESCI can be. Some of their members have risen to
become president of the National Assembly, Minister of Youth and Sports; some of them
have been tried for crimes against humanity and others have been president of the
country. It is a sordid path to greatness, but a path nevertheless. It is no wonder many
young people are drawn to the organisation and the allure of grandeur. I wanted to better
understand what Siaba meant by the sense of identity and personality that FESCI
provided. Was it an identity and personality seeped in the allure of grandeur or in service
to community? Here is what Siaba had to say:
SIABA: Oui, oui, pour moi, oui. Parce que quand vous voyez le paysage politique
des organisations de jeunesse, vous verrez que ce sont tous des gars de la FESCI,
que vous parliez de ceux du PDCI, du RDR ou du FPI, de l'UDPCI, ce sont tous
des gars qui ont rejoint la FESCI, cette organisation de jeunesse avec des
tendances politiques. Donc, oui, la FESCI a joué un rôle dans leur
autodétermination. La FESCI a permis aux jeunes Ivoiriens d'avoir une identité
certaine / spécifique, d'avoir une personnalité. Avant de rejoindre la FESCI, ils
viennent dire qu'ils veulent cultiver ou travailler leur personnalité / identité, par
exemple, comment s'adresser à une assemblée, parler en public, comment, avant
tout cela, juste pour devenir mature. Alors oui, il y a une petite partie de la FESCI
qui promeut l'autodétermination, et elle a joué un grand rôle (2018).
--SIABA: Yes, Yes, for me, yes. Because when you see the political landscape of
youth organizations, you will see these were all FESCI guys, whether you talk
about those in PDCI, RDR, or FPI, UDPCI, these were all guys who joined
FESCI, this youth organization with political leanings. So, yeah, FESCI played a
role in their self-determination. FESCI allowed for young Ivorians to have a
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certain/specific identity, to have a personality. Before, they join FESCI they come
saying that they want to cultivate or work on their personality/identity, for
example, how to address an assembly, public speaking, how to, before all that,
just to become mature. So yeah, there is a little part of FESCI that promotes selfdetermination, and it has played a big role (2018).
Was this self-determination a result of FESCI or its political affiliation? What did
it mean, then, when they brought up the concept of ivoirien nouveau? Was it all in
practice to govern or to work for the community? Were those things mutually exclusive?
Trying to understand FESCI’s leadership and identity formation was difficult when
attempting to reconcile its past. It did not help that when it came to leadership and
training, politics seemed to color the conversation. Whereas YEM members were quick
to distance themselves from politics, FESCI still struggled. While on the one hand they
railed against the leadership for perpetuating the status quo, on the other hand, their most
influential leaders were members of the government whose methods they seemed to have
adopted.
ANGRA:… Nous sommes en Afrique, tout commence par la politique,
aujourd’hui, à part le président Félix Houphouët BOIGNY, le président GUEI
Robert, je peux dire que tous les présidents qui ont succédé ont milité à la FESCI.
D’abord quand tu rentres à la FESCI,tu as, c’est comme…Tu es protégé et ça te
permet de prendre la parole en devant tes amis, d’être responsable parce que si tu
vas faire lancer une information en amphi, tu vois, tu es confronté à plusieurs
regards, donc, donc du coup , déjà ça te motive .Bon, aussi la FESCI, par
exemple, je peux citer comme le président Laurent GBAGBO qui était l’un de
leader de la FESCI, Monsieur Charles Blé GOUDÉ, SORO Guillaume, et plein
d’autres..., tout ceux-là ont milité à la FESCI (2018).
--ANGRA: ...We are in Africa, it all starts with politics, today, besides President
Félix Houphouët BOIGNY, President GUEI Robert, I can say that all the
successive presidents were FESCI activists. First when you join FESCI, you have,
it's like… You are protected and it allows you to speak in front of your friends, to
be responsible because if you are going to relay information in the amphitheater,
you see, you are confronted in several respects, therefore...that already motivates
you. Well, also FESCI, for example, I can say like President Laurent GBAGBO
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who was one of the leaders of FESCI, Mr. Charles Blé GOUDÉ, SORO
Guillaume, and many others..., all of them were Fescists (2018).
Just as Angra (2018) mentioned earlier, FESCI was like a family and when you
were in the family, there was a sense of protection and safety. One felt emboldened to
speak in front of a large group of students, to protest the administration, to demand from
leadership, and to challenge. This was the new Ivorian that FESCI supported, one that
both fought for students rights and yet hindered their progression. Though the
participants I spoke with tried to tell me that FESCI was changing, when I would probe
further, it was revealed to me that change was hard to come by when the status quo was
so lucrative.
FESCI has experienced a contentious past and is still trying to reconcile its image
today. Though there have been documented gains made, the organization is still
struggling with its identity. Are they a student movement working for students’ rights, or
are they a recruiting entity for political organizations? Had I been played by their words
of change and liberation? Moreover, whose liberation were they fighting for and from
what?
Conversely, leadership, language and identity form the basis of YEM’s Hip-Hop
pedagogy as a means of engaging young people throughout Senegal and sub-Saharan
Africa. Championing Hip-Hop culture and advocating its dominant ideal of knowledge of
self, “overstanding,” and keepin it real, YEM embraces an authentic engagement that
celebrates Wolof, a new type of Senegalese, and an understanding of ownership.
Recognizing their colonial past and continuous colonial reliance, YEM is clear that they
favor true ownership of Senegal and Senegalese resources. In so doing, their panafrican
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ideal, similarly upheld by the Universal Zulu Nation, is a means to “build” a new Africa,
or as Césaire (1939) imagined a cultural bridge, and Adjirakor (2017) calls the “African
City.” This is an Africa that is not traced by arbitrary colonial borders, nor is it
linguistically manipulated or economically dependent.
Concluding Discussion
When considering the ways in which FESCI and YEM have used Hip-Hop to
organize and engage young people, what we see is an ideology that centers authenticity
and ownership in their promotion of leadership, identity formation, and linguistic
expression. Hip-Hop is about authenticity, keepin it real and “being true to the local.”
This idea of authenticity, Magro (2016) argues, “is linked to specific linguistic varieties”
and thus, “membership in a global community of style may have as much to do with
ideologies of language and transidiomatic practices” as it does with local musical, artistic,
and linguistic forms (p. 18).
Within this ideology of authenticity, the two organizations diverge in how they
convey their message. Both organizations maintain they are influenced by the likes of
Sankara, Lumumba, and Nkrumah, but how they embody these ideals vastly differs.
YEM is vocally apolitical, nonviolent and embodies a conscious Hip-Hop; an old school
concept many adherents fear has been sidelined. FESCI claims to be apolitical and
nonviolent but their history and current state of affairs bring that into question. Their
form of engagement takes on political leanings, infuses Zouglou, and is laced with a bit
of quid pro quo to ease action. And yet, young people are drawn to both these
organizations in much the same way. YEM and FESCI fight for young people and
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confront injustice, yet one promotes consciousness and panafricanism, the other promises
a seat in government. Both have achieved results in varying ways.
In examining YEM and FESCI and their use of Hip-Hop as a pedagogical tool for
engagement, educators and policymakers must contend with the macro and micro queries
that inform local, lived experiences of Africa’s most powerful demographic, young
people. What then, can the education and political sector offer to promote peace
education, counter extremism, and advance civic engagement? In looking at its appeal,
transformative nature, and engaging aspect, a critical Hip-Hop pedagogy may be an
answer. Why? As we have seen Hip-Hop pedagogy builds on Touré’s (forthcoming)
transnégritude and Mignolo’s (2003; 2009) epistemic disobedience. It considers the lived
experiences of those coming from a shared struggle, it affirms and weaponizes Blackness
and authentic Ivorian or Senegalese expressions as tools for resistance, and finally, it
forefronts Ivorian/Senegalese ways of knowing, promotes leadership and identity
formation.
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CHAPTER 7
SLAP THEM UP: CONCLUSION
Introduction
The greatest threat to political stability, security, and economic growth in West
Africa is ignoring the valuable asset that is young people. Research expounds on the lack
of opportunities for youth, who are disillusioned, idle and left to question the benefits of
gaining an education (Abbink, 2005; Gavin, 2007; Gow & Dijxhoorn, 2013). Due to
limited resources, students have few options upon leaving school. Senegalese journalist
and organizer Fadel Barro framed this dilemma as, “Y’en a Marre or Boko Haram,” civic
organizing or radical extremism.8 Though often we tend to hear of an “easily duped”
youth population (Lambert, 2016), what this study has shown is that young people
“struggling against the neo-colonial stage of imperialism” have chosen to mobilize and
engage in an authentic, Hip-Hop pedagogy that espouses leadership and transformation.
Consider for example, the recent release of the African Youth Survey (2020)
which, despite recognizing the challenges young people face on the continent, noticed a
“trend of ‘Afro-optimism’ among young people in Africa” (Kazeem, 2020; AYS, 2020).
The study found that young people of today are “self-starters, pan-African, digital and
media savvy, tolerant but mindful of the challenges that could blight their ‘African
Century,’ such as corruption, the lack of new jobs, limited start-up capital, water scarcity,
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fake news, terrorism and poor education systems” (AYS, 2020). This “Afro-optimism” as
described by the survey is “driven by a strong sense of individual responsibility,
entrepreneurship and confidence in an African identity” (Kazeem, 2020; AYS, 2020).
The influence and notoriety of organizations such as Y’en a Marre and FESCI, illustrate
the impact of a critical Hip-Hop pedagogy delinking from neocolonial realities, and
promoting a new shared identity that encourages leadership and autonomy.
Summary of key findings
When considering the ways in which FESCI and YEM have used Hip-Hop to
organize and engage young people, what we see is the shared experience of lost,
abandoned, or sacrificed young people who adopted a cultural expression and aesthetic
to challenge their circumstances. In doing so, Hip-Hop has become not only a vehicle of
expression but an educative tool that challenges schooling, encourages socialization and
citizenship building; promotes authenticity and employs that sentiment and praxis
through language, identity formation, and leadership training. Through pedagogic
concerts, workshops, and music, young people in Abidjan and Dakar are creating spaces
of autonomy and engagement that speaks to the delinking notions of Mignolo’s (2009)
epistemic disobedience and the “multiple roots [of Blackness]...articulating conditions of
people trapped in errant circuits,” that Touré (forthcoming) puts forth as transnégritude.
As we appreciate the dynamic and divulging ways in which FESCI and Y’en a
Marre were created, my investigation illustrated the varied ways in which FESCI and
YEM are caught within, what Ngugi (1980) calls the struggles against the neocolonial
stage of imperialism. These two organizations represent a generation of young people
who are considered lost, sacrificed, and/ or abandoned (Schumann, 2012; Appert, 2016;
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Lambert, 2016). These young people were let down by the political and socioeconomic
consequences of neoliberal agendas that saw a decrease in public spending leading to the
deterioration in the standard of living (Schumann, 2012; Lambert, 2016; HRW, 2008).
FESCI and YEM grew as a challenge to these broken promises, as a counter to the old
political system and a schooling alternative whose graduates have been formidable.
Through their adoption of a critical Hip-Hop pedagogy FESCI and YEM have
engendered an identity and consciousness that is authentically Ivorian or Senegalese.
YEM and FESCI approach Hip-Hop and Zouglou in much the same way; birthed from a
shared struggle and voicelessness (Gueye, 2013; Lambert, 2016; HRW Report, 2008;
Clark 2018; Haupt, 2008). Hip-Hop is adopted and remixed to suit cultural contexts and
becomes a tool of expression and mobilization through Wolof in Dakar and Nouchi in
Abidjan. Through pedagogic concerts, workshops, and social media YEM and FESCI
challenge the concepts of school and its purposes (Jenkins, 2013; Seidel, 2011;
McMannon, 1997). Given their global reach, these two organizations provide a panAfrican outlook albeit diverging approaches to the conditions of young people throughout
the continent (Hie, 2018; Fadel, 2018). Clark (2018), Pennycook et al., (2009), and
Chang (2006) speak of the transversal relationship of Hip-Hop in Africa and in the U.S.,
a connection that has crossed oceans and influenced a “global African population (Clark,
2018, p. 9; Chang and DJ Kool Herc, 2005).
Keeping in mind Touré’s (forthcoming) transnégritude and his notion of the
“multiple roots” of Black identities and expressions, what we see in the utility of HipHop as pedagogy when utilized by YEM and FESCI is a call for linguistic, social, and
leadership autonomy that speaks to the neocolonial struggles they must navigate within
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this current stage of imperialism (Ngugi, 1980). The multiple roots of identity,
sociopolitical context, music, and language are “concomitantly deconstruct[ed] and
reenacts the ongoing co-construction of an ostracized self and fearless other” (Touré,
forthcoming, Mignolo, 2009).
Theoretical and methodological implications
Throughout this essay I employed Touré’s (forthcoming) concept of
transnégritude and Vavrus and Bartlett’s (2017) Comparative Case Study (CCS)
methodology. In doing so, I wanted to recognize the fluidity and multiscalar approach in
conducting a wide, complex, and intersecting research study. For this study,
transnégritude, “echoes the notion of transversality of négritude...the temporal
(transgenerational) for one and the spatial for the other,” and as such provides an
extensive analysis of young people navigating postcolonial diasporic realities (Touré, p.
15). Hip-Hop as a transnégritude concept then falls not only within diasporic narratives
but clearly possesses multiple roots and identities as manifested in culturally specific
contexts. Vavrus and Bartlett (2017) recognize comparative case study’s fluidity and its
inability to be boxed in. As noted, they speak to falling into the “transversal” to reckon
with all aspects of the study and recognize the macro; the sociopolitical contexts of
Abidjan and Dakar, the glocal, and how Hip-Hop is approached by YEM and FESCI, and
micro; its employment as a tool for socialization, identity formation, leadership, and
linguistic autonomy.
This study therefore provides researchers with a larger theoretical and
methodological framework in the fields of critical research, Hip-Hop pedagogy,
development studies and comparative education. At its core, this investigation considers
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how young people can and should influence policies on education and social change.
Accordingly, we must take on a holistic or what Vavrus and Bartlett (2017) call a
“multiscalar” approach to the policy process that considers power, human agency,
culture, and social structures (Shah, 2011).
The use of transnégritude, civic education, epistemic disobedience, and
comparative case study allows us to consider how these multiscalar processes interact,
change, and reproduce society so that we can better examine the lived experiences of
young people and link them to larger social structures. The differences I highlight as to
how YEM and FESCI choose to mobilize and engage is emblematic of Ngugi’s (1980,
1987) sociopolitical discourse on decolonial struggles as he clearly highlights in Devil on
the Cross and vividly details in Decolonizing the Mind. The lure of political power,
financial gain, and renown while ensuring international financial support is highlighted
and nuanced through YEM and FESCI as they promote their mission and goals.
Policy implications
Citizenship education has become an important feature for many countries, it is
viewed as an “opportunity to begin preparing young people for their understanding of,
and involvement in, the civic life of their community” (Evans, 2007, p. 272). When it
comes to policy implications, we must consider not only the opportunity source that is
young people, but also forefront their epistemologies, recognize their lived realities and
be sensitive to their goals. It is necessary to understand sociopolitical and economic
variances within Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the ways in which this impacts
young people. Though current policies highlight holistic approaches to promoting peace,
citizenship, or countering violent extremist education, they tend to overlook the voices of
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the young people they are seeking to develop and moreover, diminish their optimism.
During my time as an intern at UNESCO, I often worked on projects and workshops that
aimed to promote the organization’s Sustainable Development Goals and the Global
Citizenship Education campaign. We worked with prestigious institutions in the U.S. to
develop curricula that would promote peace education, collaborated with international
and local consultants and met with various ministries. What was missing, usually, was the
active participation of young people and/or organizations who could address, challenge,
and benefit from these policies.
Evans (2007) approaches the study of citizenship education from a
“worldmindedness and holistic understanding, multiple and cosmopolitan citizenship, and
action for justice (p. 277-279). This is a point he hopes will entice those working in
International Development Agencies, Non-governmental Organizations, and other
agencies/organizations to view young people as an opportunity source who are “taking on
the work that governments and social institutions are meant to do without adequate
resources but with great creativity (Strong, 2020 as quoted in Kazeem, 2020).
As such, it is imperative we forefront the voices and experiences of youth and
activists as one of the tools to determine policy changes and international aid. We should,
as Bishop (2011) says, position our approach to policy to “operationalize selfdetermination,” to encourage optimism, leadership, and entrepreneurship (p. 21). This is
necessary if we are to consider how these “diasporic educational spaces” disrupt notions
of identity and provide spaces for counter-narratives and knowledge-making that go
beyond accepted norms (Shirazi, 2019). Engaging with processes of identification and
civic education in west Africa provides nuance to the field of comparative and
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international education and may provide a glimpse to understand how “educational
practices and spaces are implicated in articulating” identification, belonging and agency
(Shirazi, 2019, p. 498).
Civic education, in the context of the global South, is more about “the right to
have rights” rather than about individual rights, which may produce uneven outcomes but
can also build “crucial practices of resistance” to unresponsive states (Lieres, 2014, p.
49). Citizen action, Lieres continues, speaks to those moments whereby people mobilize
to confront the state not as individuals but as ‘rights-demanding citizens with public
claims” (p. 50). This form of engagement as illustrated by YEM and FESCI is rarely
straightforward and its efficacy is never guaranteed. As I noted in Chapter 2,
organizations such as YEM and FESCI face a “possible disjuncture” between the
practices of democracy and advocacy and the realities of clientelism, patronage and
authoritarian politics (p. 52). This forces us to consider the ways in which YEM and
FESCI navigated these very real challenges.
Through the lens of Hip-Hop, we can consider how YEM and FESCI face the
dichotomy between democracy and clientelism. Pennycook (2007), acknowledges that
the Hip-Hop concept of “keepin’ it real” represents the “quest for the coalescence and
interface of ever-shifting art, politics, representation, performance and individual
accountability that reflects all aspects of youth experience” (p. 103). Pennycook views
authenticity as a “dialogical engagement” with the community. Authenticity, Pennycook
surmises, cannot be defined without the relational social context, moreover, authenticity
goes beyond the self and instead is about “being true to ourselves, is recovering our own
‘sentiment de l’existence’ then perhaps we can only achieve it integrally if we recognize

204

that this sentiment connects us to a wider whole” (p. 103). Within the global context,
civic education and keepin’ it real is about defining the Self while recognizing and
understanding the relationship of the Self to the larger context (p. 104). Through this lens
of consciousness, self-determination and autonomy, developing tangible and pertinent
policies that center young people can be a powerful tool.
Programmatic implications
This analysis hopes to contribute to programs that highlight youth empowerment,
peace education, and alternative schooling when developing policies and programs on
youth education. Acknowledging the role young people play in the evolution and
reconstruction of their communities engenders a consideration of their impact vis-à-vis
international development. Take for example UNESCO’s (2019) report on
“Strengthening the rule of law through education: a guide for policymakers,” which was
developed to assist policymakers and educational professionals in developing policies
and programs that promote the rule of law through education and to fill the knowledge
gap between the education and international sectors. As a result, the guide attempts to
provide opportunities for the education sector to “leverage its transformational power” to
encourage and support young people to be positive, active members of society (p. 9).
The role of education within international development challenges us to consider
the purpose of schooling and development. The UNESCO (2019) report calls for a
holistic and inclusive approach to encourage teachers, parents, cultural leaders,
government institutions, etc., to encourage engagement and understanding of the rule of
law and other human rights endeavors. What an engaged pedagogy such as Hip-Hop can
do is provide the tools for self-actualization and consciousness raising, which can have
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dramatic impact for a disenfranchised yet optimistic youth population. This is crucial if
we are to implement educational initiatives in regions to curtail the influence of
extremism and instead engage young people to be an effective population in fighting for
political and economic stability. The global movement towards citizenship education
carries with it important comparative lessons, first, it brings with it a transnational,
alternative educational thought. And, this transnational alternative educational discourse
contributes to the evolving discussions of democratic education and engagement
(Levinson, 2005, p. 337).
Limitations and recommendations for future research
This analysis contributes to discussions centering Hip-Hop pedagogy,
comparative studies, and youth engagement in West Africa. However, given the scope
and diversity of subjects, I recognize the limitations in this study. Moving forward, my
goal is to further develop discussions on women and their role in YEM and FESCI,
student perceptions of these organizations, and nuances between Hip-Hop and Zouglou.
Given that YEM and FESCI are mostly male dominated organizations, I naively
did not anticipate the role of women in these organizations and their impact. My goal is
to further delve into the role of women in these organizations and provide a comparative
analysis of their seeming invisibility yet prowess, much like women in the civil rights
movements. Why?
When I brought up the role of women in Y’en a Marre or FESCI, our
conversations further cemented the ways in which Hip-Hop culture is still contending
with how to recognize and validate women. Our discussions further challenged how HipHop is viewed as both oppressive and empowering (Petchauer, 2009; Rose, 1994).
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Women within these organizations occupied a very interesting role. There were very few
women in the core leadership of YEM, but many were involved in the esprits, local
branches throughout the country. When I probed further, I was told that this was due to
the “African mentality” that still relegates women to the household, but, Sophie, would
state, things are changing. She continues:
Sophie : ….c’est la…, non c’est,
ça c’est la mentalité africaine.
C’est carrément africain, parce
qu’en Afrique, les femmes, c’est
au foyer, la cuisine, le ménage,
les enfants, et ce sont les
hommes qui vont au boulot, qui
ont le droit de dire ceci, qui ont
le droit de voilà, crier leur râle
bole et tout, la femme elle est
soumise. C’est ç la mentalité
africaine, mais on voit que, au fil
du temps, on voit qu’il y a un
réel changement, on voit des
femmes qui s’activent de plus en
plus, qui sont au-devant de la
scène, qui prennent des décisions
et tout ça ….je crois qu’il y a un
réel changement … (2018).

Sophie: .... this is the ..., no it is,
this is the African mentality. It's
downright African, because in
Africa, women are at home,
cooking, cleaning, children, and
it's men who go to work, who
have the right to say this, who
have here it is, shouting their
groans and everything, the
woman is submissive. This is the
African mentality, but we see
that, over time, we see that there
is a real change, we see women
who are getting more and more
active, who are at the forefront ,
who make decisions and all
that…. I believe there is a real
change… (2018).

When I asked about the role of women in YEM, participants were quick to
mention that they recognized this “weakness” but stated that this was due to “sociological
factors.” Fadel told me, “What is certain is that for me the participation of women in
public action is one of the great weaknesses of our societies. There is no exception. It’s a
great weakness, you have to recognize it and work on it. But it is also linked to several
sociological factors…” (Fadel, 2018). Sophie reiterated this and went further noting that
the nature of their organization; the protests, the perceived aggression, parents did not
want their daughters associated with this. Moriba and Sophie argue further that this is due
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in part to sociological factors that perpetuate the submissive role of women (Moriba,
2018; Sophie, 2018; Fadel, 2018). YEM has tried to boost women in leadership roles-Sophie, Fadel added, was too shy and chose to stay in the background--but they actively
wanted to change this. At FESCI, the narrative was a bit more complex.
When I attended FESCI’s General Assembly, I often saw a group of women
sitting together, at times equally vocal other times sitting calmly looking on. They were
known as “amazons,” by Fescists and they were FESCI’s female “soldiers,” who bring a
“gentle and kind” approach to their activism (Siaba, 2018). Siaba and Angra both spoke
to me about Amazons and their essential role in FESCI. But, whenever I tried to approach
them or interview them, I was told I had to go through FESCI’s leadership to get access
to them. After several attempts, my access to the amazons proved to be unsuccessful.
This made me question just how autonomous and vocal these women really were.
According to Angra, amazons also organized activities and utilized their position in
FESCI to report any unwanted “male coercion” (Angra, 2018). FESCI may have been
proud of their female representation but given their barred access, I was left to mull over
Sophie’s words on the current accepted roles for women.
SIABA: Il faut dire que les amazones sont un bras militant de la FESCI. Oui,
outre le fait que ce sont des femmes, c'est pourquoi nous les appelons des
amazones, il n'y a pas de différence entre ce qu'elles font et les hommes. Ouais.
Avec les Amazones, vous savez que partout où il y a une femme, il y aura une
touche de douceur / gentillesse, l'approche sera différente. On peut dire que les
hommes sont violents, mais quand vous venez, vous vous approchez d'une femme
membre de la FESCI cela vous fera un peu hausser les sourcils. Oui, donc il y a
des filles qui jouent un rôle important. En fait, cela a donné aux gens une autre
impression de la FESCI, une autre impression...(2018).
--SIABA: It should be said that the amazons they are a militant arm of FESCI.
Yeah, besides the fact that they are women, which is why we call them amazons,
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there is no difference between what they do and the men. Yeah. With the
Amazons, you know that wherever there is a woman, there will be a touch of
gentleness/kindness, the approach will be different. We can say that men are
violent, but when you come, you approach a woman who is a member of FESCI it
will make you raise your eyebrow a little bit. Yeah, so there are girls who are,
who play an important role. In fact, it gave people another impression of FESCI,
another impression…(2018).
The differences in engagement between these two groups exemplifies the
contradictions inherent within Hip-Hop culture. In her seminal work on Hip-Hop culture,
Tricia Rose (1994), presented the dichotomy of these “prophets of rage” who were at
once marginalized, oppositional, and soldiers of social justice and also vulnerable to
reiterating the eurocentrism, patriarchy, and sexism they are working against (Kun, 2002;
Rose, 1994). This is made explicit when we look at the ways in which FESCI and YEM
approach women and politics.
As much as FESCI members spoke of political autonomy, nonviolence, and
women empowerment, they also revealed that their desire for autonomy conflicted with
their political aspirations and the benefits they received as allies with political parties.
Women in FESCI were relegated to the sidelines, confined to traditional gender roles.
YEM, weary of “political games” was adamantly apolitical, nonviolent, and worked to
promote gender equality. Though they may not have reached gender parity, their ongoing
projects and protests, demonstrate their commitments to social consciousness and
economic emancipation.
Moving forward, I wish to problematize Hip-Hop’s dichotomy as an engine for
engagement and social justice but also a culture that marginalizes, deletes and
mischaracterizes women’s role in black cultural production (Rose, 1994). Though as
Davis (1990) asserts that any attempt to understand the “evolution of women’s
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consciousness within the Black community requires a serious examination of the music
which has influenced them--particularly that which they themselves have created”
(Davis, 1990, as quoted in Rose 1994, p. 153). One can surmise that women were not
only present but also made significant and meaningful contribution to the
conceptualization and mobilization of these organizations, as university students on
campus, at the genesis of Zouglou and FESCI much like Sophie was hanging with Fadel
and who would later become the founding members of Y’en a Marre. And still, women’s
presence in both these organizations is minimal and their impact yet to be felt. When
evoking the notions of “keepin’ it real,” Low et al., (2013) accepted the limitations within
the “discourse of authenticity” among their case study. Utilizing Henry Louis Gates’
(1988) “trope of signifying,” Low et al., reconcile Hip-Hop’s ironic and satirical style to
“celebrate the multiplicity and even chaos of meaning making” to further complicate the
“notion of a static, knowable ‘real’” (Low et al., 2013, p. 133). Challenging and
dissecting the multilayered approaches to Hip-Hop, women, and engagement in West
Africa is crucial as we further understand this opportunity source.
Bearing in mind that FESCI and YEM are both young organizations, it is
necessary to also consider perceptions of university students in general, especially those
at Université Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD) and Université félix Houphouët-Boigny
(UFHB), on YEM or FESCI, their approaches to Hip-Hop and/or Zouglou, and their lived
experiences as it relates to the socioeconomic and political dynamics explained to me by
Fescists and Yenamarristes. Clark (2018) considers the intersections between Hip-Hop
and the migrant experiences of Africans in the diaspora. These are avenues I hope to
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follow as I situate this discussion within the larger scope of comparative studies, Hip-Hop
pedagogy, international development and education policies.
Final thoughts
A nuanced qualitative study of any group of people will always leave us with
more questions than answers, more problems than solutions, and more frustrations than
contentment. This is the struggle within the Comparative Case Study and a broad
research that seeks to interpret the lived experiences of people through a critical Hip-Hop
pedagogy. However, what this study has attempted to illustrate is that Hip-Hop pedagogy
has engendered a sense of identity, ownership and leadership that cannot be stifled. We
should consider the contributions of this young cultural expression just as we should
elevate the conditions and resources of young people in West Africa who, despite grim
statistics concerning population growth and infrastructure and policy development,
remain “bullish” about their own prospects (Kazeem, 2020). Their time is now. Why not
hear them out?
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